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ABSTRACT 
The challenges of the broadband divide between rural and urban areas, 
and the demand for access spectrum exceeding the available supply, 
require regulators to rethink their approaches to spectrum regulation. 
Traditional spectrum management mechanisms resulted in artificial 
spectrum scarcity and hoarding whilst operators ignored their universal 
service obligations. This research report uses the regulatory impact 
assessment methodology to investigate what the proposed market-based 
spectrum licensing models of wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum park mean and the impact such regulatory approaches would 
have on the communications industry and technology progression.  
The findings of this research indicate that the wholesale open access and 
managed park are new concepts and were not well defined thus as a 
result are not well understood within the industry. The different 
stakeholders have different interpretations that suit and benefit their own 
organisations. The regulator does not have spectrum strategy that acts as 
a guide in achieving a digital country. There is no guiding document that 
promotes compliance for the relevant stakeholders to roll out broadband 
networks for next generation e-services.  
The „artificial‟ interdependence between policy-maker and regulator‟s 
mandates has created a vacuum where all the industry players manipulate 
both institutions in order to advance their commercial business interests. 
Yet, regulatory failure has negative consequences for technology 
progression. ICASA‟s lack of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) studies 
worsens the situation as the 2011 proposed spectrum licensing models 
were never investigated before being introduced.  
The conclusions of this research indicate that for greater broadband 
inclusivity, a hybrid of traditional spectrum management approaches with 
market-based models should be employed. The regulator needs to make 
RIA a permanent process in decision making to minimise possibilities of 
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litigation and regulatory capture. This will make it easier to implement new 
regulations and make decisions from an informed position. Incumbents 
have existing infrastructure, capital and technical expertise and it is up to 
the regulator to decide whether they can be used as enablers or 
considered obstacles for faster broadband rollout. 
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CHAPTER 1: The strengths and weaknesses of spectrum regulation 
for broadband in South Africa 
This chapter introduces the research topic and the place where the study 
will take place. It will give general information on the environment being 
studied; introduce the research problem, the purpose statement and the 
research questions. 
1.1 ICASA’s 2011 spectrum licensing models for broadband 
This report seeks to conduct research about advantages and 
disadvantages of the spectrum licensing models (wholesale open access 
and managed spectrum parks) proposed by ICASA in the published draft 
spectrum assignment plan (draft regulations) in 2011, (ICASA, 2011b). It 
strives to find out what would be the best way for licensing spectrum 
where demand exceeds supply whilst encouraging competition and at the 
same time introducing new markets, giving access to new entrants, 
allowing technology progress and ensuring broadband rural connectivity 
for all. It also attempts to understand the definition and the broader 
meaning of the proposed spectrum licensing models and what impact they 
will have on the communications industry as a whole. By so doing, it would 
be possible to critically and analytically comment on ICASA‟s proposed 
spectrum regulation. 
There are a number of other issues raised in the proposed draft regulation, 
new concepts, principles and obligations introduced but which  are not 
thoroughly explained for example, “successful applicants are expected to 
provide broadband services in line with IMT framework as defined by the 
ITU” and how some incumbent operators got additional assignments 
without following any process. This makes room for regulatory impact 
assessment to be done on the entire regulation. This research report, 
however, will only focus on the spectrum licensing models proposed. The 
IMT spectrum (spectrum earmarked for broadband) will be referred to as 
high demand, last mile or access spectrum.
  1.2 Population and broadband access 
South Africa has a population of 52.98 million, (mid-year estimate) 
(StatsSA, 2013). According to the World Bank (2012), “South Africa is an 
upper middle income economy”. It has the largest economy in Africa and 
is ranked 41st overall in terms of ease of doing business in the world 
(World Bank, 2013) with a nominal GDP of $384.3 billion (World Bank, 
2012). Just less than a quarter of the population is unemployed, 24.1% 
(StatsSA, 2013). One of the objectives of the proposed spectrum licensing 
models is to address lack of broadband connectivity because broadband is 
believed to contribute positively in job creation not only within the 
communications sector but has positive ripple effect that overspills into 
other sectors as well. Qiang, Rossotto & Kimura (2009, p45) claim and 
confirms that “growth benefit that broadband provides for developing 
countries was of similar magnitude as …[in] developed economies - about 
a 1.38 percentage increase for each 10 per cent increase in [broadband] 
penetration. Such investments in broadband infrastructure have spill-over 
effects and increases payoffs in other sectors”. From a broader economic, 
efficiency and governmental point of view, broadband will assist 
government in delivering critical services faster and more efficiently to the 
people. Being able to place an order for agricultural services, provide 
traditional clothing online from a rural area (e-commerce), request 
assistance for municipal/government services (e-government services) 
and appoint an expert teacher from the urban area to give a lecture on a 
particular subject to a rural school (e-education) all become possible when 
broadband connectivity is a reality for all.  
It has been more than 18 years since democracy but the state of 
communications in South Africa still reflects its history of apartheid to a 
larger extent, (Limpitlaw, 2009). For example, the communications sector 
and infrastructure in South Africa is highly developed in certain parts of the 
country e.g. the major metropolitan areas (Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
Durban, the golden triangle) yet almost non-existent in some areas such 
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as the villages in Limpopo and Eastern Cape, resulting in a digital divide 
and in particular a broadband divide between urban and rural areas. The 
sad reality is that even in those major metropolitan areas, the state of 3G 
in some suburbs leaves much to be desired as it becomes a struggle to 
get continuous connection let alone reasonable speeds. It is unfortunate 
that in recent years the number of fixed lines also started declining. 
TechCentral (2013) reported that there are currently approximately “3.8 
million fixed lines after slumping to 4 million fixed lines a year ago“, with 
the majority in urban areas contributing negatively to fixed broadband 
penetration growth especially in rural areas. “The number of broadband 
digital subscriber lines in service has increased by only 5.2 % to 870 000 
lines”, (TechCentral, 2013).  
Figure 1 below depicts the level of ADSL penetration with darker colours 
showing areas with more telephone lines and therefore some level of 
ADSL.                            
Figure 1: The level of fixed broadband in South Africa 
 
Source: www.broadbandstats.co.za 
Considering the limited number of existing fixed lines, and taking into 
consideration the geographic mobile coverage which is believed to be 
closer to 100%, it can be concluded that the vision of „broadband 
connectivity for all‟ will be achieved mainly through wireless and mobile 
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technologies. There are limitations though to mobile broadband in South 
Africa due to limited bandwidth availability and the number of licensed 
IECNS and IECS operators „qualifying‟ to apply for the available high 
demand spectrum. In terms of the standard terms and conditions for 
IECNS licences‟ regulations of 2010, the IECNS licence gives right to the 
licensee to “construct, operate and maintain an ECN as well as provide an 
ECNS in the licence area”, (ICASA, 2010b). Also the standard terms and 
conditions for IECS licences‟ regulations of 2010 gives right to IECS 
licensee to “provide ECS by means of an ECN operated by ECNS 
licensee or a licence-exempt PECN operator.  This suggests that all the 
licensed IECNS and IECS licensees can apply („qualify‟ to apply) for the 
available high demand spectrum. What this means is that government 
might have to consider including a mix of fixed (fibre) and wireless with 
mobile technologies or even satellite as part of its broadband strategy. 
ICASA spectrum licensing models are proposed to assist the new smaller 
operators to gain access to high demand spectrum introducing more 
competition and changing the market whilst also introducing obligations to 
connect certain percentages of the population and geography (excluding 
the big metropolitan areas) to address the digital and broadband divides.  
The migration to digital technologies and the convergence of technologies 
required countries to reconsider and align themselves with a converged 
regime in order to be able to regulate accordingly. In 2002 a converged 
regulator was formed by the merger between the then telecommunications 
regulator, SATRA and the broadcasting regulator, IBA. Convergence 
legislation repealed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Independent 
Broadcasting Act of 1993 and certain sections of the Broadcasting Act of 
1999 through the introduction of the Electronic Communications Act (ECA 
or EC Act) promulgated in 2005. The objective was to create a licensing 
regime that encourages horizontally integrated networks which makes it 
easier for all operators to provide converged services or even share 
networks wherever possible. The promulgation of the Electronic 
Communications Act however, did more than that, disrupting the Minister‟s 
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managed liberalisation policy of waiting for the invitation to apply from the 
Minister before any new Individual Electronic Communications Network 
licensee could be licensed. The then VANS operator Altech took ICASA 
and the Minister of Communications to court and the so-called Altech-
Autopage v ICASA, Minister court ruling resulted in approximately 400+ 
operators being converted to either Individual or Class Electronic 
Communications Network Service (ECNS) and Electronic Communications 
Service (ECS) licensees. These operators need access to high demand 
spectrum for them to be competitive and to be able to provide efficient 
services. Given this dilemma faced by ICASA in fulfilling its mandate 
where there are more operators than the available high demand spectrum, 
the proposed spectrum licensing models are „considered mechanisms to 
encourage spectrum and network sharing, ensuring efficient use of 
spectrum which in effect ensures sharing of spectrum and network costs‟.  
It is yet to be seen whether ICASA will be able to achieve some of its 
goals and government objectives and bring about positive change to the 
communications industry by introducing these models. 
1.3 ICASA’s mandate regarding spectrum regulation 
In terms of section 4(3)(c) and (e) of the ICASA Act of 2000, ICASA “must 
manage the radio frequency spectrum in accordance with bilateral 
agreements or international treaties entered into by the Republic”, and 
“must grant, amend, renew, transfer and revoke licences” including 
spectrum licences. The EC Act of 2005 gives ICASA authority to make 
regulations regarding the different licences and the use of radio frequency 
spectrum.  Some of ICASA‟s objects are to “ensure efficient [and effective] 
use of the radio frequency spectrum”, regulate the markets, promote 
competition, encourage innovation, and promote universal provision of 
electronic communications networks and services and hereby ensuring 
connectivity for all. ICASA‟s aims by introducing the 2011 spectrum 
licensing models were to address the need for spectrum efficiency, 
spectrum markets, competition and broadband connectivity for all. It is in 
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the interest of South Africa to discourage network duplication at all levels 
especially in rural areas to ensure that communications‟ costs are kept at 
a minimum. Section 31(3) of the EC Act mandates ICASA to “prescribe 
procedures and criteria for awarding radio frequency spectrum licences for 
competing applications or [in] instances where there is insufficient 
spectrum available to accommodate demand”. However, it is not clear 
whether the wholesale open access and managed spectrum park 
approaches to spectrum regulation are the most appropriate means to 
achieve these aims.  
1.4 The industry’s reaction on the proposed spectrum licensing 
models 
The major operators objected to the introduction of the 2011 spectrum 
licensing models especially the wholesale open access citing various 
concerns. ICASA also did not assist the situation and gave the operators 
more reasons to object as they published the plan only a day after the 
draft policy directive on high demand spectrum was published. Some of 
the concerns raised include exactly that the timing of the publication of the 
spectrum assignment plan and the ITA notwithstanding the fact that 
ICASA does not have to act as per the policy directive but „must consider 
the policy directive‟. Other concerns raised are the limitations in bandwidth 
in the midst of  technology evolution e.g. 4G technologies if the 
incumbents are excluded, the cost of building a network from scratch for 
new operators, the viability of introducing additional operators to the 
market, the viability of the business model of operators operating and 
competing at wholesale level only. Other concerns relate to ICASA using 
regulatory mechanisms to introduce competition instead of allowing 
market forces to dictate and the delays that could be experienced in 
relying on new entrants to build broadband networks especially in rural 
areas. Furthermore, the draft spectrum assignment plan does not make it 
clear how this regulatory approach would contribute to addressing the 
digital and broadband divide. 
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1.5 The status quo in terms of current high demand spectrum 
distribution 
Currently in 2014, there are four mobile operators and two MVNO‟s, two 
fixed-line operators and 400+ IECN/ECS licensees.  
Due to the old traditional spectrum regulatory models e.g. command and 
control, beauty contests, first come first served that gave exclusivity to a 
limited number of operators, the spectrum that has economic value (high 
demand, IMT or access spectrum) is in the hands of few operators i.e. 
MTN, Vodacom, Telkom, Cell C, Neotel and WBS. The bands referred to 
are 800MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz, 2.6 GHz (2600 MHz) and 
3.5 GHz bands. Within the broadcasting sector, Sentech, a state-owned 
signal distributor, was a holder of spectrum licences to some of the high 
demand bands i.e. 2.6 and 3.5 GHz bands and has recently (2013) 
returned this spectrum back to the regulator after the introduction of 
administrative incentive pricing (AIP) model which resulted in high 
spectrum fees. Despite the amount of bandwidth already assigned to the 
operators, the existing level of competition still has failed to reduce prices 
and to address broadband divide hence the proposed alternative spectrum 
licensing models. The challenge is to show how those models will assist in 
achieving the desired objectives. The rest of the spectrum has not yet 
been identified for IMT and hence is not referred to as high demand as is 
available for assignment to a larger extent, e.g. for point to point links and 
other shared services i.e. alarm systems. 
1.5.1 High demand spectrum that could potentially be available for 
licensing 
The remaining high demand spectrum includes the unassigned portions in 
the 2.6 and 3.5 GHz bands and the spectrum that will be released after the 
analogue broadcasting services have switched over to digital 
technologies, „the digital dividend‟, I and II. The 450-470 MHz band is not 
yet available for broadband in South Africa even though it has been 
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identified by ITU for IMT services. WRC 2007 identified the 450-470 MHz 
band for IMT services, (Resolution 224, WRC07). The 2.3 GHz band on 
the other hand was used mainly for fixed links by the then „bulk users‟, i.e. 
Telkom and Transnet amongst others and is one of the frequency bands 
identified for IMT services. The regulator still has to undertake a migration 
process where necessary for all the services occupying IMT identified 
bands which will take years to complete. A frequency migration plan has 
since been finalised and ICASA is proposing to do a feasibility study 
especially in the 450-470 MHz band given the current occupation and 
usage by government and operators like Transnet. The 450-470 MHz 
band is one of the bands of interest due to its propagation characteristics 
which are suitable for rural areas but is unfortunately not yet available for 
assignment as is assumed to be „congested‟. Spectrum monitoring 
conducted by ICASA in the 450-470 MHz band shows that the band is 
underutilised confirming the concept of „artificial‟ spectrum scarcity‟, 
(ICASA, 2010a). This will still have to be further investigated by ICASA 
before any decision is taken.  
1.5.2 Exploring other means to address demand-supply asymmetry 
As part of ensuring spectrum efficiency and managing „artificial spectrum 
scarcity‟, ICASA has started investigating technologies that use white 
spaces to provide broadband services starting with TV white spaces. 
White spaces are those spectrum channels that sit idle in certain areas at 
certain times due to the design of certain networks that can be used by 
other services when not in use without causing interference, e.g. 
broadcasting networks. These use intelligent technologies, the dynamic 
spectrum access or cognitive radios, which hop and detect unused 
channels avoiding occupied channels. “Cognitive radio along with software 
[defined] radio,…, and other emerging technologies can facilitate new 
forms of spectrum sharing that would greatly improve spectral efficiency 
and alleviate scarcity, if spectrum policies are in place that support these 
forms of sharing” (Peha, 2008, p2). The ITU WP5D is further investigating 
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more spectrum bands where IMT technologies could be implemented and 
the findings will be discussed and endorsed (if at all) during the next ITU 
World Radio Conference (WRC) in 2015. 
1.6 The key events in regulating the ‘high demand’ spectrum 
Vodacom and MTN were assigned spectrum in the 900 MHz band as far 
back as 1993 together with their service licences. At the time this 
happened, during a transition period, apartheid-democracy negotiations, 
telecommunications was in a way overlooked, the focus being more on 
broadcasting, such that Vodacom and MTN were licenced in the middle of 
the negotiation period and the ANC “threatened to revoke the licences 
when it came to power”, (Limpitlaw, 2009, p2) which almost collapsed the 
negotiations, probably due to the fact that the process was seen to be 
either flawed or unfair by the new party. When the third mobile operator 
was licenced in 2001, there was not enough bandwidth in the 900 MHz 
band (GSM band) and was assigned spectrum in the 1800 MHz band first. 
The extended GSM (E-GSM) was later cleared for Cell C to utilise as the 
1800 MHz band was dubbed as „not economically viable for rural 
deployment‟. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave exclusivity to 
Telkom for five years in exchange for rural connectivity amongst other 
things. During Telkom‟s exclusivity period, 100 MHz of bandwidth in the 
3.5 GHz band was assigned to Telkom and when the exclusivity expired, 
Telkom relinquished some of the spectrum in the 3.5 GHz band and 
remained with 2X14 MHz of bandwidth. The minister issued a policy 
directive under the amended old Telecommunications Act in 2002 giving 
„deemed access‟ for mobile operators to apply for spectrum in the 1800 
MHz and third generation spectrum i.e. 2100 MHz band. Telkom and the 
second network operator (Neotel) also enjoyed the same privilege of being 
beneficiaries to the policy directive for both 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz 
bands. All these operators were to be assigned spectrum in the 1800 MHz 
and 2100 MHz bands on application. Some spectrum was assigned and 
licenced to WBS in the 1800 MHz and 2600 MHz bands. Unfortunately the 
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way the 2100 MHz band was segmented resulted in there not having 
enough spectrum to accommodate all the operators in the 2100 MHz band 
as pronounced in the amended Telecommunications Act and as a result 
Neotel being the last entrant was assigned spectrum in the 1800 MHz 
band only and in the 3.5 GHz band. The amended Telecommunications 
Act gave rights of access to the 3G band to 5 operators at the time as 
alluded to above. It was stated as follows: 
Within six months after the date the second national operator is 
granted a public switched telecommunications service licence, or 
such longer period as the Minister may determine, Telkom may 
apply to the Authority for a third generation telecommunication radio 
frequency spectrum licence to provide public switched 
telecommunication services, and such other services as Telkom, 
from time-to-time, is licensed to provide, (Telecommunications Act, 
2002).  
The responsibility for the regulator was to ensure that all these operators 
have equal assignments in the 3G band by slicing the band in a way that 
guarantees access to all those „deemed‟ to be the licence holders and by 
also reserving some spectrum for those who apply at a later stage. The 
3G band has 2X60 MHz of bandwidth and unfortunately ICASA assigned 
2X15 MHz bandwidth to each operator „deemed‟ to be the holder depleting 
all the assignable spectrum in the band hence Neotel could not be 
assigned. For an operator to build a high-speed, high-capacity 3G 
network, how much bandwidth makes business sense for consumers to 
obtain the benefits? The researcher has not come across any document 
that explained the criteria used by ICASA to choose 2X15 MHz.     
In 2002, Sentech was issued with carrier of carrier‟s and multimedia 
licences. These licences were issued together with spectrum in the 2.6 
GHz and 3.5 GHz bands, thanks to the same policy directive.  
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1.6.1 Regulation of spectrum fees 
The introduction of the administrative incentive pricing (AIP) model for 
spectrum fees in 2010 and its implementation in 2012 started forcing a 
number of operators to return some of the spectrum they were either not 
using or using inefficiently e.g. Telkom, Sentech and others which 
drastically reduced their spectrum fees. Interestingly though even after the 
introduction of the AIP, most operators who had access to the high 
demand spectrum decided to hold on to their assignments reflecting how 
much they value their asset (spectrum) with the exception of Sentech who 
gave back 50 MHz of bandwidth in the 2.6 GHz band and 2x14 MHz of 
bandwidth in the 3.5 GHz bands. 
1.7 Policy and regulatory landscape regarding high demand 
spectrum 
Between 2003 and 2006, a huge hype and interest on the WiMax 
technology erupted and ICASA started a process of assigning and 
licensing the remaining high demand spectrum both in the 2.6 GHz and 
3.5 GHz bands using market-based assignment model proposing to 
auction the spectrum.  
The draft regulations on high demand spectrum and Invitation to Apply 
(ITA) were published in 2009 but the ITA was later withdrawn. The 
regulations have since been finalised and incorporated in the final Radio 
Regulations document that was published on 31 March 2011. The 
licensing process was later put in abeyance and was resurrected in 2011 
with a different approach. The proposed approach is combining the 
licensing of the 800 MHz and 2600 MHz bands using wholesale open 
access and managed spectrum park for 20 MHz portion in the 2600 MHz 
band. The licensing of the 3.5 GHz band thereof has been put on hold 
though no clear reason has been given for this decision. However, 
according to agenda item 1.1 for WRC 15, “initial frequency bands are 
under consideration by WP 5D members, within the following ranges 
12 
 
(MHz): 470-694; 694-790; 1000-1700; 2025-2110; 2200-2290; 2700-3400; 
3400-5000; 5350-5470; 5850-6425”. The identification of the 3400-3600 
MHz band for IMT was not globally agreed meaning some countries 
wanted to keep the band for satellite use. The 3.5 GHz band forms part of 
the C-band for satellite services hence sharing studies had to be 
conducted as per report ITU-R M.2109 (i.e. “sharing International Mobile 
Telecommunications-Advanced (IMT-Advanced) systems and 
geostationary-satellite networks in the fixed-satellite service in the 3 400-4 
200 MHz…frequency band”, (Resolution 154, WRC12) though in South 
Africa the mobile allocation and licensing for mobile broadband has 
already been done specifically in the 3400-3600 MHz band.  
A draft policy directive on the licensing of high demand spectrum 
specifically the 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz bands was published by the DoC on 
the 14 December 2011. One day later ICASA published a draft spectrum 
assignment plan and the draft ITA on combined licensing of the 800 MHz 
and 2.6 GHz bands. ICASA‟s draft plan and ITA were put on hold pending 
the finalisation of the policy directive by the Minister. More than two years 
have passed and the policy directive has still not been finalised. This has 
delayed the finalisation of ICASA‟s spectrum assignment plan and the ITA 
resulting in delays in licensing the most sought after spectrum which would 
have assisted in increasing broadband connectivity and realising the 
government‟s goal of broadband connectivity for all by 2020. One of the 
reason‟s cited to be contributing to the delay is the outcome of WRC 2012 
which officially made an allocation of the 700 MHz band, the second digital 
dividend (694-790 MHz) or (700 MHz band) to mobile services in Region 
1, giving an opportunity to assign and licence the 700 MHZ and 800 MHz 
at the same time or even combined. This increases the bandwidth 
available for assignment to accommodate more operators than the initial 
plan. This also gives an opportunity to choose a channel arrangement that 
will harmonise the country‟s plan with the APT plan i.e. in region 3. As this 
guarantees more bandwidth for assignment, it also guarantees economies 
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of scale and therefore lower costs for handsets. Whether this will yield 
positive results remains to be seen.  
1.7.1 The ITU and ATU in regulating high demand spectrum and 
digital dividend 
The ITU divides the world into three regions, region 1 includes Africa and 
Europe, region 2 refers to North and South America, and region 3 as 
already explained. Region 3 is the Asia-Pacific region of the ITU including 
Australia. 
The ITU is a United Nations agent responsible for radio communication 
(ITU-R), telecommunication (ITU-T) and development (ITU-D). It holds 
world radio communication conferences (WRC‟s) every three to four years 
discussing and deciding on new radio frequency spectrum allocations as 
the technologies evolve.  
The sharing studies are still underway within the ITU regarding the lower 
band edge of the 700 MHz and interference protection values for 
broadcasting services. In fact South Africa hosted a simulation workshop 
on behalf of ATU to carry out the ITU studies in order to ensure that Africa 
does not miss out on the 700 MHz opportunity since the consideration for 
allocating the 700 MHz band to mobile services was mainly motivated for 
and by African countries. The issue to be considered is how much socio-
economic benefits the country is missing out on whilst delaying the 
licensing of the 800 MHz spectrum. “The effect of time on money makes a 
dollar received or spent today worth more than a dollar received (or spent) 
in the future” and “people place a higher value on a benefit that they obtain 
today than one they will obtain in the future”, (OECD, 2008, p13). What 
becomes a challenge for the country (SA) and Africa as a whole is 
deciding whether the benefits from delaying the licensing process (having 
more spectrum to accommodate more operators) outweigh the benefits of 
immediate release and licensing of the 800 MHz band i.e. economic 
benefits from broadband networks or vice versa.  
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1.7.2 Wholesale open access and managed spectrum park in a South 
African context.  
The draft spectrum assignment plan is proposing two spectrum licensing 
models, the wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks. These 
are new concepts in the South African regulatory environment and not 
much research has been done to get a detailed understanding of what 
these mean and what their impact is for both the new entrants and the 
incumbent operators, i.e. on the market and competition and whether they 
will address broadband connectivity for all. 
1.7.2.1 Wholesale open access 
In the South African proposal, wholesale open access means “no locking 
i.e. encouraging interoperability, no blocking which refers to no restrictions 
on „legal‟ content and applications, and no retail referring to no service 
provision to end user”, (ICASA, 2011b). According to OECD (2013), “open 
access refers to some type of effective wholesale access to broadband 
services, with a certain degree of “openness” – such as transparency and 
non-discrimination – in the access policy established for these services, 
either on a voluntary basis or resulting from some obligations”, (OECD, 
2013, p9). Berec (2011, p8) defines open access as “a form of wholesale 
access whereby operators are offered transparent and non-discriminatory 
wholesale access, thereby enhancing competition at the retail level”. It 
seems as if the idea with wholesale open access in this context is 
infrastructure or spectrum sharing or both and open access is used loosely 
to refer to „wholesale access‟. To avoid ambiguity and confusion, this 
distinction will be given throughout the document. 
In the draft plan, two combined licences in the 800 and 2600 MHz bands 
were earmarked for wholesale open access, one for Sentech and one for 
an I-ECNS licensee who has no spectrum assigned in any of the high 
demand bands. It appears that this approach was intended to either get 
one operator to build a network or operators to form consortiums and build 
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a network with a view to resell to others on a national wholesale basis and 
use Sentech‟s advantage of national presence to expand its network in 
order to eventually resell to retail operators. Two other licences in the 
2600 MHz band only are allocated for any I-ECNS licensee who has no 
“spectrum assigned in any of the designated IMT bands”. It is not clear 
what the intention is with these two licences whether they will be assigned 
on a national basis or will address ‟hotspots‟ given the characteristics of 
the 2600 MHz band.  
1.7.2.2 Managed spectrum park 
The Managed Spectrum Park model in ICASA‟s proposal refers to a 
“sharing model where a number of entities apply to participate in sharing a 
block of common spectrum on self- managed basis and according to some 
regulations and/ or agreed procedures. The model encourages efficient 
use of spectrum, innovation and flexibility and provides for low-cost 
compliance and administration over time”, (ICASA, 2011b). In the 
regulations only one block of spectrum in the 2600 MHz band is allocated 
for managed spectrum park. It appears that this approach was intended to 
cover „hotspots‟, university campuses, smaller dense towns etc., on a 
managed basis. The only other available definition of managed spectrum 
parks is based on the New Zealand model which defines the concept as 
follows: “Managed spectrum parks (MSPs) are intended to allow access to 
a number of users in a common band of spectrum on a shared and, as far 
as possible, self-managed basis. Ideally, they encourage efficient use of 
spectrum, innovation and flexibility and provide for low-cost compliance 
and administration over time”, (Ohanga, 2008, p4). The closest other 
authors came to defining a concept closer to managed spectrum parks is 
open access commons, for example Brito (2007) defines a commons as “a 
resource that is owned or controlled jointly by a group of individuals”. It “is 
characterized by restrictions on who uses the resource, and when and 
how”, (Brito, 2007, p4) whilst open access, on the other hand is defined as 
“a regime under which anyone has access to an un-owned resource 
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without limitation; no one controls access to the resource under open 
access”, (open access referred to here has the same meaning as licence-
exempt)  or “open access” [Internet Exchange Points] IXPs [which] provide 
an example of self-regulation where the actors using these facilities 
establish their own rules and practices”, (OECD, 2013, p9). The managed 
spectrum park model introduces some form of control and management to 
general „commons‟ or „open access‟ regime. For the sake of completeness 
and to avoid further confusion from the definitions above, spectrum 
commons and open access will be used in reference to licence-exempt 
unless a clear distinction is given. 
1.7.2.3 The impact of the introduction of the 2011 spectrum 
licensing models and the incumbents’ reactions 
The introduction of the draft spectrum licensing models and the exclusion 
of the incumbent operators has had unintended positive and negative 
externalities and consequences, for example the incumbent operators 
started re-farming some of their high demand spectrum which they were 
using for GSM, EDGE technologies (1st and 2nd generation mobile 
technologies) and introduced LTE technology (4th generation). The 
negative consequence though is that this could create gaps in the GSM 
networks as operators would need a number of contiguous 200 kHz voice 
channels to make 5 MHz data channel for LTE technology. This has a 
potential to increase the number of drop calls on the GSM networks 
affecting the very same poor communities that the regulator is trying to 
connect unless the incumbent operators are prepared to re-engineer the 
networks and build more base stations. The concerns therefore raised by 
the incumbent operators and proposals made by ICASA should take into 
consideration the negative unintended effects.  
Both models encourage sharing in an „open access‟ environment with 
variations in access be it wholesale open access, private commons (for 
managed spectrum parks) etc., but the proposals are meant to indirectly 
exclude incumbent operators with the exception of Neotel, Sentech and 
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WBS who is benefiting by getting 5 MHz additional bandwidth and 5 MHz 
of guard-bands on each side without having to undergo a competitive 
process with other operators. The assumption is that the proposed 
additional 5 MHz bandwidth will be used as an „incentive‟ for having to do 
an in-band migration in the 2.6 GHz band. 
1.8 A case for more competition and broadband in South Africa 
and regulatory interventions  
The country is faced with a number of challenges well past its apartheid 
years, that of providing basic needs for its citizens e.g. health, education, 
electricity, water, housing etc. amongst the priorities. Like the world in 
general it has experienced economic decline in the past few years and 
unfortunately the economy is now struggling to recover with the 
unemployment rate not improving at all. According to Qiang, Rossotto, & 
Kimura, (2009), “[In Korea], the rapid deployment of broadband provided 
important opportunities for [their] ICT industry. Some 300,000 jobs have 
been created in ICT, and the sector is growing three times faster than the 
rest of the economy”. They further assert that “broadband is not just an 
infrastructure. It is a general purpose technology that can fundamentally 
restructure an economy”, (Qiang, Rossotto, & Kimura, 2009, p41). The 
statement above demonstrates the importance and the critical role played 
by broadband in different economies. The developed countries have made 
a case for broadband for example,  
governments around the world that had given up a direct stake in 
the telecommunications industry by privatising their incumbent 
operators and separating the functions of regulation from those of 
policy-making have also been active in creating and implementing 
policies aimed at realising the benefits of the information economy 
(Firth & Mellor, 2005, p232) e.g. Australia, Korea, USA and others.  
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1.8.1 The introduction of regional licensees in expanding 
communications and broadband coverage 
As already mentioned, there are competing operators in SA who have 
access to high demand spectrum nonetheless without assisting the 
country in meeting its objectives of broadband for all and lower 
communications costs. The high demand spectrum licences were issued 
with obligations to connect a certain number of schools, clinics and 
community centres and yet this did not yield any positive results for the 
country. The process of licensing Universal Service Area Licensees 
(USALs) started in 2001 with the intention of addressing rural connectivity 
as these licensees were only focused on certain district municipalities, i.e. 
regional licensees. This still did not yield the expected results either even 
though the USALs were given „special treatment‟ in terms of high demand 
spectrum access, e.g. most USALs were assigned spectrum in the 3.5 
GHz band (e.g. Metsweding, Amathole Telecommunications) and one or 
two allowed to share with the incumbents, the 800 MHz band, e.g. Thinta-
thinta was issued with a licence in the 800 MHz band and Karabotel‟s 
licence was never issued, even though they did apply, (ICASA source). 
They still failed to compete or make a noticeable impact in those 
communities where they were licenced. Most of them remain dormant after 
all these years and some never paid the licence fees in the following years 
and were therefore never renewed, (ICASA source). Convergence 
legislation, i.e. the EC Act of 2005 instead converted all the USAL‟s to 
class ECNS‟s (C-ECNS‟s). This makes a strong case for intervention from 
the regulator, a strong case for the introduction of some form of 
competition or is it a case of encouraging competitiveness amongst the 
existing operators? It remains however to be seen how and whether the 
proposed spectrum licensing will introduce efficient competition that will 
eventually reduce communications costs.  
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1.9 Summary of the research problem  
South Africa, like most ITU member states, has in the past used the old 
traditional spectrum management models of command and control. The 
regulator/s assigned and licenced the radio frequency spectrum in an 
exclusive manner and on a first come first served basis. This mainly 
protected Telkom monopoly and state-owned enterprises Eskom, 
Transnet, Police and Defence, which were previously given priority in 
terms of spectrum assignments and were referred to as „the bulk users‟. 
The traditional spectrum assignment and licensing models resulted in 
operators getting spectrum which they ended up not using or using 
inefficiently. This created „artificial‟ spectrum scarcity and hoarding. A good 
example of this is the 50 MHz of spectrum in the 2.6 GHz band that was 
assigned and licenced to Sentech in 2002 but has never been used until 
returned back to the regulator in 2013.  
The reform period, politically and within telecoms created an environment 
conducive enough for the regulator to start introducing obligations as part 
of the licence terms and conditions of the licensees to address universal 
service and access. With all these interventions, SA is still sitting at less 
than 10% broadband penetration and the rural areas are affected the 
most. Through the process of conversion encouraged by the EC Act, 
ICASA licenced 400+ network and service licensees which could not gain 
access and compete in the wireless and mobile space due to demand 
exceeding supply for the remaining „lucrative‟ high demand frequency 
bands. ICASA has been attempting to address the issues of imbalance 
between frequency demand/supply, effective competition and lack of 
broadband connectivity by introducing wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum park licensing models but unfortunately to date has 
not succeeded. This has only given the incumbent operators ammunition 
against potential new entrants, for example, the incumbent operators have 
started re-farming their 900 and 1800 MHz spectrum introducing Long 
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Term Evolution (LTE) technology (3.9G-4G technology) whilst keeping 
telecommunications prices unreasonably high.  
The potential benefits for wholesale open access is cost-saving in 
infrastructure for network rollout especially in rural areas if operators form 
consortiums to build networks which in turn will reduce consumer prices 
and sharing exorbitant spectrum licence fees. It also gives potential to 
introduce competition at service level. It might however be a challenge for 
government to impose obligations on new smaller operators to start or 
focus the broadband network rollout in underserved or un-served areas 
without any incentive to do so e.g. through government subsidy or funding. 
These models may encourage innovation, technology neutrality and 
efficient spectrum use. The disadvantages could be discrimination by the 
operators who gain access as wholesale open access operators against 
some of the retail operators. Other disadvantages are non-cooperation 
from the operators who get the spectrum licences and difficulty in reaching 
consensus for the rules of managing the spectrum parks which could 
result in uncontrollable interference defeating the main objectives of the 
models.  
1.10 Problem statement  
The spectrum licensing models used in the past i.e. command and control, 
first come first served resulted in economically inefficient use of spectrum. 
This was due to vertically integrated networks and managed liberalisation 
which protected the incumbent‟s exclusivity period amongst others. This 
created artificial spectrum scarcity and hoarding and resulted in some 
spectrum neither being used nor used efficiently, thereby contributing to a 
lack of connectivity, lack of e-services‟ delivery, and economic value not 
realised.  
In South Africa the government has never adopted a spectrum licensing 
policy with the exception of the draft policy for high demand spectrum 
which was published on 14 December 2011. The only other document that 
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attempts to address spectrum policy issues is a national radio frequency 
spectrum policy document published in 2010 by the Department of 
Communications (DoC), though this does not address spectrum licensing 
models. The regulator is proposing wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum park as the new spectrum licensing models, though without 
having conducted a regulatory impact assessment (RIA). Conducting RIA 
before introducing a regulation assists in determining the impact/effect as 
one proposed solution is not always the only solution in addressing and 
achieving the regulatory objectives.  
The majority of the high demand spectrum is already assigned and 
licenced to mainly the big operators i.e. the mobile and fixed operators and 
yet have not managed to rollout 3G and ADSL networks in most rural 
communities. The country is sitting at less than 10% broadband 
penetration and one of the objectives of the proposed spectrum licensing 
models is to change this and ensure effective competition and access to 
broadband for all. Operators allegedly attribute the lack of rural 
connectivity to various factors e.g. high costs of rolling out 3G networks 
and copper cables due to geographic location and distances between the 
poor rural communities and population sizes in those communities which 
does not make business sense for operators to provide services, and also 
unavailability and lack of access to spectrum in lower frequency bands 
that are appropriate for rural coverage.  
It is not clear what will be the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed spectrum licensing models, how they will encourage rural 
broadband connectivity and whether they will address the issues of 
competition or infrastructure sharing and how, hence the study. 
1.11 Purpose statement  
The purpose of this research is to understand the applicable spectrum 
regulation concepts i.e. exclusive licensing, secondary markets, spectrum 
commons amongst others, in order to analyse the advantages and 
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disadvantages of ICASA‟s 2011 proposed spectrum licensing models and 
its limitations.  
The study will investigate the perspectives of the regulator, operators and 
experts in further adding to an understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of these spectrum licensing models.  
These analytical approaches will enable the researcher to draw 
conclusions about the impact these spectrum licensing models will have in 
addressing the regulator‟s strategic goals of introducing competition and 
broadband connectivity for all.  
1.12 The research questions 
With the understanding that ICASA‟s 2011 spectrum licensing models 
were still in a draft format and not yet finalised, an ex-ante RIA will be 
conducted to investigate whether the benefits of these models outweigh 
the costs and justify the action by ICASA. 
The main question and the sub-questions therefore are crafted with that 
kind of background. 
1.12.1 Main question 
To what extent do ICASA‟s 2011 spectrum licensing models reflect an 
appropriate regulatory approach to achieving ubiquitous and high speed 
connectivity for South Africa? 
1.12.2 Sub-questions  
(1) To what extent are the proposed spectrum licensing models 
expected to encourage competition in electronic communications 
markets?  
(2) To what extent would this regulatory approach address issues of 
low broadband connectivity in both urban and rural areas? 
(3) What other effects could this regulatory approach have on services 
offered by the broader electronic communications market?  
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(4) In which ways do the anticipated benefits justify the costs 
associated with implementing the proposed spectrum assignment 
plan/regulations? 
1.13 Conclusion 
The main objective with this chapter was to introduce the country on which 
this study takes place. Also the history and key events in as far as 
regulation of high demand spectrum were highlighted. Interventions 
introduced by the regulator to achieve the main objectives as highlighted 
in ICASA‟s 2011 proposal are briefly mentioned. The proposed spectrum 
licensing models are introduced though not discussed in detail. The 
problem statement and the main research question are also indicated in 
this chapter. In the next chapter, literature on spectrum licensing models 
will be reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 2: Traditional vs modern spectrum management models 
All the literature reviewed on the spectrum licensing models with relevance 
to the current environment and to the study being conducted will be 
discussed. 
2.1 Introducing spectrum management 
This section explores and reviews literature on spectrum assignment and 
spectrum licensing models proposed by different authors and taking into 
consideration future spectrum requirements. In essence it looks at basic 
spectrum management principles and how those relate back to the study. 
In South Africa, there has been limited investigation into spectrum policies 
and their licensing models and the impact these have on the 
communications industry and the public in general. The international 
experiences, debates and proposals would therefore be explored to 
increase the level of understanding on spectrum regulation and specifically 
the issues being investigated. 
The literature review is intended to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
problem. As Rocco points out, “the purpose of the literature review is to 
determine if the topic is researchable, to report the results of closely 
related studies” (Rocco, 2009, p125). There are lots of theories and 
studies on „exclusive‟ spectrum licencing and „licence-exempt but not 
much research has been done on a concept of „wholesale open access‟ 
especially wireless or mobile and managed spectrum parks. The concept 
of licence-exempt is generally referred to as „open access‟ though in some 
instances authors use the term „open access‟ loosely to refer to access 
provided at wholesale level, e.g. in OECD (2013, p4), „open access 
arrangements‟ “refer to wholesale access to network infrastructure or 
services that is provided effectively on fair and reasonable terms, for which 
there is some degree of transparency and non-discrimination”. As already 
pointed out, for the sake of completeness and to avoid confusion „open 
access‟ will be used to refer to licence-exempt unless otherwise specified 
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and in those instances such distinction will be qualified to reflect the 
difference. A number of countries have recently published their broadband 
policies where this concept of wholesale open access is proposed e.g. 
Australia. On the concept of managed spectrum parks, the New Zealand 
approach will be studied. Regulatory Impact Assessment/Analysis (RIA) 
will be used to conduct the study.  
2.2 Defining regulation, economic regulation and why we regulate in 
general 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p18) suggest using the following to 
define regulation in general “as a specific set of commands …”, as a 
deliberate state influence”, and “ as all forms of social or economic 
influence …”. Regulation according to the OECD work is defined as a 
“diverse set of instruments by which governments impose requirements on 
enterprises and citizens. [These] include constitutions, laws, formal and 
informal orders, …, joint opinions, declarations, resolutions, 
recommendations, proposals, guidelines, codes of conduct [etc.]”, 
(Cordova-Novion, 2007, p1). A summarised way to define regulation is 
that it is a rule or set of rules meant to direct, instruct or give guidance to 
its citizens by a superior body within a particular industry or government 
for various reasons e.g. to address issues of competition, consumer 
protection (safety, health) etc. “Regulation … was generally advocated on 
two main grounds: natural monopoly and externalities” and so was and still 
is the case in telecommunications, (Sutherland, 2012, p22).  Regulations 
can be introduced at any stage of the process but preferably ex-ante 
especially in markets where competition is adversely affected and the 
economy is suffering. 
The effects of regulation, whether it is "economic regulation" or 
"social regulation," are likely to depend on a variety of factors: the 
motivation for regulation, the nature of regulatory instruments and 
structure of the regulatory process, the industry's economic 
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characteristics, and the legal and political environment in which 
regulation takes place, (Joskow & Rose, 1989, p1451).  
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p258) indicate that “regulators can 
intervene [with regulations] in economic or social activity not merely by 
different methods but at different stages in the processes that lead to 
harms”. Regulations may be used to control certain conduct or behaviour 
of those it regulates to avoid or prevent those harmful consequences. 
According to Cordova-Novion (2007, p1-2), “regulations fall in three 
categories, economic, social and administrative”. “In general, deregulation 
strategies are applied to economic regulation, while various means of 
improving regulatory quality and reducing burdens are used for social and 
administrative regulation”, (OECD, 1997, p8). “Economic regulations 
intervene directly in market decisions such as pricing, competition, market 
entry, or exit”; (OECD, 1997, p6). Whilst economic regulation is deemed 
necessary for competitive markets and in turn, assumed to be driving 
down costs; “markets do not [always] properly value some public interests 
that citizens deem important”, (OECD, 1997, p8), so governments will 
always have a role to play through social regulations in making sure that 
public interests are taken care of. In some instances markets fail dismally 
when left to dictate, unregulated or to self-regulate. 
2.3 Regulating frequency spectrum for broadband 
Spectrum regulation was introduced to maintain order and avoid chaos of 
the airwaves. “Historically, access to and use of radio spectrum has been 
highly regulated in order to prevent interference among users of adjacent 
frequencies or from neighbouring geographic areas, particularly for 
reasons of defence and security”, (Foster, 2011, p6). Spectrum is 
regulated for economic and social benefits, to avoid interference, 
encourage competition, to protect consumers and to assist in addressing 
the digital divide for developing countries. In the digital era, spectrum is 
also regulated to encourage 100% broadband connectivity in different 
countries. 
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Figure 2 below (borrowed from Blackman & Srivastava, 2011, p20) 
illustrates basic objectives why regulation, and spectrum regulation in 
particular is critical.   
Figure 2: Objectives for regulation 
Source: ICT Regulation Toolkit 
2.4 Spectrum regulation in a converged environment  
Spectrum management is a process of regulating frequency spectrum and 
it includes planning, assignment, equipment registration, licensing, 
monitoring and compliance, amongst other functions. It is defined as “the 
planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative 
procedures”, (AESMO, 2006, p6). Prince (2004, p1) on the other hand 
defines Frequency Spectrum Management as “the regulatory and perhaps 
co-operative process of allocating specific frequency bands for specific 
uses and users”. The different operators are given usage rights of 
spectrum through different licencing methods. In some instances, 
spectrum licensing and spectrum assignment are used interchangeably 
although the ITU gives the basic distinction between the two terms. The 
spectrum licensing is the authorisation or approval element within 
spectrum management; authorisation is given through a licence. 
“Authorisations can be used to identify the source of any transmissions 
28 
 
causing a problem and to take measures to eliminate it”. Spectrum 
assignment on the other hand involves the engineering aspect of the 
process, the specific lot to be assigned power output etc., including 
coordination i.e. consultation with other users of the band”, ITU-R 
SM.2093. Even though spectrum licensing is a subset of spectrum 
management but “their policies have an important distinction” with 
management policy concerned about long-term planning for all the 
technologies that might require spectrum and licensing policy being short-
term procedure in assigning access rights to applicants, (Carp, Dunogué & 
Murakami, 2002, p2). 
Spectrum management policies, regulations including its authorisations 
have always been defined using the traditional historic ways where the 
regulator used to dictate to the market. Technological development is 
taking place at such a fast pace that the spectrum management policies 
and regulations are lacking behind whereby the market is dictating to the 
policy-makers. “Regulatory policies are now being challenged by a 
convergent world, whereby new technologies blur the existing distinction 
between fixed/mobile/broadcast services”, (Bondelind, Brito, & Tan, 2007, 
p1). Television and internet on the mobile handsets are proof of the real 
convergent world. “There is a need to define new spectrum management 
rules that accommodate [both] former and newer technologies…”, 
(Bondelind, Brito, & Tan, 2007, p1), instead of using outdated regulations 
with latest technologies. “Regulations that are outdated or poorly designed 
to achieve policy goals can impose unnecessary costs”, (Cordova-Novion, 
2007, p2).  This defeats the purpose of regulation in the first place as one 
of the objectives why regulation is critical is aimed at reducing costs. 
2.5 Approaches to spectrum regulation 
The traditional spectrum management methods created artificial spectrum 
scarcity resulting in exclusion of new entrants to competition which created 
monopolies and duopolies.  The new bandwidth-hungry technologies and 
the opening up in the market with more operators coming into the market 
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cause the demand to exceed the supply calling for market-based 
assignment methods e.g. spectrum auctions, spectrum trading and 
spectrum leasing amongst others. “Fundamental to the efficiency of 
markets is scarcity. If resources are not scarce,…, then there is simply no 
need to have markets, which have costs to organize, administer and 
maintain” (Faulhaber & Faber, 2002, p8). Developing countries are faced 
with challenges of balancing the „two worlds‟; embracing technology 
advancements whilst addressing socio-economic factors including the 
broadband divide hence the constant need to review and update the 
current policies and regulations, and introduce forward thinking models. 
“Flexible regulatory regimes and technologies that make spectrum use 
more accessible to start-ups and other small innovative operators offer 
significant potential to reduce lead times from innovation to market for 
communication products and lend a competitive edge to domestic 
producers in new product markets”, (Freyens, 2009, p6). “Promotion of 
competition should also be a principal consideration motivating the 
establishment of rules for assigning spectrum to individual users”, 
(Rosston & Steinberg, n.d., p5). This would explain why ex-ante regulation 
is still very critical in developing countries to prevent uncompetitive 
unwarranted behavioural patterns before they actually happen and to 
ensure a level playing field for all especially new smaller entrants. For 
meaningful competition to be enhanced and markets developed, 
regulators in developing countries need to play a crucial role by 
introducing market-based assignment and licensing models with an aim of 
fulfilling government‟s objective of broadband connectivity for all. It is 
however crucial to note that market-based mechanisms alone may not 
address social interests. 
2.6 Convergence and vertical vs horizontal licensing structures in 
creating a digital country 
Former technologies and licensing models required separation of services 
and licences. Service or network licences and spectrum licences were 
30 
 
specific to either fixed, mobile or broadcast services. The convergence 
mandates a flat licensing structure instead of vertical integrated licensing. 
“In terms of [service or network] licences, there are various types, 
including individual licences, system licences, class licences, general 
authorizations” (Miedema, 2011, p33). In South Africa since the 
promulgation of the EC Act, spectrum licences are only assigned and 
licenced if an operator is in possession of an individual, class licence or 
licence-exempt. The objective of the EC Act was to move away from 
service specific licences to more horizontally integrated, technology 
neutral licences introducing a more converged licencing regime. The 
converged regulator and converged licensing framework with the 
converged technologies facilitated the possibility to consider re-assigning 
spectrum previously used purely for broadcasting to wireless mobile 
broadband services i.e. the digital dividend or 800 MHz band. With 
broadband connectivity sitting at 7% (DoC, 2012) in South Africa, the 800 
MHz band and others e.g. 450 MHz band, with wider geographic coverage 
provide key roles in fostering the digital country and therefore a digital 
economy where connectivity for all becomes a reality. The licensing of 
access spectrum facilitates the deployment of broadband networks. The 
challenges to be addressed are how to licence the limited available 
spectrum be it a digital dividend or any other whilst ensuring the 
introduction of competition through licensing new entrants and also 
addressing the broadband divide.  
The researcher presents a hierarchy below showing different compliance 
levels for operators towards achieving the digital economy.  
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Figure 3: Steps contributing to digital country 
 
Source: Researcher‟s own 
The base layer is the access to network licence which gives rights to build 
a communications network and a service licence which gives rights to 
provide a service. Equipment that forms part of the network must conform 
to certain standards and therefore must have certification by reputable 
labs. The radio frequency spectrum has become the most contested and 
highly “congested” and the licensing methodology is therefore highly 
debated; that is the basis for this research study. Access to the right 
spectrum unlocks the possibility of broadband networks‟ and it is the 
availability of such spectrum that eventually builds a digital country. “IP-
enabled services and applications delivered by broadband networks will 
propel the digital economy in the next decade”, (Miedema, 2011, p89). 
The immediate licensing and release of the remaining access spectrum 
especially lower frequency bands e.g. the digital dividend will assist in 
making broadband connectivity for all a reality as the band is ideal for rural 
coverage due to its propagation characteristics. The delays are depriving 
the country from realising economic value from this spectrum. Policy and 
regulation must therefore evolve and not stifle technology development 
ensuring and „promoting an open, fair and non-discriminatory‟ regulatory 
environment. 
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2.7 The historical spectrum assignment and licensing - command 
and control 
It may seem as if many authors such as Buddhikot (2007) and Lehr (2005) 
share a view that the notion of „spectrum scarcity‟ is artificial and is “made 
worse” by the old traditional spectrum management models, for example 
Buddhikot‟s (2007, p1) observation was that “spectrum scarcity was the 
by-product of antiquated spectrum management, even though a large part 
of prime spectrum was assigned, it remained highly underutilized”. 
“Command and control provide[d] exclusive license rights, assigned in 
administrative fashion, with rigid rules about transmission standards (use, 
power, area, etc.) and regulatory constraints on equipment standards, 
frequency use and interference management”, (Freyens, 2009, p20). 
Spectrum in South Africa was also assigned and licensed on a command 
and control basis and of course on a first come first served „administrative‟ 
basis. This has resulted in governments deciding how much spectrum gets 
assigned to who and this also resulted in lucrative spectrum being 
assigned and licenced exclusively to those who first came into the market. 
This practice has continued until ICASA was faced with more spectrum 
applications than available spectrum especially in access bands e.g. the 
2.6 and 3.5 GHz bands. The advancement of technology and the 
introduction of new services have placed a strain on bandwidth availability 
thus forcing ICASA to consider modern market-based spectrum licensing 
alternatives in order to address demand supply asymmetry, increase 
competition and broadband penetration. 
2.8 Exclusivity vs licence exempt 
According to Lehr (2005), the old traditional spectrum models stifle 
innovation; limit „the choice of technology‟, “constrains [the] ability to 
redeploy the spectrum to higher value uses” which eventually “constrain 
the business models”, (Lehr, 2005, p1). He states the traditional 
approaches created „artificial scarcity of spectrum‟. He advocates for 
spectrum management reform models that are market-based, the 
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introduction of „flexible licensing‟ and unlicensed models though to a larger 
extent more for unlicensed model, (Lehr, 2005). In South Africa some 
frequency bands are licence-exempt‟ or unlicensed though this does not 
refer to the high demand, high valued spectrum, which is what Lehr is 
advocating for. This was mainly an issue of conformity since South Africa 
falls under ITU region 1 and the ISM bands which are licence-exempt 
bands were already identified at an international level.  
Banerjee et al (n.d) share the same views as (Lehr, 2005), they argue that 
“the „exclusive‟ spectrum licensing approach is static and leads to under-
utilisation. On the other hand, the commons or unlicensed spectrum is 
believed to encourage innovation leading to new technologies being 
introduced and efficient spectrum utilisation”. According to Banerjee et. al. 
(n.d), „spectrum occupancy rarely exceeded 25% in the US and the FCC 
eventually had to legalise secondary markets to take care of the under-
utilisation. These secondary users sub-lease spectrum from the primary 
owners‟. Peha (2007, p7) takes the debate further and suggests that “with 
either coexistence or cooperation, a “spectrum commons” could be 
created by a license-holder instead of the regulator”, he explains: Rather 
than using unlicensed spectrum, a private entity might obtain a license, 
establish its own operating rules, and allow devices to operate in its 
spectrum” but accepts that “such a band may never emerge without 
deliberate assistance from the regulator”. This is another approach which 
requires one entity to build the network and let others use their devices to 
either receive a service or provide a service, similar to what ICASA 
proposes with wholesale open access or other entities sublease spectrum 
building networks in areas where they are non-existent or limited. Either 
way this minimises infrastructure duplication or limitations whilst increasing 
competition or taking services where they are needed, e.g. broadband 
services. The OECD (2013, p6) concurs and asserts that “the use of an 
open access policy is often highlighted as a facilitator of objectives, such 
as promoting greater choice for consumers or addressing infrastructure 
bottlenecks, especially in the context of regulated access”. „Open access‟ 
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in this context refers to “access … provided at wholesale level”, access 
“provided on transparent and non-discriminatory terms”, (OECD, 2013, p5) 
which is how ICASA defined their „wholesale open access‟ model.  
 
2.9 Spectrum ownership rights 
The economists and mobile operators are advocating for market-based 
spectrum licensing models as this protects the huge investments made in 
setting up the commercial mobile networks, e.g. Buddhikot (2007). This is 
so because even if spectrum is assigned through auctions, operators can 
still have exclusive access to a particular block of frequencies. Engineers 
on the other hand believe that moving from the traditional spectrum 
assignment and licensing models and increasing more bandwidth to 
unlicensed model encourages innovation forcing interoperability, e.g. Lehr 
(2005). Faulhaber & Faber (2002) are taking a different approach in 
addressing „artificial scarcity‟ and the sharing models to be introduced. 
Their view is that “both economists and engineers got this all wrong and 
that the best way to deal with this spectrum scarcity is to introduce a legal 
regime through property rights for spectrum. They believe that this will 
support both markets and commons. The model being proposed is a 
“market-based ownership with non-interfering easement regime”, 
(Faulhaber & Faber, 2002, p19). In brief this is more like introducing 
secondary markets with protection just as proposed by Banerjee et al. 
(n.d) just like with Neotel in the South African case. The difference is just 
the issue of ownership. In South Africa, the second network operator 
Neotel was assigned and licenced using in the 800 MHz band which is 
traditionally a broadcasting band. WRC 2007 identified the 800 MHz band 
as one of the bands for IMT services to be available immediately after 
digital switch-over of broadcasters from analogue to digital technologies. 
The assignment was made on a secondary coordinated basis with the 
broadcasters and was possible because there was „underutilisation‟ of 
some broadcasting channels which made it possible for Neotel to co-exist 
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with the broadcasters. Basically Neotel is using „broadcasting white 
spaces‟ for their CDMA network.  
Most regulators have always licensed spectrum to an operator giving 
rights to its use but not ownership. Faulhaber & Faber (2002) are 
suggesting a move from this regime and the regulators actually 
relinquishing spectrum ownership to licensees. “The full property rights 
approach differs by higher degree of flexibility with regard to technological 
standards and license use, and is assigned by auctions or similar 
competitive mechanisms rather than administrative rule”, (Freyens, 2009, 
p22). This might be all well and good for mature economies and industries 
but not for developing countries such as South Africa where social 
differences between the haves and have-nots still need to be addressed. 
Ownership of spectrum might still be better off left in the hands of the 
country so as to address the issues of competition and broadband digital 
divide no matter how the spectrum is assigned and licenced. It has been 
proven that even with obligations attached to the lucrative spectrum; it has 
been difficult for the regulator to enforce compliance on the operators. 
Operators would rather pay penalty fees than rollout networks in some 
rural areas hence the experiment with wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum parks even though it is not clear how they will be 
implemented. 
2.10 Wholesale open access as a licensing model 
“Through human history, demand increase caused by population growth, 
new technologies, and economic growth have led to adjustments in the 
governance regimes of many resources which were once available freely 
to the public into private properties”, (Bauer, Kwon & Wildman, 2006, p1). 
This resulted in exclusive assignments and licensing which in turn created 
„artificial spectrum scarcity‟ as operators had indirect ownership of 
spectrum for a number of years denying access to others. The debate 
between exclusive spectrum assignments and spectrum commons or 
licence-exempt became relevant as the industry was opening the market 
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to more competition, licensing more new operators and access spectrum 
supply becoming reduced. In order to accommodate the supply shortage 
versus the demand, countries are experimenting with a concept of 
wholesale open access e.g. US with the licencing of its digital dividend, 
the 700 MHz band, (Goodman, 2009). Both the US and Australia have 
already experimented with the concept of wholesale open access but 
more on fixed last mile, (Lehr, Sirbu & Gillett, 2006) The key would be 
clear guidelines on the format of access, be it network sharing, how, or 
any other to ensure practical implementation. “There is little evidence to 
date of wholesale-only mobile operators enjoying commercial success. 
Infrastructure sharing agreements appear to be gaining importance and 
this may be the trend in many countries for the deployment of LTE 
networks”, (OECD, 2013, p12). 
2.10.1 Introducing infrastructure or spectrum sharing or both 
Mobile operators have realised in the recent years starting with the 
introduction of 3G networks, that building new networks or even upgrading 
their current networks is very expensive. This was mainly due to the 
expenses incurred for licence fees through spectrum auctions especially 
during the licensing of 3G spectrum, (Frisanco, Tafertshofer, Lurrin, & Ang, 
2008). “One scheme for reducing capital requirements and operating costs 
is network sharing”, (Bauer, Westerveld & Maitland, 2001, p13). This 
statement was therefore more relevant to assist operators reduce costs for 
3G infrastructure rollout, and still is relevant today if one considers the 
objective for introducing wholesale open access. “Infrastructure sharing 
agreements are playing an increasingly important role in mobile markets, 
more markedly in the context of the deployment of LTE technology. 
Wholesale-only models have emerged at different levels of the network 
and are usually based on purely commercial arrangements”, (OECD, 
2013, p32). One of the policy objectives according to ICASA is to ensure 
“affordable, accessible and universal access to infrastructure for 
businesses, communities…”, (ICASA, 2011b), i.e. increasing competition 
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by licensing more operators within limited available spectrum which will 
assist in ensuring broadband for all especially rural connectivity.  
Open access arrangements will [] play a major role in shaping the 
level of competition in next generation access (NGA) networks 
[broadband networks], …, regardless of historic challenges or 
interventions e.g. local loop unbundling, MVNO‟s or even lack of 
cable and fibre networks as it is unclear whether there will be 
sufficient infrastructure competition, especially outside very densely 
settled urban areas … (OECD, 2013, p5).  
Again in this scenario, open access‟ is used loosely to refer to „access at 
wholesale level‟. 
Below are the different scenarios for infrastructure and spectrum sharing: 
Technicalities on the practical implementation is what ICASA will 
eventually have to clarify;  
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Figure 4: Different forms of infrastructure and spectrum sharing 
 
Source: BIPT 
Roemer, Zhang, Haardt, & Jorswieck (2010, p1) argue that “equal-priority 
resource sharing in wireless networks improves the spectral efficiency, 
enhances coverage, increases user satisfaction, leads to increased 
revenue for operators, and de-creases capital and operating 
expenditures”. They further assert that this kind of sharing and cooperation 
enhances efficiency which “improves the operators‟ individual sum data 
rates” and also “it reduces the operators‟ expenditure since the cost of 
deploying and maintaining the infrastructure as well as licensing the 
spectrum can be shared as well” (Roemer, Zhang, Haardt, & Jorswieck, 
2010, p7). The statements above make an assumption that the benefits 
derived from the network sharing models outweigh the exclusive spectrum 
licencing models hence the investigation in this study. 
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2.11 Exploring Managed Spectrum Park  
One other model which has not been fully explored is that of „controlled 
open access‟ which Freyens (2009, p9) refers to as “privately-run 
commons or commons park”. What this entails is “establishing joint 
spectrum property rights first, and let the co-owners manage spectrum 
access, interferences and usage rights among themselves”, (Freyens, 
2009, p7). This model combines the exclusive (exclusive to a group of 
operators) property rights and the licence-exempt or commons. This can 
also be through light licensing also. Given the lack of detail so far on the 
approach proposed by ICASA and analysing the definitions given for the 
proposed spectrum licensing models, the managed spectrum park model 
could be defined similarly to the „commons park‟. The “managed spectrum 
parks are intended to allow access to a number of users in a common 
band of spectrum on shared, and, as far as possible self-managed basis” 
(Ohanga, 2009, p2) hence the regulatory impact assessment/analysis 
(RIA) study to investigate whether the government strategic objectives of 
increasing competition and broadband for all will be achieved through 
these proposed spectrum licensing models. 
2.12 Global Trends on wholesale open access and Managed 
Spectrum Parks 
Wholesale open access as a concept has been introduced in a number of 
countries but mainly for fixed and fibre to the home (FTTH) services 
through the national broadband policies or strategies. These national 
broadband strategies are implemented differently in different countries. 
Some countries impose stiffer universal service obligations to those who 
gain access to the digital dividend whilst others bring government back to 
partner with private sector in building this wholesale open access network 
to ensure 100% population coverage. Government involvement is 
criticized by some who believe markets will eventually take care but 
acknowledged by some who view rolling out broadband services in deep 
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uneconomical rural areas as a government obligation. Justifying 
government involvement Given (2010) states that:  
The global financial and economic crisis helped spread these policy 
impulses across the whole economy. By diminishing the private 
sector‟s capacity to invest, increasing the demands for governments 
to spend and undermining faith in the efficacy of free markets [] the 
crisis provided a rationale for „nation-building‟ initiatives. Among 
them, broadband–„the most important economic infrastructure of 
the, 21st century‟, (Given, 2010, p543).  
The majority of the developed countries introduced some form of open 
access through local loop unbundling but the introduction of „wholesale 
open access‟ for mobile creates new markets altogether. Few countries 
(e.g. Australia, US, Germany (to learn of obligations for rural connectivity), 
some BRICS countries e.g. Brazil and Russia, Kenya as an African 
country and Korea only because of its broadband success story) who are 
either attempting to introduce or have some form of „wholesale open 
access‟ introduced in licensing operators for broadband deployment will be 
analysed. Korea is not an example of wholesale open access but rather a 
successful „broadband for all‟ case study. German is also included to 
understand how obligations in the licensing of the 800 MHz band were 
imposed to address rural connectivity. The wholesale open access 
concept will be explored whether it is applied to fixed or wireless services 
or both with a view of understanding the practical implementation. 
2.12.1 Australia: PPP wholesale open access for 100% population 
coverage 
Australia is a country which is also a continent and encompasses few 
surrounding islands and is situated in the Southern Hemisphere with New 
Zealand, Bangladesh and Indonesia amongst others as its neighbours. It 
has a Population of 22.68 million and is the world‟s sixth largest country by 
total area, (World Bank, 2012). 
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Australia is one of the highly developed and one of the wealthiest 
countries worldwide. It is one of the high income countries, (World Bank, 
2012).  
“In April 2009, the Australian Government announced that it would 
establish a company that will invest up to $43 billion Australian dollars 
over the next eight years to build and operate a wholesale-only, open 
access National Broadband Network [NBN]”, (Oliver, 2009, p4) to build 
and bring high-speed broadband within reach of all Australian premises. 
Government will be the majority shareholder and will „privatise the 
company once it is up and running. It is expected that the NBN will use 
mainly fibre, for the majority of the population, about 80 %, but will also 
use wireless and satellite to cover the remaining 20% of the population. 
“The product approach involves offering one product construct for fibre, 
wireless and satellite and one entry level speed across the technologies 
for the same wholesale price”, (NBNCo, 2013). The Australian government 
believes that the National Broadband Network has potential to provide 
economic and social benefits e.g. to health and education sectors, create 
employment and new business opportunities. According to OECD (2009, 
p4), broadband networks “serve as a communication and transaction 
platform for the entire economy and can improve productivity across all 
sectors. Advanced communication networks are a key component of 
innovative ecosystems and support economic growth”.  
Service providers will seek access from the NBN provider and to qualify to 
be an „access seeker‟, whereby a service provider must meet certain 
requirements and NBN is not allowed to discriminate against any access 
seeker as long as all requirements are met. The NBN company will make 
a thorough investigation of the actual product proposed by the access 
seeker and will test for interoperability of the proposed product with NBN 
from a technical, operational and organisational capability viewpoint so as 
to ensure that the service provider will successfully „interoperate‟. The 
fixed or fibre wholesale open access model is more of a local loop 
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unbundling and the wireless portion is a bit complex as it requires that the 
service provider seeks other parts of the network from other third parties to 
complete the network, (NBNCo, 2013). The NBN company is given full 
control on the entire network with the regulator getting involved when there 
are disputes that cannot be resolved by the affected parties. The 
incumbent operator in Australia, Telstra was „threatened‟ to structurally 
separate or will be prevented from accessing additional spectrum for 
advanced wireless broadband if it remained vertically integrated, (Oliver, 
2012, p15). This forced Telstra to enter into agreements “to make its 
infrastructure, including pits, ducts and backhaul fibre, available to NBN 
Co, and to migrate its fixed line customers progressively from its own 
copper and HFC networks to NBN Co‟s wholesale fibre network”, (Given, 
2010, p545). The NBN Company however builds the whole network 
infrastructure without providing retail services to any end users which 
gives the model the same flavour as proposed by ICASA, however, more 
on the fixed (fibre) side. One of the major concerns though is the financial 
viability of this arrangement and whether there will be enough rate of 
return for the private operators and also that it would change the business 
model of the incumbents in the South African environment. 
2.12.2 US: ‘Open access’ for digital dividend licensing 
The United States is a federal republic consisting of 50 states and is the 
World Bank‟s largest shareholder. It has a population size of 319.9 million 
people with the GDP of $16.24 trillion, (World Bank, 2012).  Open access 
explained in this instance and from the direct quotes refers to „access at 
wholesale level‟. 
The US is among the first countries to introduce open access model in one 
form or the other and mainly in fixed services be it copper or cable 
networks. “In the United States, open access policies and, specifically, 
local loop unbundling played a major role in telecommunication policy 
debates in the 1990s and 2000s”, (OECD, 2013, p13). “…Telephone 
companies have [long] provided open access to competing ISPs and 
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content providers because they are subject to common-carrier regulation 
of their services, including broadband services”, (Crandall, 2003, p29). In 
those countries that have cable networks e.g. US, these networks are 
being upgraded to be able to accommodate broadband services but 
“unlike copper networks, open access regulation of broadband services 
provided over cable is relatively rare in OECD countries and, if it exists, it 
is implemented at a higher layer of the network” (OECD, 2013, p9), open 
access in this case referring to local loop unbundling even though not on a 
mandatory basis. This apparently is attributable to complex challenges at 
the access layers.  
Even though the US has always been amongst the leading countries in 
ICT connectivity but it left the issue of broadband connectivity or 
broadband for all to the market which unfortunately resulted in the country 
lagging behind with low broadband speed and high costs. It was only in 
2010 that government passed a national broadband strategy which 
amongst others was to assist in job creation…. One of the aims of the 
United States National Broadband Plan (2010) is to facilitate and expedite 
the development and use of high-speed broadband infrastructure by using 
broadband to create jobs and advance economic growth, (Falch & Henten, 
2010). The objective of the US government is that “by 2020, at least 100 
million U.S. homes should have affordable access to actual download 
speeds of at least 100 Mbps and actual upload speeds of at least 50 
Mbps”, (Kruger, 2013, p2). 
In 2007, the US took a chance at licensing the 700 MHz band (the digital 
dividend) which was referred to as one of the most important auctions of 
the century, (Goodman, 2009). In licensing the digital dividend, the US 
imposed conditions that those who get the licences must abide by the 
“open platform conditions”, which meant that network operators must allow 
consumers to use any devices and applications as long as they did not 
cause harm to the network, (Freyens, 2009 & Goodman, 2009). The „open 
platform conditions‟ were supported by the new entrants as they promoted 
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innovation and competition whereas the incumbents objected citing that 
“the FCC [US regulator] [would find itself] in continual oversight of a 
competitive industry and would deter investment in wireless broadband. 
Furthermore, they argued that open platform conditions would depress 
auction revenue”, (Goodman, 2009, p349). The FCC later changed the 
conditions and added a clause that allows it to re-auction the spectrum 
and remove the open platform conditions should the reserve price not be 
met. The regulator went ahead and licensed one block of the 700 MHz 
spectrum with „open platform conditions‟ to much criticism from the 
„Congress members‟, (Goodman, 2009). The open access platform is 
proving to be complex even for countries like the US whether this is due to 
competition issues or technical issues remains to be seen. 
2.12.3 GERMANY: Obligations imposed on 800 MHz licences 
Germany is a federal republic in western-central Europe and has the 
largest population of any EU country, (EU, 2014). It has a population of 
81.89 million, (World Bank, 2012) and a GDP of $3.428 trillion, (EU, 2014). 
Germany is the World Bank‟s third largest shareholder and the world‟s 
third largest economy (World Bank, 2012 & EU, 2014). 
Germany like many other countries launched its National Broadband 
Strategy in 2009 with objectives to expand coverage to the broader 
population, to increase speeds in those areas that have access to some 
basic broadband technology with the hope of generate thousands of jobs. 
In actual fact one of the stated objectives is to provide 
75 per cent of German households with access to a broadband 
connection of at least 50Mbps by 2014. The second scenario 
(labelled “ultra-broadband” and covering 2015-2020) defines the 
investment required to provide to 50 per cent of households with at 
least 100 Mbps, and another 30 per cent with 50 Mbps by 2020 
(ITU, 2012, p23). 
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The strategy combines a mix of technologies to ensure wider coverage 
and high speed connectivity. In addressing areas that can only be covered 
by wireless technologies, Germany auctioned and licensed spectrum in 
the 800 MHz band. These licenses were issued with rural coverage 
broadband obligations, referred to in this document as the „German 
model‟. The German model states that “the winners of the spectrum [the 
800 MHz spectrum] were required to build-out their networks in listed 
communities in four stages in areas with no or very low broadband 
coverage, before deploying in more populated area”, (GSMA, 2011, p3) 
these were divided into different priorities with the less densely populated 
given the first priority. The four stages are: 
 smaller towns and districts with 5000 or fewer inhabitants (priority 
stage 1) 
 towns and districts with between 5000 and 20000 inhabitants 
(priority stage 2) 
 towns and districts with between 20000 and 50000 inhabitants 
(priority stage 3) 
 towns and districts with more than 50000 inhabitants (priority stage 
4). (GSMA, 2011, p3). 
The condition was that 90% of the population in those areas must be 
covered first before moving to the next second priority stage. The 
operators were also allowed to share infrastructure and lease spectrum. 
2.12.4 BRICS countries 
BRICS is a group of emerging economies representing Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa. Before the inclusion of South Africa in 2010, 
this group was referred to as BRIC, (Kelly & Rossotto, 2012). The BRICS 
members are all developing and newly industrialised countries and are all 
G20 members, (World Bank, 2012). A brief look at the broadband 
strategies of Brazil and Russia where the concept of open access is 
mainly introduced will be carried out with the exception of South Africa 
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which is the country being studied. China and India will also not be 
included. 
Brazil: Infrastructure sharing as a form of open access 
Brazil is the fifth most populated and fifth largest country in the world, with 
a population of 198.66 million people, (World Bank, 2012). Brazil is 
classified as an emerging economy but is ranked among the top ten 
countries worldwide when ranked by total number of broadband users, 
(Jensen, 2011, Kelly & Rossotto, 2012). “At the end of 2010 Brazil was in 
9th position, with about 15m fixed broadband subscribers, as well as 20m 
mobile broadband (3G) subscribers”, (Jensen, 2011, p7). In fact Brazil is 
the World‟s 7th wealthiest economy, (World Bank, 2012). Brazil has some 
similarities to South Africa that have been identified e.g. a bigger 
percentage of population staying in rural areas and a huge disparity 
between poor and rich communities including a growing middle class. It 
launched one of the largest projects to triple broadband penetration by 
2014 to include mainly low-income households that are either poorly 
served or under-served, (Jensen, 2011). The kind of open access 
introduced in Brazil was that of MVNO‟s with an aim of improving 
broadband access in 2008. The official national broadband strategy was 
however launched in 2010, (Roetter, 2013). The commitment made 
through the national broadband strategy is that “by [2014, Brazil must] 
“have 30 million fixed broadband connections, including homes, 
businesses and co-operatives, plus 100,000 telecasters”, (Roetter, 2013, 
p31). In Brazil, broadband was found to add up to 1.4 percent to the 
employment growth rate (Kelly & Rossotto, 2012). 
The high demand bands have been licensed to different operators with the 
1.9/2.1 GHz band auctioned with mandatory infrastructure sharing with 
smaller operators as a form of open access model. As evident in the 
explanation here, open access is used loosely but refers to „access at 
wholesale level‟. The SMP operators are compelled to charge the smaller 
operators lower wholesale prices, (Jensen, 2011). Also “a form of local 
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loop unbundling is also being considered that would allow any provider to 
sell services on the last mile if the operator that installed it is not providing 
services”, (Jensen, 2011, p23). This makes for open access at the 
wholesale level so that competition is only at the retail level. 
 Russia: Consortium to build wholesale open access network 
Russia is a country in northern Eurasia. It is the largest country in the 
world covering more than one-eighth of the Earth's inhabited land area. It 
is also the world's ninth most populous nation with 143.5 million people 
with a GDP of $2.015 trillion, (World Bank, 2012).  
In Russia, the Broadband strategy was launched in 2010. The 
commitment is that “by 2010, [there should be] 15 lines per 100 
population; by 2015, to have 35 lines per 100 population”, (Roetter, 2013, 
p31). The way wholesale open access was introduced is that, a mobile 
operator (Yota) in 2010 “reached an agreement … with four mobile 
operators in the country, to roll out one single wholesale LTE network that 
will be utilised by the four operators on a wholesale basis”, (OECD, 2013, 
p32). The challenge with this approach is that these mobile operators had 
already started making plans of their own e.g. trial of LTE throughout the 
country, (Northfield, 2011). The issue to consider is the impact of this new 
arrangement even though the LTE network will be accessed by these 
mobile operators, the reality is that it changes the business model. One of 
the issues indicated is “an arrangement for the separation of network 
ownership and service provision,... to avoid the cost of duplication of 
infrastructure investment and provide users with faster mobile access at 
lower prices”, (OECD, 2013, p32). There is also an option for these 
operators to have 20% future stake in Yota, (OECD, 2013). This is another 
form of wholesale open access highlighted focusing on infrastructure 
sharing. 
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2.12.5 Kenya 
Within the African continent, the broadband strategy of Kenya will be 
looked into. Kenya has a population of about 44 million, (World Bank, 
2012). The economy of Kenya is the largest by GDP in East and Central 
Africa.  
The government of Kenya launched a broadband strategy, „a draft national 
broadband strategy for Kenya‟ in 2013 with the aim of “transform[ing] 
Kenya to a knowledge-based society driven by a high capacity nationwide 
broadband network”, and also in order to assist in achieving Kenya‟s 
Vision 2030, (Kenya, 2013). Vision 2030 seeks to “provide Kenyan citizens 
with a lifestyle that is equivalent to the experience that a newly 
industrialized country provides. The overall objective of [the] strategy is to 
provide quality broadband services to all citizens”, (Kenya, 2013, p3). This 
sounds like a common theme to most broadband strategies worldwide 
including South Africa. The difference and the challenge is in the 
implementation details.  
The wireline and mobile broadband penetration rate was estimated at two 
subscriptions per 100 people in 2010, “90% of Kenyans do not have 
access to broadband” meaning Kenya like all the developing countries 
“still has significant progress to make with respect to broadband uptake”, 
(Kenya, 2013). A number of initiatives have been launched to address 
issues of literacy, education, content and others as a way of increasing the 
uptake. Kenyan connections to three undersea cables has resulted in an 
80 percent decrease in wholesale bandwidth costs”, (Kelly & Rosotto, 
2012, p323). “The Kenyan government, for example, has supported open 
access to backbone infrastructure in various ways. It encouraged 
operators to participate in the TEAMS undersea cable and has also 
pursued public-private partnerships for national backbone construction”, 
(Kelly & Rosotto, 2012, p314). 
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The Kenyan government again like many other administrations has [also] 
proposed a private public initiative to form a consortium that will roll out a 
wireless network in the context of a single national open access LTE 
network, with open access referring to „wholesale access‟. The network 
will be funded and used by a single “consortium”. The incumbent 
operators in Kenya will form part of the consortium. “The ownership 
structure is based on a public and private partnership (PPP) where the 
government and telecommunication operators will own stakes equivalent 
to the capital they will invest in this joint venture” (OECD, 2013, p32). This 
approach is similar to the Russian proposal mentioned above of one single 
wholesale LTE network. 
2.12.6 Korea  
Korea makes an interesting case study even though there is no real 
lesson on open access to be learned. However the objectives for the 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum park‟s models is to 
promote broadband connectivity for all and Korea achieved 97% percent 
coverage across the peninsula and a subscriber base of 47 million as of 
June 2009 for mobile broadband and also more than 90% penetration for 
fixed broadband and aiming to have 100 % coverage by 2015, (Kim, Kelly 
& Raja, 2010). Looking at the broadband penetration figures, South Africa 
could learn positive lessons from the Korean story hence the interest.  
Just a quick peek at Korea, Korea is divided into two distinct states, North 
and South Korea but the focus of the case study will be on South Korea 
with an estimated population of 50 million residents. It is Asia's fourth 
largest economy and the world's 15th largest economy, (World Bank, 
2012).  
Korea has been successful in rolling out broadband networks despite the 
absence of mandatory local loop unbundling (LLU), “LLU has played a 
negligible role in broadband development”, (Ovum, 2009, p102). It 
mandated open access through the broadband project and targeting newly 
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built apartments. The Korean Government played a proactive role in terms 
of ensuring rollout and penetration of broadband services to the broader 
geography and population, (Ovum, (2009), Kushida & Oh, (2006)). The 
advantage for Korea is that it has densely populated residential areas. 
About 58.6% Koreans stay in apartment buildings making it easier to 
rollout fibre networks to the buildings but the Korean government had to 
come up with a strategy for different operators to have access, share 
infrastructure and bring about choice for consumers, (OECD, 2013). Korea 
[has] “promoted open access to the inside wiring of apartment buildings, or 
other connection points for high-rise buildings, that facilitate infrastructure 
competition”, (OECD, 2013, p12). The “in-house wiring belongs to the 
house owners and is therefore not included in the wholesale market 
definition”, (OECD, 2013, p17). Korea [] also adopted a comprehensive 
broadband strategy focused on providing operators with financial 
incentives to invest in their networks”, (Kim, Kelly & Raja, 2010, p103).  
On the wireless spectrum side, “The Republic of Korea plans to re-allocate 
spectrum in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands with preference given to 
new operators and latecomers to the market”, (Qiang, 2010, p7). Korea is 
one of the countries that has a “mobile broadband penetration in excess of 
100 connections per capita”, (ITU, 2013).  
The Government‟s stance in being proactive through enabling policies, 
awareness campaigns and funding models has assisted in putting the 
country amongst the leading countries in broadband. The ITU (2013) 
asserts that “Korea ranks in the top five countries for both fixed and mobile 
broadband penetration…, and has the highest household penetration in 
the world” and developing countries could learn valuable lessons on the 
approach adopted by Korea. 
2.13 Using RIA as an investigative approach 
“RIA is a process of systematically identifying and assessing the expected 
effects of regulatory proposals, using a consistent analytical method, such 
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as benefit/cost analysis” (OECD, 2008, p3). Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004, 
p2) define RIA as “a term used to describe the process of systematically 
assessing the benefits and costs of a new regulation or an existing 
regulation, with the aim of improving the quality of regulatory policy”. The 
process of RIA is assessed in terms of „good governance principles‟ and 
these comprise, “consistency in decision making to avoid uncertainty, 
accountability for regulatory actions and outcomes, and transparency in 
decision making to avoid arbitrariness and promote accountability”, 
(Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2003, p3). This is what was not done when 
proposing the new spectrum licensing models. RIA is introduced in a 
number of countries to regulate better and to improve on decision-making. 
“An impact assessment needs to encompass many factors, social, 
economic and environmental”, (Sutherland, 2010, p22). Ladergaard (2005, 
p2) concurs and describes RIA as “a tool used in most developed 
countries to improve the understanding of impacts of regulation, be it 
economic, social or environmental”. For government choosing to 
undertake a RIA study, it is important to understand who will be affected 
and the depth of the impact. “The preparation of an impact assessment 
requires a detailed understanding of the economics of specific markets in 
order to see how the different players will be affected and to measure the 
overall effects”, (Sutherland, 2010, p22). A number of authors e.g. 
Kirkpatrick & Parker, (2004) agree that the challenges in introducing RIA in 
developing countries is the lack of understanding what RIA is, limited or no 
training on RIA and many more others. 
The South African government has produced a document on „guidelines 
for the implementation of the regulatory impact analysis/assessment (RIA) 
process in South Africa‟, (RSA, 2012). In the South African 
communications industry the process of regulatory impact assessment has 
unfortunately not really been implemented. The government and 
regulatory objectives for introducing RIA are to improve governance and to 
use „evidence based‟ policy decisions. “The underlying rationale for RIA is 
that regulations need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to see 
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whether they contribute to strategic policy goals” (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 
2004, p3). According to Rodrigo (2005), there is no correct model for RIA, 
the approach differs from country to country dependent on political, 
economic and social standing and status. The bottom line is to assess ex-
ante the impact and level to which the proposed regulation affects the 
country, its economy and its people. Radaelli (2003) identifies 
„benchmarking‟ and „lesson drawing‟ as the two RIA methods. The OECD 
includes expert, consensus, political, empirical and benchmarking as the 
different RIA methods. The cost/ benefit analysis, multi-criteria analysis or 
even simple checklists can then be used to compare the different RIA 
methods.  
The following are some of the questions on the checklist to be answered 
when conducting RIA: 
1. Is the problem correctly defined? 
2. Is government action justified? 
3. Is regulation the best form of government action? 
4. Is there a legal basis for regulation? 
5. What is the appropriate level (or levels) of government for this action? 
6. Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs? 
7. Is the distribution of effects across society transparent? 
8. Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible and accessible to 
users? 
9. Have all interested parties had the opportunity to present their views? 
10. How will compliance be achieved? Source: OECD (1995). 
The decision whether to regulate or not arises: 
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When the benefit to be derived from the regulation cannot justify the cost 
for the government action and yet the problem will still not be addressed 
effectively. (OECD, 2008). RIA will assist in arriving at a decision on 
whether to take action or not in addressing a particular goal. In this 
instance it will investigate whether or not the intentions and actions by 
ICASA are justified. 
What governments have been struggling to do is to evaluate the 
usefulness and effectiveness of the regulations being introduced hence 
RIA was adopted in many developed countries and slowly making in-roads 
in developing countries. “RIA usually involves the use of economic 
analysis – in particular cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis 
– to examine the impact of government regulations”, (Goggin & Lauder, 
2008, p15). The challenge would be to turn the results into monetary 
terms. Quantification of costs and benefits may prove difficult in some 
cases and that a qualitative measure may prove valuable”, (Hahn, Burnett, 
Chan, Mader, & Moyle, 2000, p10).  
Governments and the regulators have always had a key responsibility 
from a policy and a regulatory point of view to ensure that frequency 
spectrum as a scarce resource is used effectively and efficiently. In a 
country like South Africa spectrum is also a tool that could help 
government to reduce communication costs by increasing competition and 
to bridge the digital broadband divide. RIA will investigate if the proposed 
models achieve the government‟s strategic goal of increasing competition 
and bridging the digital broadband divide. To the communications industry, 
frequency spectrum is one of the most valued business assets. 
Government introduced competition in the South African communications 
industry but has struggled to enforce the licence obligations on those 
operators to bring broadband to all citizens. Cave (2002, p221) suggests 
that “regulators should be interested in inserting competition in 
infrastructure as deeply as possible in the spectrum value-chain in order to 
sharpen commercial rivalries and promote service differentiation”. 
54 
 
Wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks could be but one of 
the models of introducing such competition. 
2.14 Conceptual framework for spectrum regulation 
The conceptual framework includes two major perspectives, namely 
approaches to spectrum regulation and the utilisation of regulatory impact 
assessment ex-ante. 
According to Cave (2002, p5) spectrum is “a finite but non-exhaustive 
resource which is a vital input into an ever widening range of services”, 
and is always referred to as a scarce resource. Spectrum licensing is a 
component of spectrum management process and is a highly regulated 
subject. First-come first-served and beauty contest licensing approaches 
are some of the traditional command and control exclusive assignment 
methods; whereas auction and lotteries are some of the market-based 
assignment methods. Increasing demand for spectrum to operate mobile 
and broadband networks required spectrum administrators to introduce 
alternatives to accommodate the limited supply by introducing secondary 
markets, for example spectrum leasing, trading and re-farming as 
reassignment methods. Licence-exempt, open-access or spectrum 
commons approaches require no licensing as the names suggest, but are 
open for all users to access as long as certain regulatory limitations are 
observed. These are the few critical spectrum policy and regulatory 
concepts that the study utilises to investigate the research problem.  
The regulatory impact analysis/assessment (RIA) methodology is an 
important underlying process to inform good regulatory practice, including 
understanding the comparative benefits of various spectrum regulation 
models and is used to investigate the wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum park models proposed by ICASA. Different spectrum 
regulation approaches have yielded different results with the traditional 
approach creating „artificial scarcity‟ and „hoarding‟, leading to the creation 
of secondary markets.  Demand-supply asymmetry requires regulators to 
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introduce flexible market-based spectrum regulatory mechanisms, such as 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks, and other 
mechanisms.   
Figure 5: Generic overview for spectrum regulation 
 
Source: Researcher‟s own 
2.14.1 Traditional spectrum regulation 
From the literature discussed in this chapter, the traditional spectrum 
regulation methods favoured government owned entities and operators 
that came into the market first which at the time was just a handful hence 
they ended up with more spectrum which was either underutilised or used 
inefficiently. Analysing the progress with and the impact of the traditional 
spectrum regulation methods on the South African market, in particular the 
exclusivity that was given to operators for high demand spectrum, may 
assist with understanding ICASA‟s basis and the objectives for introducing 
the 2011 spectrum licensing models. The aim is to understand the 
advantages and disadvantages of the models proposed by ICASA, given 
the artificial spectrum scarcity and hoarding created by the traditional 
spectrum regulation models.  
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2.14.2 Market-based spectrum regulation approaches 
From the theory discussed in this chapter, it is evident that traditional 
spectrum regulation methods with exclusive licensing failed to connect 
rural areas, hence the introduction of market based spectrum regulation 
mechanisms. The study investigates the extent to which the particular 
market-based spectrum regulation models proposed, namely wholesale 
open access and managed spectrum park, have the potential to address 
the issues of broadband connectivity, competition and the introduction of 
new markets. Market-based spectrum regulation mechanisms are 
preferred as assignment methods for high demand spectrum as they are 
viewed as objective and transparent. Introducing these new concepts in 
South Africa, it is critical to consider the readiness of the South African 
market, hence RIA is employed to analyse the perceived benefit versus 
the perceived cost. 
2.14.3 Secondary markets for spectrum utilisation 
The concept of secondary markets emerged from research and the 
contemplation of traditional spectrum management models and the 
introduction of market-based models. Secondary markets are a by-product 
of both traditional and market-based spectrum management mechanisms. 
The investigation into possible secondary markets for spectrum in South 
Africa arises as a result of hoarding created by traditional spectrum 
management methods and the realisation that supply cannot meet the 
demand for extensive high-speed bandwidth network infrastructure. This 
aspect of the investigation has the potential to assist in determining 
whether and how secondary markets may develop under the proposed 
models to address the demand-supply asymmetry, and to balance 
technology progress and competition. The issues investigated for broad 
stakeholder consideration include co-existence and co-operation amongst 
the licensees to allow for easy implementation of the proposed models. 
The terms for spectrum sharing are negotiated either amongst the 
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licensees or with the regulator, hence the study explores where the 
proposed models saw this responsibility residing. 
2.14.4 Open access spectrum 
For the sake of clarity in this report, open access and spectrum commons 
have the same meaning as licence-exempt, unless otherwise specified. 
These approaches are believed to encourage innovation, spectrum 
sharing and to address the issue of „artificial spectrum scarcity‟. The study 
investigates how the proposed models relate to these concepts (open 
access, spectrum commons or licence-exempt) and any similar elements, 
in order to expand the understanding of these models. The obvious 
advantage of open access approach is that no operator has priority over 
others, and operators must learn to co-exist. The study examines the 
managed spectrum park approach to see if there are any elements within 
the definition, which could address those sentiments advocated for by 
open access and spectrum commons. 
2.15. Conclusion 
At the beginning of the chapter, it was highlighted that spectrum regulation 
concepts e.g. exclusive licensing, license-exempt and open access will be 
investigated to gain better understanding of the proposed wholesale open 
access and managed spectrum park models. The investigation focused 
mainly on the approaches that have been employed in South Africa and in 
particular on ICASA‟s proposed licensing models. The regulatory impact 
assessment is highlighted as a methodological approach to carry out the 
study. The following chapter explains the basic principles of RIA that are 
considered for the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Research Methodology and Design  
The research approach will be discussed in this chapter together with the 
design and data collection. 
3.1. Introducing the qualitative RIA 
Research is about asking questions and finding answers to those 
questions. Goddard & Melville (2001, p1) define research as “a process of 
expanding the boundaries of our ignorance” and “not just a process of 
gathering information”. Once a problem is identified and questions are 
known, the researcher decides on the research methodology as a quest to 
finding out those answers. 
“Research methodology is what makes social science scientific”, 
(Neuman, 1997, p79). This section describes the methodology to be 
followed in conducting the research. It identifies the research approach, 
the research design, the sampling methodology and data analysis. 
Limitations of the research will also be highlighted.  
3.2. Research approach: Qualitative regulatory impact assessment 
The approach to be undertaken for this study is qualitative research 
instead of quantitative methodology. The reason for qualitative is that the 
researcher‟s “primary interest is in understanding a phenomenon”, 
(Merriam, 2002, p4), in this instance the advantages and disadvantages of 
ICASA‟s 2011 spectrum licensing models i.e. wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum parks. Merriam (2002, p5) further explains that 
qualitative research is undertaken “because there is a lack of theory or an 
existing theory fails to adequately explain a phenomenon” as is the case 
with wholesale open access and managed spectrum park in a South 
African context. Investigation of phenomena in qualitative research takes 
place in their natural settings (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p34) hence the 
interactions with interviewees will be conducted in their natural settings i.e. 
where people work or any other familiar environment and the interpretation 
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of the collected data will be done mainly in words as it might be difficult to 
quantify the responses. Qualitative research is about making sense and 
interpreting other peoples‟ worlds or seeing things from their perspectives 
i.e. putting yourself in their shoes. Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, (2011, p9) 
assert that “one of the main distinctive features of qualitative research is 
that the approach allows you to identify issues from the perspective view 
of your study participants, and understand the meaning and interpretations 
that they give to behaviour, events or objects”. Merriam (2002, p15) 
observes that “in qualitative research, it is the rich thick descriptions, the 
words (not numbers) that persuade the reader of the trustworthiness of the 
findings”. This subjective nature of qualitative research requires “the 
researcher [to be an] instrument for data collection”, which allows them to 
get close enough to social subjects to be able to discover, interpret and 
understand participants‟ perspectives of social reality”, (Shaw, 1999, p6). 
In comparison with quantitative approach, the general process for 
quantitative is to test theory, it is meant to study statistical and numeric 
environments and therefore it is measurable, (Anderson, 2006). According 
to Creswell (2003, p18), in a qualitative research, “the researcher collects 
open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes 
from the data”. Anderson (2006) further notes that “… qualitative research 
generates rich, detailed and valid data that contribute to in-depth 
understanding of the context whereas quantitative research generates 
reliable population based and generalizable data and is well suited to 
establishing cause-and-effect relationships”, (Anderson, 2006, p3).. 
Marshall (1996, p1) agrees that “the aim of the quantitative approach is to 
test pre-determined hypotheses and produce generalizable results and 
such studies are useful for answering more mechanistic 'what?' 
questions”. Compared to qualitative studies which he states “aim to 
provide illumination and understanding of complex psychosocial issues 
and are most useful for answering humanistic 'why?' and 'how?' 
questions”, (Marshall, 1996, p1).  In further exploring on the approach, one 
looks at Creswell‟s definitions and descriptions of qualitative versus 
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quantitative methods. He gives the following definitions for better 
understanding of the differences between qualitative and quantitative 
research designs and environments in which they are employed: “A 
qualitative approach is one in which the inquirer often makes knowledge 
claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives…. It also uses 
strategies of inquiry such as narratives, phenomenologies, ethnographies, 
grounded theory studies, or case studies”, (Creswell, 2003, p18). On the 
other hand he defines quantitative approach as “one in which the 
investigator primarily uses post-positivist claims for developing 
knowledge…, [observing that] it employs strategies of inquiry such as 
experiments and surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments 
that yield statistical data”, (Creswell, 2003, p18). The study being 
conducted does not look into experiments or predetermined hypotheses 
and theorems, it aims to investigate and understand views from the 
different industry participants hence the conclusion to follow a qualitative 
approach. 
Patton quoted in Merriam (2002, p4) refers to qualitative research as “an 
effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular 
context and the interactions there”. The decision therefore to do qualitative 
or quantitative depends on a number of factors e.g. the kind of study, the 
environment or industry and the availability of enabling resources. 
Marshall (1996) suggests that a decision to undertake qualitative or 
quantitative should be based on the research question and not as a 
preference to the researcher. With all the different explanations and 
definitions from the different authors and taking those factors into 
consideration, quantitative research is therefore neither practical nor 
relevant for the study being undertaken as there is no numerical data to be 
explored, no experiments are to be considered and only a small pre-
defined group is targeted. 
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3.2.1 Describing RIA in line with the qualitative study conducted 
The study looks into the advantages and disadvantages of ICASA‟s 2011 
proposed spectrum licensing models and therefore interviews will be 
conducted with key players to understand their views. Babbie and Mouton 
(2004, 270) suggests that “the use of the term “qualitative” refers to a 
collection of methods and techniques which share a certain set of 
principles and logic”, e.g. case studies, ethnographic studies. “The primary 
aim of such an approach is in-depth descriptions and understandings of 
actions and events”, (Babbie and Mouton, 2004, p270). The concerns and 
complexities anticipated due to the introduction of these alternative 
spectrum licensing models will be explored. “Qualitative approaches focus 
on phenomena that occur in natural settings and involve studying those 
phenomena in all their complexity”, (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005, p133). The 
approach will follow a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) process. The 
benefit of following a RIA process is that it “exposes the merits of 
decisions and the impacts of actions” and for that reason it “is closely 
linked to processes of public consultation” (Rodrigo, 2005, p7). The 
interviews that will be conducted are part of the public consultation; the 
difference being that the questions will only be shared with a chosen target 
group not with the general public. As part of data collection and 
stakeholder consultation, a set of questions will be prepared and circulated 
to a targeted group of operators, organisations and identified individuals. 
“Consultation with stakeholder groups is one of the most cost-effective 
ways of obtaining data to support RIA”, (OECD, 2008, p19). Responses 
(through the submitted documents) received from ICASA‟s public 
consultation process will also be critically assessed and analysed. As part 
of the benefit-cost analysis, the stakeholders will be requested to voice 
their views on alternative spectrum licensing models that are more 
appropriate for South Africa taking into consideration government 
objectives and the level of broadband connectivity, amount of available 
bandwidth versus the demand and the cost of communication in South 
Africa. According to the OECD (2008, p3), “RIA is a comparative process”, 
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it is about looking at all alternative regulations that could be implemented 
to achieve the same regulatory objectives, using the same analysis (e.g. 
benefit/cost analysis) for all and then making an informed decision 
whether to regulate or not. RIA will therefore assist the decision-maker on 
an appropriate action as sometimes “you may find that another type of 
policy tool is likely to achieve the objective more effectively or efficiently”, 
(OECD, 2008, p5) than the proposed approach. For this research, a 
benefit-cost analysis process will be done considering the proposed 
spectrum licensing models versus other alternative models including 
exclusive licensing, ownership rights etc., because even if it becomes 
challenging to convert the regulatory impacts into monetary terms, “the 
benefit-cost approach [still] provides a constructive means for decision-
making” (Viscusi, 1997, p182) and a qualitative analysis will be used on 
the final results. As Merriam (2002, p5) concurs, the product of qualitative 
is richly descriptive”. Jacobs (2006, 34) further insists that “the economics 
thrust of RIA has always favored benefit-cost analysis (BCA) as the most 
inclusive and socially responsible method of public decision-making”. A 
number of authors emphasize that RIA is about asking the right questions 
and in that case the sequence of questions is not really important. This fits 
in well with the nature of the study as the researcher should give operators 
enough liberty and not be confined by the questions. This assists as the 
operators might actually come up with more questions to consider as part 
of the investigation.  
3.3. Research Design and data collection 
Babbie and Mouton (2004) use an analogy of building a house in 
explaining research design, and that it is an „architectural design or a plan‟ 
to be followed when conducting the research. An Exploratory (Empirical) 
type of RIA will be used with document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews for collecting data. This is more like doing an investigation to 
get an understanding and finding answers. The process of “document 
analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - 
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both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) 
material”, (Bowen, 2009, p27). The analysis of the documents is already 
done in document analysis and “the analytical procedure entails, finding, 
selecting, appraising (making sense of), and synthesising data contained 
in documents”, (Bowen 2009, p28). Whereas in semi-structured interview 
“specific information is desired from all participants, this forms the highly 
structured part of the interview. The largest part of the interview is guided 
by a list of questions or issues to be explored, neither the exact wording 
nor order is determined ahead of time”, (Merriam, 2002, p13). A 
combination of document analysis and semi-structured interviews will 
assist as “multiple methods enhance the validity of findings”, (Merriam, 
2002, p12) and some of the relevant smaller players may not be easily 
accessible for face to face interviews. Data collection in research means 
taking the design or plan of how to do it and putting it into action.  
3.3.1. Checklist as the RIA process to be followed 
A RIA approach will be used in all the different steps of the research study. 
“The usefulness of a RIA depends on the quality of the data used to 
evaluate the impact of a proposed or existing regulation”, (Rodrigo, 2005, 
p18).  
The basic checklist questions (see under RIA) will be added to the 
interview questions in order to assess ex-ante whether the proposed 
models will achieve government‟s strategic goals. Basically the checklist 
will be used as a type of RIA process chosen for the study as the 
questions touch on all the critical elements of RIA, e.g. cost-benefit and 
alternatives. All the questions on the checklist will be used including those 
that investigate costs taking into consideration the expected limitations on 
the availability of monetary data. These limitations will be explained. 
Viscusi (1997), stresses that the rationale for benefit-cost test should be to 
ensure that policymakers and regulators choose and implement 
regulations that will benefit society. The benefit-cost analysis will be 
conducted on the proposed models and comparisons will be made with 
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alternative models that could be employed to achieve same goals. This 
will be done in order to understand the cost of the proposed regulation on 
the regulator, operators and the economy versus the benefit to the 
industry as a whole including the public in general.  
In SA telecoms environment, the incumbents usually use similar 
arguments for or against certain proposed regulations vs the rest of the 
smaller telecoms players. Ethnographic study (which is a form of 
qualitative research method) will be used through the RIA methodology. 
Babbie & Mouton (2004) observe that this approach has openness to 
multiple sources. Ethnographic study has to present sociocultural 
interpretation of data and should not be concerned about how it was 
collected but rather its interpretation, (Merriam, 2002, p8). “Ethnographic 
designs are procedures for describing, analysing, and interpreting a 
culture-sharing groups shared patterns of behaviour, beliefs and language 
that develop over time”, (Creswell, 2002, p436). In this instance “RIA [will 
assist] furnish empirical data that can be used to make wise regulatory 
decisions”, and “…[will] be useful in promoting [both] economic and social 
welfare” (Rodrigo, 2005, p3) which according to ICASA is the basis for the 
introduction of these spectrum licensing models. Rodrigo (2005, p18) 
further suggests that “[one] can ensure better data quality by involving 
expert groups in the consultation process, such as academic and other 
research bodies that do not have strong sectional interests in the issue”. 
This will bring the objectivity to the process by getting views outside the 
sector operators. The idea is to find facts which will contribute towards an 
informed recommendation hence academics and industry experts form 
part of the sample to be interviewed. Merriam, (2002) suggest that the way 
questions are structured and the way data is collected should relate to 
how it will be analysed and used.  Regardless of which method you decide 
to use, recording should be done concurrent with data collection if 
possible, or soon thereafter, so that nothing gets lost and „memory doesn‟t 
fade‟. In conducting RIA there is no „one size fits all‟ approach and 
therefore it will be adapted to suit the environment, i.e. the limited time 
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available, human resources available and costs associated with 
performing a very detailed regulatory impact assessment on the proposed 
spectrum licensing models. 
3.4. Sampling Methodology 
“The cost of studying an entire population to answer a specific question is 
usually prohibitive in terms of time, money and resources, therefore a 
subset of subjects representatives of a given population must be selected, 
this is called sampling”, Lunsford & Lunsford (1995, p105). Neuman (2011, 
p219) refers to a sample “as a smaller set of cases a researcher selects 
from a larger pool and generalizes to the population”. What this means is 
that sampling is about choosing a well-represented sample in order to 
avoid leaving out some people, objects or items of the group or population 
being studied.  This is an indication that during research, a researcher is 
dependent on a chosen sample to draw conclusions on a particular topic 
being studied. Marshall (1996) stresses the importance of not using 
random sampling for qualitative studies as this generalises the results. 
“Qualitative researchers are intentionally non-random in their selection of 
data sources, … they select those individuals or objects that will yield the 
most information about the topic under investigation”, (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005, p145). The challenge is not about how many people are interviewed 
but the relevance and the understanding of the topic being investigated. 
Neuman (2011, p219) agrees that “qualitative researchers focus less on a 
sample‟s representativeness than on how the sample or small collection of 
cases, units, or activities illuminates social life”. He asserts that “the 
primary focus is to collect specific cases, even, or actions than can clarify 
and deepen understanding”, (Neuman, 2011, p219). In deciding on a 
particular sample, the environment being studied is taken into 
consideration. The South African population is sitting at just above 50 
million but the interest group is very small. Therefore, for this study, 
purposeful sampling will be chosen because the target market is well 
defined and as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2005), only relevant 
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stakeholders who will add value to this investigation will be interviewed. 
For example, all incumbent operators will be interviewed including the 
representative from the communications forum representing the smaller 
players. The regulator and the policy maker i.e. the department of 
communications will be interviewed. Academics and experts also form part 
of the sample to get objective views. Few equipment vendors will be 
considered to get a technical understanding of infrastructure sharing on 
the access level. Given the limited time and human resources, the study 
will exclude all other government departments and ancillary services‟ 
departments like maritime, aeronautical etc. Also because qualitative 
research method will be used so no random sampling will be done. 
3.4.1. Sample of interviewees 
As explained, sampling is done because it is impractical to interview the 
entire population or industry being studied. The goals of sampling are to 
decrease time and money costs, to increase the amount of data and detail 
that can be obtained, and to increase accuracy of data collection by 
preventing errors”, (Lunsford &Lunsford, 1995, p111). It might also not be 
economical to target the entire population and within limited time period 
hence the quality of the researcher‟s sample will eventually determine the 
credibility and reliability of the study results. 
The incumbent operators play a very active role in policy and regulation 
formulation and consider spectrum as key to their business success with 
good reason given the evolution of technologies. The question is whether 
the incumbents have enough spectrum to cater for the 4G type 
technologies or DoC and whether ICASA will actually cripple the 
communications industry by excluding them in the licensing process. It 
therefore makes sense that the following participants from the following 
operators will be interviewed to get their views: incumbent operators, few 
smaller players, representative from the communications forum on the 
proposed spectrum licensing models and the best ways to service 
government goals. To add to the industry interviewees, representatives 
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from DoC and ICASA will be interviewed to get an understanding behind 
the thinking when the proposed models were introduced and academics 
will be consulted to get objective views on practicality. Table 1 below 
indicates a list of interviewees and they all have more than 10 years‟ 
experience in the sector: 
Table 1: Sample of interviewees from the industry 
Interviewee Type of institution Brief profile and experience 
1 SO1 Government entity The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
2 IN2 Incumbent operator The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
5 PR11 Government policy The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays critical role in 
spectrum policy 
6 PR12 Government policy The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays a critical role in 
spectrum policy 
7 MA1 Manufacturer The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
regulatory processes  
9 PR22 Regulator The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays a critical role in 
spectrum regulation 
10 PR21 Regulator The interviewee has vast 
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experience in the communications 
sector and plays a critical role in 
spectrum regulation 
11 NE1 New entrant The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before but the interview was 
cancelled 
12 CA1 Communications forum The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
regulatory processes  
13 IN3 Incumbent operator The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
regulatory processes  
14 NE2 New entrant The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and has worked for the 
regulator before but the interview 
was cancelled 
15 IN1 Incumbent operator The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
16 AC1 Academic The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
17 MA3 Manufacturer The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
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regulatory processes  
18 NE3 New entrant The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
19 SO2 Government entity The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
regulatory processes  
20 IN5 Incumbent The interviewee has vast 
experience in the communications 
sector and plays an active role in 
regulatory processes  
21 AC2 Academic The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
22 IN4 Incumbent The interviewee has vast 
experience in the 
telecommunications sector and 
has worked for the regulator 
before 
 
Source: Researcher‟s own. 
The list of interviewees mentioned above is not exhaustive and 
discussions with other affected and interested parties or beneficiaries 
might be added during the data collection process. Views from other new 
entrants will be used as part of the document analysis process. 
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3.5. Data Analysis 
Levine (1996, p1) defines data analysis as “a body of methods that help to 
describe facts, detect patterns, develop explanations, and test 
hypotheses”. On the other hand Glass (1976) described data analysis to 
have three levels: 
Primary analysis [which] is the original analysis of data in a 
research study... e.g. application of statistical methods. Secondary 
analysis is the re-analysis of data for the purpose of answering the 
original research question with better statistical techniques, or 
answering new questions with old data. The last level meta-
analysis: This one is referred to as „the analysis of analyses‟. It is 
used “to refer to the statistical analysis of a large collection of 
analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of 
integrating the findings, (Glass 1976, p3).  
Data analysis is an analytical process where raw information is 
administered, packaged, assembled in a way that assists the researcher 
to make recommendations and reach certain conclusions. The process of 
data analysis also assists in eliminating information which was not covered 
whilst identifying patterns of commonality and differences on the collected 
information. Data can be in different forms, e.g. numerical statistics, written 
submissions or oral and video submissions. This research study will seek 
to ensure that the research question is being answered or has been 
answered in any way. 
The data analysis process usually includes the steps of organising the 
data for analysis and interpreting the data amongst others. Some authors 
(Merriam, (2002), Ritchie and Spencer (2002)) advise that part of 
analysing qualitative data is about reading through the interview notes and 
listening through the interview tapes and going through any other data, 
develop codes, code the data, and „drawing connections between discrete 
pieces of data‟. It is therefore important to organise the data into specific 
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themes as per the study or different categories which will make it easier to 
interpret e.g. relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, results/impacts or 
sustainability (Shaw, 1999, Levine, 2006). The critical themes in this study 
are broadband connectivity, markets and competition. The following by-
products of the study themes will be investigated during the data collection 
process and will be used to do qualitative assessment and the decision to 
quantify any of them will be determined by the kind of information 
received: job creation, economic growth, inflation, sector investment, cost 
to communicate, business model. “Data analysis is an inductive strategy”, 
(Merriam, 2002, p6) it begins with a unit of data (phrases, meaningful 
words) and compared to another unit of data whilst looking out for 
patterns, common themes, these are then coded, developed and adjusted 
as the data collection process continues, (Merriam, 2002). The themes 
from the conceptual framework (e.g. market-based licensing, secondary 
markets, wholesale open access) all relate to the strategic objectives 
identified by the regulator and some are used as units for analysis e.g. 
broadband for all, competition and emerging markets. These will be 
analysed with the themes that emerge during the data collection process. 
3.6 Expected limitations of the research 
It is not always practical to quantify the benefit-cost of a regulation in 
monetary terms as might be the case in this study because of the 
limitations in time, limited data available to monetise the impact, however, 
“developing even an incomplete BCA can greatly improve decision-
making”, (OECD, 2008, p10). Should the costs not be quantifiable, they 
will be discussed in qualitative terms, “drawing some conclusions about 
their relative importance”, (OECD, 2008, p10). 
3.6.1. The practical limitations from field work experiences 
All the key stakeholders within the electronic communications industry will 
be interviewed in order to understand whether the proposed spectrum 
licensing models will have an effect on the communications market (1), 
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whether they will encourage competition (2) and provide broadband 
connectivity (3) for all. Permission will be requested from the regulatory 
body to view and analyse the documents submitted on the spectrum 
licensing models. 
The different individuals to be interviewed and the organisations and 
companies they represent were chosen because of their vast experience 
with technical regulations. A pleasant coincidence was that the majority of 
them have worked for the regulator before either under SATRA, IBA or 
ICASA. The researcher chose all the big incumbents, government entities 
that play part in the communications space and only the highly active 
smaller „new entrants‟. The rest of the „new entrants‟ was mainly 
represented by an industry body. This therefore gave the researcher 
confidence that those individuals will be in a position to give views from 
different perspectives to give the researcher a better understanding of the 
research problem including the research questions. However, with all the 
individuals and organisations interviewed, the reader should take into 
consideration that the sample does not represent the whole 
communications industry in the country. 
3.6.2. The following are some of the challenges experienced whilst 
collecting data: 
 Setting up appointments for interviews was not a serious problem 
but honouring those appointments by some of the smaller operators 
was a draining experience. Most of the identified smaller new 
entrants never availed themselves for interviews and were 
eventually cancelled. Strangely almost all the incumbents were 
immediately available to be interviewed.  
 The longer time it took to secure appointments 
During the interviews, it became clear that some of the questions were 
similar and as a result similar responses from the participants were given. 
As the interviews progressed, those questions were grouped together and 
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asked at the same time to avoid repetition and to give a better 
understanding to the participants. This minimised the sense of intimidation 
from the interviewees due to the number of questions. The questions were 
grouped under different themes which address the following: universal 
service obligations and broadband connectivity, technology and digital era, 
competition and finally policy and regulatory frameworks which are 
constituted to form the RIA approach and have been taken as a guide 
from the OECD RIA checklist. The participants were all given the same 
questions to answer but others were exempted from answering some of 
the questions as they were irrelevant to certain interviewees e.g. policy-
maker, regulator and academics. The questions are therefore grouped 
under the themes mentioned and will be analysed as such. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The research methodology chosen for this study is qualitative research 
method due to the nature of the problem being investigated. RIA is used 
throughout the investigative process to understand the impact of the 
proposed spectrum licensing models. The sampled group and their vast 
technical regulatory experience are highlighted. The findings from the 
fieldwork will be reported in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Ex-ante regulatory impact assessment outcomes 
The findings from the field interviews integrated with findings from 
document analysis are presented under this chapter. This chapter 
describes and presents the outcomes of the qualitative study undertaken 
by the researcher as highlighted in the previous chapters using three 
themes which are in line with the regulatory strategic goals. These are 
universal service and broadband connectivity for all, competition and 
emerging markets. A look at the regulatory framework is added as the 
overall umbrella under which all these themes were developed. As 
indicated, the three themes being analysed are part of the objectives as 
outlined in the regulations being studied and reasons for introducing the 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks models being 
analysed.  
The theme on broadband seeks views from the interviewees on whether 
the proposed spectrum licensing models would encourage broadband 
connectivity for all which would therefore build a digital country. New 
markets are created by the introduction of wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum park models hence the theme „emerging markets‟ 
which seeks to understand from the interviewees the business models 
created by these new markets. Lastly, competition as a theme is 
investigated and analysed versus competitiveness as one of the sub-
themes emerging from interviews.  
From the responses and findings of the data collection process, sub-
themes were established. The findings are thus depicted in a way that 
reflects the themes and the sub-themes created by the researcher based 
on the information from the different participants interviewed. Figure 6 
below illustrates the three themes and the sub-themes, see the figure 
below. 
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Figure 6: Themes and sub-themes from the interviews 
 
Source: Researcher‟s own  
Below is a discussion of major issues raised during the interviews which 
are based on the themes and sub-themes which were created. A total of 
20 interviews were conducted, 16 face to face semi-structured, 2 online 
and 2 telephonic interviews were also conducted. The participants to these 
interviews were selected based on their technical regulatory experience 
with the majority having worked for the regulator or in a regulatory 
environment.   
Whilst interviewing the operators it became clear that it was difficult to 
analyse ICASA‟s proposed spectrum licensing models without bringing the 
broader context under which the models were introduced. Indeed this 
expectation and view was reasonable and realistic as some of the 
questions were crafted with the background as captured in the regulations 
e.g. exclusion of all operators with spectrum assignments in the IMT 
bands. This necessitated certain critical parts of the regulation being 
brought to be part of the discussion in order to give meaning to the 
concepts in a South African environment. The results and views of the 
Lack of broadband 
connectivity in rural areas 
and using spectrum to 
achieve this 
• No distinct definition of wholesale 
open access as a spectrum 
licensing model 
• No clarity on the role of 
government or state owned 
entities in wholesale open access 
• Lack of spectrum strategy 
• No clear definition for USA and no  
clear realistic obligations 
• No incentives rural coverage 
 
Emerging new markets  
• Introduction of wholesale open 
access only and infrastructure 
sharing 
• Introduction of secondary markets 
and spectrum sharing 
Competition or 
competitiveness    
• Introduce competition on services 
and encourage competitiveness 
• Lack of resources for the new 
entrants to be competitive 
• No market study conducted 
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interviewees are displayed in the discussions below. As previously 
mentioned, the outcomes from the data collection process were 
incorporated with the results from analysis of the submission documents, 
i.e. the document analysis process.  
One common attitude from the interviewees was to basically brush aside 
the concept of managed spectrum park because it was never properly 
explained in the regulations as it was deferred to a later stage hence there 
will be a very limited discussion around it.  
4.1. Lack of broadband connectivity in rural areas and using 
spectrum to achieve this 
The main question all the participants had to respond to was in regard to 
the extent to which the spectrum licensing models would encourage 
ubiquitous and high speed connectivity for South Africa. The reasoning 
behind such a question is to understand the impact and get a view of 
whether the proposed models would actually address issues of low 
broadband connectivity especially in rural areas. This investigation is 
made so as to contrast the views and findings with the regulatory 
objectives of ICASA as stated in the 2011 draft regulations of “committing 
to making broadband available to all its citizens”, (ICASA, 2011b), also to 
check potential benefit against progress achieved through the existing 
spectrum management and licensing models.  
As previously explained, it proved difficult for participants to give straight 
answers as the view was that there are just too many policy gaps and lack 
of strategic guidelines to expand on a yes or a no answer hence the sub-
themes as discussed below.  
4.1.1 No distinct and understandable definition of wholesale open 
access as a spectrum licensing model 
The following are direct quotes from the interviewees highlighting the 
difficulty in giving straight answers on whether the wholesale open access 
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and managed spectrum park models would encourage broadband for all 
without a clear definition of the models themselves: 
IN5 stated that the Wholesale Open Access model was not really defined and the 
model is very complex though it still has merits and is the way to go in rural 
areas. 
 
NE3 alluded to the fact that there is nowhere where WOA is clearly defined since 
there are so many different models of wholesale open access, No one 
understanding on what wholesale open access is and what model government 
and ICASA are introducing 
 
SO1 indicated that there is no definition for wholesale open access and majority 
of operators came with different views for their own benefit, understandably so. 
 
MA1 stated that the regulation is clear but not reliable, it is subjective and is open 
to different interpretations and will be implemented with different challenges 
 
What became obvious from the onset was that the concepts of wholesale 
open access and managed spectrum parks were not clearly defined for 
the industry to share a common understanding and as a result operators 
and everyone else had their own different interpretations. This makes the 
regulation unclear and unreliable. One of the active manufacturers in the 
technical regulatory environment stated that “these models are untested 
and complex and can only be successful through thorough discussion 
among all stakeholders” (MA3, 20 January 2014). This view and concern 
was raised by one incumbent (IN5) and an interviewee from a 
manufacturer (MA1) as highlighted in the quotes above that “the model is 
very complex” and that “it is subject to different interpretations” (interview, 
09 January 2014 & 08 January 2014 respectively). Not properly defining 
the proposed spectrum licensing models makes it difficult for operators to 
define their business models within the new environment as it is not 
explicit what the regulator is proposing and how it will be implemented. 
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ICASA only gave a „no locking‟, „no blocking‟, and „no retail‟ as a way of 
defining the wholesale open access model and this means nothing for the 
operators who need a clear view in terms of where they fit into this new 
environment. The incumbents are anxious about getting clarity on the 
proposed models as one of them further asked “where is the business 
model especially with no retail” (IN5, 09 January 2014).  
Technically though, it remains unclear what form the wholesale open 
access would take including the technical measures to ensure practical 
implementation. The concept of MVNO‟s has been suggested by some of 
the participants indicating that to be the only form that retail providers 
would access the network. Along the same lines of this discussion, ICASA 
would not have gone through so much length coming up with „modern‟ 
licensing models just to introduce MVNO‟s, there must have been an ideal 
of how the retail operators were to access the wholesaler‟s network. 
MVNO‟s are virtual operators who buy bulk minutes at a discounted price. 
Fortunately some of interviewees from policy and regulatory institutions 
were interviewed amongst the last group of interviewees to solicit views 
behind the practical technical implementation details on what form ICASA 
anticipates. The policy and regulatory officials are sure the proposed 
model is not MVNO‟s but rather that the retail operators would still be 
allowed and expected to build the last mile and sublet spectrum from the 
wholesale open access operator as one of the interviewees stated “in 
terms of network architecture the network operator will provide switches, 
etc. but retailer will still build their own base stations” (PR22, 20 January 
2014). What this means is that the retail operators will be „assigned‟ 
bandwidth by the wholesale provider as per the individual requests. One of 
the incumbent interviewees expressed a view that “access to [such] 
spectrum must be clear and no one operator should be allowed to buy all 
the capacity but also having too many retail operators will affect the quality 
of service” (IN2, 18 November 2013). At the end of the day it goes back to 
the fact that only a limited few will have access to this high demand 
spectrum as the bandwidth „assigned‟ cannot be too small in such a way 
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that the consumers end up not getting the value of high speed. 4G 
technologies are bandwidth hungry and therefore, retail providers will need 
access to a reasonable minimum for their businesses to make sense. 
Figure 7 below illustrates one of the examples of „open access‟ being 
considered and identified as indicated by one of the interviewees, (PR22, 
20 January 2014). The question asked is, is this open access or 
infrastructure sharing by any operator including the existing operators? 
Figure 7: Proposed wholesale open access model 
Source: BIPT 
The matter to seriously investigate is whether the concern is a lack of a 
proper definition or different interpretations by the industry? Either way the 
models need to be given an explicit description to minimise any ambiguity 
that may arise.   
4.1.2 No clarity on the role of government or state owned entities in 
wholesale open access 
Internationally, a number of countries who are trying to address ubiquitous 
broadband connectivity have introduced innovative ways including public 
private partnerships. They do this using market-based licensing 
mechanisms e.g. wholesale open access amongst others. In the 2011 
proposal, Sentech was given access to spectrum in the 800 MHz band on 
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a „silver platter‟ in exchange for the return of some spectrum in their 2600 
MHz assignment which lay dormant for many years making Sentech one 
of the potential wholesale open access operators. This was an unfortunate 
regulatory transaction by ICASA given the different characteristics and the 
differences in economic value of the two different bands, the 800 and 2600 
MHz bands. With the introduction of the AIP, Sentech has since returned 
all the spectrum in the 2600 MHz band, making ICASA‟s proposal null and 
void. At the time of the proposal there was a serious uproar with regard to 
this decision from the incumbent operators who would have given anything 
to get their hands on the 800 MHz band spectrum. However, during the 
interviews there were mixed reactions on the involvement of state owned 
entities (SOE‟s) but the majority agree that only through government 
funding will the country ever come close to the desired aim of „broadband 
connectivity for all‟. The question is how can government get involved, 
through SOE or just making funds available? The reality is government or 
private sector, no entity or organisation can just handover billions of rands 
and not be involved. One of the academics raised this concern over lack of 
clarity on the involvement of SOE‟s. This academic raised the following 
questions “what is the role of state-owned companies like Broadband 
InfraCo and Sentech, how can they be used to effect government 
objectives, e.g. the network infrastructure for rural areas”, and further 
stated that “they [SOE‟s] need to be funded properly cause the National 
Broadband Network (NBN) can be done properly at the back of a state 
owned entity” (AC1, 11 December 2013). “Broadband in rural areas 
cannot be done without infrastructure sharing, spectrum pooling, and 
government involvement”, this is a view expressed by one of the 
manufacturers but voicing a strong disagreement with Sentech receiving 
free spectrum in the 800 MHz band indicating that “Sentech was getting a 
blank cheque having failed in the past with the 2.6 GHz spectrum” (MA1, 
08 January 2014). The government entities are themselves not sure where 
they feature in these new spectrum licensing models as they have a 
mandate to fulfil. Incumbents though are a bit divided on this view, one of 
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the incumbents stated that “wholesale open access network licensee 
should be a Public Private Partnership (PPP) so that state and private 
funding can be combined with private sector business principles to form -a 
self-sufficient operating company that does not need constant government 
financial bailouts” (IN4, 12 December 2013). A contrasting view from 
another incumbent was that “government involvement in making this 
country a digital country should be focused on the demand side and leave 
the supply side to the market forces” (IN3, 26 November 2013). The 
different views show disunity and in a way lack of confidence in 
government‟s ability in addressing its own objective of broadband 
connectivity for all but also a lack of confidence on the willingness of the 
incumbents to go to rural areas. The OECD (2013) argues that “open 
access [in this instance this refers to open access at wholesale level] 
refers to mandated, transparent, non-discriminatory and effective 
wholesale access to broadband network(s) as a condition for being 
awarded subsidies”. The condition is that where there is no state funding, 
obligations will be imposed on the wholesale open access operator but 
where there is state funding, it must be a mandated effective wholesale 
open access network, for all, (OECD, 2013). The recently published 
Broadband Policy (2013) also suggests the involvement of state-owned 
entities in rolling out these networks and what remains to be seen is the 
detail of their involvement. 
4.1.3 Lack of spectrum strategy  
IN2 expressed a view that one cannot talk about high speed connectivity without 
discussing and publishing the spectrum strategy, an economic or baseline study 
needs to be conducted in order to understand what the need is for high speed 
connectivity, this will assist in determining what kind of spectrum would make it 
practical to have rural connectivity. 
 
NE3 stated that there is no consistency from government meaning they do not 
know what they want and what they are doing, no document to source their 
mandate to understand what they want to achieve. 
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The majority of the operators welcomed the progress made by the 
regulator acknowledging that the proposed regulation coupled with the 
Invitation to Apply (ITA) was a step in the right direction but rather citing a 
number of issues as areas of concern that require further investigation and 
answers before implementation. Those include amongst others the fact 
that the country lacks spectrum strategy to direct and guide the regulator 
on how to licence spectrum, for which services, to whom and how much 
including which spectrum. One of the incumbent interviewees stated that 
“there is a serious lack of policies, the spectrum bands in question 
including the 700 MHz will address broadband rollout especially in rural 
areas that is why policy issue must be resolved” (IN5, 09 January 2014). 
In supporting a similar view one of the new entrants stated that 
“[Government] has no document to source their mandate to understand 
what they want to achieve” (NE3, 09 December 2013). The fact that e-
services like e-health, e-learning and other government services are not 
clearly mentioned and how they can be achieved, which spectrum is set 
aside to achieve these goals, shows this clear indication of the lack of 
strategy or spectrum policy. An interviewee from policy and regulatory 
institutions noted that “the regulation was too broad and talking in 
numbers, the regulation must drill down and mention e.g. which 
municipalities require what ICT services and what kind of infrastructure 
exist currently, do a proper needs analysis” (PR22, 20 January 2014). One 
of the incumbents during the interview raised a question of a study that will 
feed into the strategy from a well-researched and informed position 
instead of introducing regulations without a needs and impact assessment. 
This would cushion the regulator against litigation or other related 
challenges. 
4.1.4 No clear definition for USA and no clear obligations 
IN3 stated that there is currently no proper definition of underserviced areas and 
this should be clearly spelt out and has not worked in the past and in many 
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countries. 
 
SO1 expressed a view that performance obligations must be defined upfront 
even if ICASA decides to go the auction way so that they are not left until 
afterwards in the negotiations, this will help operators filter in the obligations into 
their business plans 
 
NE3 stressed that the regulator should have a clear statement of intent about the 
rural connectivity in the regulations not just as an obligation. 
 
IN3 also stated that it seems the obligations are more focused on covering sheep 
and other animals in empty spaces where there are no people. The concern is 
why geographic coverage is made to be more important than population 
coverage 
 
 
The following section includes the discussion on both the underserviced 
area and USA obligations. The reasoning behind is that when USA 
obligations are imposed, what constitutes an underserved area that 
requires the regulator‟s intervention should ideally be clearly spelt out. 
In the discussions with the operators, it became clear that the regulations 
were not explicit on universal service and access and there was a 
common feeling of uneasiness on the obligations proposed. ICASA 
published regulations on the definitions of under-serviced areas in 2012 
but operators feel that such regulation still does not assist in giving an 
explicit definition for universal service and access including its obligations. 
The approach as proposed in the draft spectrum licensing regulations will 
not help achieve government goal of broadband connectivity for all nor will 
it encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity as no proper 
definition has been given in the under-serviced area‟s definition and the 
regulations under review. One of the incumbents raised a concern over 
lack of clarity on e-government services including e-health and e-
education and how these regulations will help achieve these, which 
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spectrum is put aside for rural broadband connectivity. This goes back to 
an issue about the country not having a spectrum strategy and the fact 
that there was never a baseline study to inform the proposals in the 
regulation as alluded to by one of the incumbents, (IN2, 18 November 
2013). In the absence of a spectrum strategy, a proposal from one of the 
interviewees from state entity was that the universal service obligations 
must be properly and explicitly defined upfront in order to minimise 
disputes and communicate expectations upfront so that operators know 
what they are in for when bidding for high demand spectrum licences, 
(SO1, 06 December 2013). This gives confidence to operators as well as 
investors instead of being met with surprises after the awarding of 
licences. 
Now with regard to the issue of not realistically defining obligations, just to 
highlight the level at which universal service obligations have been 
messed up due to lack of thorough investigations prior to imposing them, 
Hodge (n.d) observed that initially “the mobile operators were not given 
specific rollout targets because a) they were licenced prior to the 
consultative policy process, and b) this [mobile phone service] was 
considered a luxury service that did not have mass appeal”, hence the 
additional obligations that were introduced like an after-thought, after 
realising the missed opportunity and the potential of mobile technologies in 
a developing country like South Africa.  Hodge (n.d) confirms that “rollout 
targets [especially Telkom‟s targets] are themselves set with a limited 
information set and in an uncertain [fast-evolving technological] 
environment, making their suitability subject to enormous potential error”. 
These obligations were merely set based on service licences. 
Just before the introduction of convergence framework and after the 
promulgation of the EC Act, the regulator imposed obligations on 
operators with high demand spectrum licences e.g. to connect clinics, 
schools, tele-centres etc. per operator. It is during this era that universal 
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service obligations were based on the type of spectrum assigned. Table 2 
below illustrates some of these obligations. 
Table 2: Universal service obligations for SA operators 
 Rollout Obligations  Community Service 
obligations 
Telkom  
 
 
• 2.69m lines brought into 
service of which:  
 1.676m in 
underserviced 
areas 
 20,246 for priority 
customers 
 3204 villages 
• 120,000 payphones 
Vodacom • 60% population 
coverage in 2 years 
• 70% population 
coverage in 4 years 
• 22,000 community 
service telephones in 
underserviced areas over 
5 years 
• low community service 
tariff 
MTN • 60% population 
coverage in 2 years 
• 70% population 
coverage in 4 years 
• 7,500 community 
service 
telephones in 
underserviced areas over 
5 years 
• low community service 
tariff 
Cell C  
 
• 8% geographic coverage 
in 5 years, 40% with 
roaming agreements 
• 60% population 
coverage in 5 years; 80% 
through roaming 
agreements in 1 year 
• 52,000 community 
service telephones in 
underserviced areas over 
7 years 
• low community service 
tariff 
Sentech 
(multimedia) 
None • 500 internet labs in rural 
schools over 5 years 
[Neotel] 
(proposed) 
 
• Coverage of all 
Metropoles in 5 years 
• 80% of territory in 10 
years 
• 30,000 community 
service telephones in 
rural areas over 10 years 
• 2500 internet labs in 
rural 
schools over 10 years 
Source: Hodge (n.d) 
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Added obligations for mobile operators included “the supply of 250,000 
free cell phones over 5 years, provision of 4 million free SIM cards over 5 
years, more public payphones, Internet labs in schools and multi-purpose 
community centres” (Business Day 30 May 2003) in Hodge (n.d). 
Universal service and obligations was an issue of concern on most of the 
participants given that the draft regulation is focused on licensing the 800 
and 2600 MHz spectrum to selected few and mainly new entrants 
indirectly prohibiting the incumbents from acquiring the licences. The 
question that followed was that of funding for rural coverage with 
suggestion that government makes funds or some form of incentive 
available to operators to make the obligations achievable. Looking into the 
obligations for Cell C and Neotel from the table above, they were given 
stiffer community service obligations than Vodacom and MTN despite the 
fact that they were entering the market almost 10 years after the two 
mobile giants. It is clear that government‟s focus and aim through ICASA‟s 
action was to encourage rural connectivity. Government through the 
National Development Plan (2012) and the Broadband Policy (2013) is still 
highly concerned about the lack of rural broadband connectivity so surely 
something in their formula is not working. As a proposal and a way of 
enforcing compliance with obligations, all incumbents, one of the SOE‟s 
and a new entrant suggested that a German model be studied and 
adopted as a more realistic way in imposing universal service obligations. 
The model is more specific, making rural connectivity a priority with clear 
incentives for rolling out in those rural areas. As one of the interviewees 
from the policy and regulatory institutions commented that the regulations 
are too broad and are talking in numbers and suggesting that they must 
drill down and do needs analysis e.g. mention the municipalities which are 
under-served and direct operators to start rolling out in those areas before 
moving to urban areas. 
Incumbents as well as the new entrants agree that setting obligations on 
geographic coverage seems to be unrealistic instead of focusing on 
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population as geographic coverage tends to include areas that are not 
habitable and operators will cherry-pick just to meet the obligation without 
fulfilling the objective from government. 
4.1.5 No incentives for rural coverage 
IN3 argued that money follows infrastructure, what is the incentive to rollout 
broadband services to rural areas, with the current proposal there is none. 
 
AC1 stated that in theory the 3G network is supposed to be national and don‟t 
see how these licensing models will enforce building in rural areas, it will have to 
be done and built in universal service obligations 
 
IN1 further stated that the country is still not achieving, the operators are cherry 
picking cause there is no incentive to go to rural areas 
 
The incumbents believe that the regulator whilst imposing obligations is 
not clear on the incentives to rollout broadband in rural areas. As one of 
them put it “money follows infrastructure” (IN3, 26 November 2013), and 
therefore operators in general would provide services in areas where 
infrastructure already exists or rollout networks in densely populated areas 
making it challenging for government to achieve its goal of broadband 
connectivity for all. This view is supported by another incumbent as he 
stated that “for new operators to have obligations, there must be some 
form of incentive or funding”, (IN1, 18 November 2014). As already stated, 
the majority of interviewees support the German model when introducing 
obligations for rolling out in rural areas. In the model, the operators were 
also allowed to share infrastructure and lease spectrum which are 
concepts not yet put into practice in South Africa. However, one of the 
incumbents who suggested that sounded sceptical as well as he 
expressed his view to “also look at the German model i.e. start from the 
edges and work your way in but not sure how feasible that is, because 
„infrastructure follows money‟ and Germany already has lots of fibre”. 
Another incumbent suggested the same model stating that the “rollout 
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targets, such as those used in Germany to ensure that operators meet 
50% rural coverage before being allowed to roll out in urban areas, may 
be appropriate”. Government entities are proposing the same suggesting 
that the regulator should look into the “German model, posing obligations 
and give incentives for licensees to start in rural areas with minimum 
quality of service obligations then be allowed to move to urban areas”, 
(SO1, 06 December 2013). This is an area that requires a very firm and 
decisive regulator as there is no guarantee that the incumbents or any 
operator for that matter would rollout in rural areas.  
This brings us back to the issue of under-serviced areas as defined in GG 
No. 35675, which refers to amongst others, areas where no infrastructure 
exists. Both incumbents and the new entrants were very emphatic about 
the exorbitant capital investment required to build a national network from 
scratch, let alone rolling out in rural areas as an obligation. An interviewee 
from the policy and regulatory institutions stated that “the problem with 
rural areas is that the perception is that there is no money to be made 
there, it is expensive to rollout, operators are scared they will not get a 
return on their investment”, (PR12, 13 January 2014). The Broadband 
Policy (2013) published by the Department of communications is 
proposing a public private partnership with the inclusion of SOE‟s, which 
could be one incentive for government to bring a certain percentage of 
funds. The final regulation dealing with the spectrum licensing models will 
have to look into all the policies that have been published post the 
publication of the 2011 draft regulations including scrutinising a funding 
model proposed by the new entrants to guard against possible failures. 
4.2 Emerging new markets 
4.2.1 Introduction of Wholesale open access only and Infrastructure 
sharing 
NE3 expressed a view that the draft as is was not in favor or against a specific 
market structure and is not clear which direction it is proposing to take 
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IN2 stated that the wholesale open access, pairing 800 and 2600 MHz and 
licence that into a form of a consortium and let incumbents take assets and be 
the shareholders. 
 
SO1 also stated that the trend is infrastructure sharing to minimise capex 
requirements 
 
The general view from the interviewees is that the wholesale open access 
model is a good model given the demand-side that exceeds supply-side 
on a high demand spectrum. The challenge is lack of clarity on how it will 
be implemented and the majority of interviewees do not support the 
wholesale only and no retail. The interviewee from the policy and 
regulatory institutions stated that “the issue of wholesale open access is a 
good concept but who is going to be that wholesale open access operator 
especially with no retail services because the mobile operators will not be 
interested in becoming wholesale open access operator”, (PR12, 13 
January 2014). This view was confirmed by an interviewee from one 
government entity who stated that “wholesale open access is a good idea 
only if it is government funded especially with no retail, none of the mobile 
operators would want to be a wholesale open access operator and not 
provide services” (SO2, 13 January 2014). The access part or last mile on 
a communications network is the core part for the business of the 
incumbents; their current businesses actually do not exist without retail. In 
agreement with this, one interviewee from the incumbents stated that “the 
wholesale open access network operator should be licenced to provide 
both wholesale and retail services so that it has first-hand experience of 
retail customer requirements”, (IN4, 12 December 2013). Another 
interviewee from the incumbents stressed a point that “the success of the 
wholesale open access model depends on the type of technology chosen 
by the wholesale open access operator otherwise for retailers there is no 
guarantee for quality of service”, (IN5, 09 January 2014). The 
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differentiating factor on who can succeed just providing at a retail level will 
be providing „unique, exceptional services, make end-user devices 
available‟ to support those services. One of the incumbent interviewees 
gave an example of spaza shops in townships, what makes one to stand 
out is the packaging e.g one spaza shop might sell the same sugar bought 
from the same Makro but have a car wash or „bring and braai services‟ in 
the same shop whilst another will only be selling sugar. The differentiator 
is all the different services packaged together and that applies to the 
services provided by the communications operators.  
For the sake of bringing the analysis from the 2011 draft regulations under 
discussion, all operators with spectrum in the high demand bands (IMT 
spectrum), that refers to all the mobile operators, were in any case 
excluded from becoming wholesale operators meaning the target from 
ICASA was for a new entrant and Sentech to become wholesale 
providers. This is also an issue according to a government entity 
interviewee who stated that “it has never been seen anywhere where new 
entrants [commercial] would be wholesale open access operators because 
it does not make sense for them to do it given the non-existent 
infrastructure on their part”, (SO1, 06 December 2013) especially with no 
retail.  
The understanding from the interviewees is that introduction of wholesale 
open access model and the managed spectrum park models will 
encourage infrastructure sharing especially for rural coverage. 
Infrastructure sharing is supported by the majority of the interviewees for 
rural areas as it reduces capital investment. The incumbents argue that 
there is enough infrastructure competition in urban areas and therefore the 
operators will have to combine forces to cover rural areas. Explaining this, 
the interviewee from the incumbents stated that “wholesale open access 
has its space and merits especially for rural areas, operators will have to 
combine forces in order to rollout services in rural areas”, (IN5, 09 January 
2014). He further suggests to “have two joint ventures (JV‟s) to still have 
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facilities competition even in rural areas, operators must be allowed to 
have flexibility to lease spectrum in rural areas”. The manufacturers agree 
as they believe that “broadband in rural areas cannot be done without 
infrastructure sharing, spectrum pooling and government involvement”, 
(MA1, 08 January 2014). The question that comes to mind is; does 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum park equate to 
infrastructure sharing? The interviewees seem to think so especially if the 
consideration is rural coverage. One academic interviewed suggested that 
“NBN will not be a messiah alone, infrastructure sharing generally would 
help if regulated”, (AC1, 11 December 2014). This will be the case only if 
operators form a consortium and the 2011 regulation is stressing „sharing 
of spectrum‟ and specifically „sharing of common spectrum‟ for managed 
spectrum park. However, the OECD (2013) seems to agree that 
“infrastructure sharing could also be discussed in the context of open 
network access” and further explains that it “is becoming an important 
means of promoting access to networks and offering affordable broadband 
services by reducing expenditures and ongoing expenses associated with 
the rollout and operation of networks”. 
„In theory open access model looks good‟ and really ideal where demand 
exceeds supply „but according to the same OECD report, internationally 
there is no open access model‟ on mobile services „that is operationally 
proven to be successful‟, and the final decision is left to the regulator to be 
innovative in implementing this.  
4.2.2 Introduction of secondary markets and Spectrum sharing 
The quotes below are taken from the data collection process and indicate 
just how much the industry is waiting for the introduction of secondary 
markets within the sector either through leasing or trading of spectrum: 
IN1 stated that for access spectrum the regulator should introduce spectrum 
trading and allow operators to share spectrum. 
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PR11 also stated that unfortunately there is currently no secondary market 
regulation e.g. spectrum trading but further stated that if it is introduced it will 
have to be well defined as the auctions go hand in hand with spectrum trading. 
 
SO1 indicated that the bad part with the old traditional spectrum management is 
the limitation of spectrum, and that leasing is not allowed. 
 
MN1 further indicated that the regulations should allow operators to allow 
technology to evolve but introduction of secondary markets not yet been seen e.g 
spectrum trading, and that also the regulations should consider white space 
technology that is being piloted in the country but specifically look at spectrum 
trading and spectrum pooling for rural areas. 
 
AC1 suggested that the regulator should remove regulatory bottlenecks, and look 
at auctioning the spectrum but ensure that auctions are carefully designed or 
alternatively create secondary markets for spectrum trading. 
 
Adding to the support of secondary markets IN5 further suggested that they[the 
regulator] should allow operators to have flexibility to lease spectrum in rural 
areas 
 
The promulgation of the Electronic Communications Act of 2005 
introduced a converged licensing framework which encouraged a 
technology neutral environment. The regulator however has been moving 
very slowly in terms of introducing market-based licensing models that talk 
to the converged framework. The draft radio regulations proposed the 
introduction of secondary markets such as spectrum trading, subletting 
and spectrum leasing but unfortunately these were taken out of the final 
radio regulations document that was published at the end of March 2011. 
Unfortunately the regulator missed an opportunity of assisting the smaller 
players who do not want to build their own networks from scratch to 
provide services in areas that do not make business and economic sense 
for the incumbents. As one academic stated that:  
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looking at the demand versus supply, the introduction of wholesale open 
access is justified for operators who don‟t have to build their own networks 
but want to have access to spectrum as and when needed like secondary 
markets where spectrum is used and regulated on a website for operators 
to use for specific periods, (AC1, 11 December 2013).  
One of the interviewees in the policy and regulatory environment does not 
even believe that the regulator needs to go through the process of drafting 
regulations to introduce secondary markets but cautions that “those 
secondary market regulations will have to be well defined as the auctions 
go hand in hand with spectrum trading” (PR11, 08 January 2014). 
Unfortunately there is currently no real appetite for auctions in the country. 
The NDP (2012) stresses the point that “mechanisms for allocating radio 
frequency spectrum need to be smarter (for example spectrum auctions 
and reverse bids for underserviced areas), with robust and transparent 
governance”. Some of the operators including academics suggest that 
instead of licensing more operators, the regulator should assist the 
incumbents, create a level playing field, and assist those who entered the 
market last by actually removing regulatory hurdles and creating 
secondary markets for spectrum trading and other forms. Expressing this 
view the interviewee from one of the incumbents stated that “for access 
spectrum the regulator should introduce spectrum trading and allow 
operators to share spectrum”. The proposal in terms of managing this 
suggestion is such that the “responsibility still sits with operators and the 
fees go towards offsetting the license fees and incumbents can lease or 
sublet spare capacity for regional operators where incumbents do not want 
to go” (AC1, 11 December 2013). The design of the secondary markets 
will eventually be determined by the regulator as there are services that 
sublet spectrum currently. 
4.3. Introducing competition for a wider choice to reduce costs  
Globally the rule for the maximum number of operators is 3+1 otherwise 
you start seeing consolidations, (GSMA, 2012). The belief is always that 
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competition will provide consumers with a wider choice and therefore drive 
down costs. In South Africa there are currently more than 4 operators in 
the market and yet South Africa is amongst countries with the highest 
communications costs. Introducing more competitors will not on its own 
ensure competition and therefore will not drive down costs.  
During the interviews there were conflicting views sometimes from the 
same interviewees and sometimes amongst the whole group regarding 
introducing competition. The interviewees were all asked to indicate to 
what extent they thought the proposed spectrum licensing models would 
encourage competition. The idea with this was to get a sense from the 
industry whether they viewed the introduction of the new competitors as a 
warranted step by the regulator and whether that will assist South Africa in 
becoming a digital country.  
4.3.1 Introduce competition on services and encourage 
competitiveness 
The majority of operators agreed on the issue of introducing competition 
on services especially for rural areas and encourage infrastructure sharing 
to reduce capital investments in uneconomical areas and also 
encouraging competitiveness by putting measures in place to achieve this. 
Below are some of the quotes on the views regarding competition on 
services: 
IN2 stated that if going rural and responding to government‟s goal of bridging the 
digital divide, rural communities must enjoy the same benefits as those in urban 
areas, a consideration could be to give the lower band spectrum which is relevant 
for rural coverage to one operator and let all others compete on services. 
 
IN3 further stated that having 3 to 4 operators in South Africa is the maximum 
number that is sustainable. There is however scope for more competition on 
services instead of infrastructure competition.  
 
PR12 also stated that the wholesale open access is a good idea and then have 
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competition on services especially for underserviced areas but comes back to 
who is going to be that wholesale open access operator. 
 
Most of the interviewees if not all of them agree that for the proposed 
models to be implementable, effective and be able to achieve the 
regulator‟s goals of introducing competition, reduce costs, introduce new 
markets and rollout broadband in rural areas, there has to be some 
collaboration amongst operators. The regulations were however, indirectly 
excluding the incumbents meaning that ICASA was determined in 
introducing another competitor to compete on infrastructure. One of the 
interviewees in expressing his view on competition stated that “competition 
is good but when is competition enough? Why doesn‟t ICASA try and 
assist the current incumbents and create a level playing field, create 
effective competition with the current operators”, (IN5, 09 January 2014). 
This view is shared by the representative for the policy and regulatory 
institutions as he cautioned that “the regulation as is will increase the 
number of operators and insisted that “a market analysis study is needed 
to determine how many more operators should be introduced into the 
market otherwise if the document is implemented as is, the country might 
even double the number of operators”. An interviewee representing one of 
the manufactures also cautioned that “the new entrants might not survive, 
3 or 4 maximum in terms of the number of operators is what is practical” 
(MA1, 08 January 2014). Agreeing with this concern another incumbent 
raised an issue that “having 3 to 4 operators in South Africa is the optimal/ 
maximum number of infrastructure operators that is sustainable”, (IN3, 26 
November 2013). The argument presented by the interviewees is that 
there is a limited number of operators that any country can sustain before 
it loses economies of scale, operators get a return on their investment. 
However, there is scope for more competition on services instead of 
infrastructure competition”, (IN3, 26 November 2013). The view is that 
there should be competition at both infrastructure and services level but in 
areas that are economically not viable it is better to have competition at 
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service level than infrastructure, (PR22, 13 January 2014). This is where 
the proposed models can be adopted if operators are prepared to work 
together and form consortiums.  
A word of caution from another operator was that “government should be 
careful of confusing competition and competitiveness, increasing the 
number of operators in the market does not guarantee or determine 
competitiveness”, (IN3, 26 November 2013). The respondent from the 
policy and regulatory institutions agrees with this statement as he stated 
that “currently there are 4 „mobile‟ operators, why is there no competition, 
that is the fundamental question, is the market big enough? Telkom mobile 
is supported by Telkom, why are they battling, why are they not making 
it?”, (PR12, 13 January 2014). He further argued that “Cell C has been 
around for so many years, why cant they crack MTN and Vodacom 
duopoly, if you bring in a new guy, the conditions are the same, what is 
going to assist that guy to make it?”, (PR12, 13 January 2014). What the 
interviewees argued was that it has taken Cell C (third mobile operator) 
more than 10 years to be profitable even though they did not have to build 
a national network as they were roaming on Vodacom for years. Cell C is 
still finding it difficult to be really competitive and take on operators like 
Vodacom and MTN as they are bigger and have been in operation far too 
long. They have gained enough market share, enough subscribers, 
revenue, experience and technical expertise in the past 20 years. 
Operators like Neotel and WBS are also finding it difficult to rollout and 
operate outside the golden triangle i.e. Gauteng, Durban or Cape Town. 
The concern is that the introduction of the 4th „mobile‟ operator through 
Telkom Mobile caused an even more saturated market to introduce more 
new operators. The argument is that the 4th mobile operator though it has 
Telkom‟s advantage of a national backhaul and roaming on MTN network 
that have national presence has been struggling to reach just 1 million 
subscribers. On this note during the interview one of the incumbents 
asked “what makes ICASA think these new entrants will be any different 
especially in rural areas, where is the business model especially with no 
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retail”, (IN5, 09 January 2014). The point to consider then is what makes 
ICASA think the new entrants will introduce effective competition or even 
encourage competitiveness in the market. A „guest‟ academic who shared 
in this study asked “what mechanisms did ICASA put in place to assist the 
new entrants to compete successfully”, and “whether ICASA has done any 
investigation to determine whether the number portability was successful 
or unsuccessful”, (AC3, 08 February 2014). Secondary markets as 
mentioned in 4.2.2 above are not yet supported; there is currently no 
spectrum trading, leasing or subletting permitted by law. These are the 
issues that ICASA needs to investigate to encourage competitiveness. 
Another academic‟s view was that the country might not necessarily need 
more new operators but rather new investors to boost and assist those 
operators that are already in the market but are struggling financially, 
(AC1, 13 December 2013) as supported by the incumbent above that the 
regulator should rather level the playing field for the current operators.  
The operators including both incumbents and new entrants believe that 
the lack of competitiveness in a South African environment is due to not 
having a strong and pro-active regulator. A concern was that there was no 
market study conducted to determine the maximum number of operators 
that can be sustainable. The regulator is believed to be too weak and re-
active and either does not exercise its powers or does not know what 
powers it holds.  
4.3.2 Lack of resources for the new entrants to be competitive 
All the interviewees were asked to give a view on how much they think it 
will cost operators and the country at large if incumbents are left out of the 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum park approaches. 
Coupled with that they also had to respond to the question regarding the 
effect the draft spectrum licensing models would have on the rollout of 4G 
and the broader communications industry. This came about because in 
the 2011 regulations, the incumbents were indirectly excluded from 
participating in the licensing process. It was therefore important for the 
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researcher to seek views from the industry itself to determine whether the 
advantages expected from the proposed models outweigh the 
disadvantages taking into consideration the broader context under which 
the models were introduced. The sub-theme discussed below emerged 
from the discussions related to the questions mentioned above.  
IN3 stated that the industry is a very capex oriented industry and licensing new 
entrants is setting the country up for failure as it costs billions of rands to build a 
network from scratch. 
 
PR21 also expressed a view that to start from scratch costs a lot of money, since 
it has been a natural progression for mobile operators, and therefore excluding 
the incumbents, the country will miss-out on faster broadband rollout because for 
incumbents it‟s an upgrade of what currently exists 
 
IN5 also expressed a concern that if incumbents are not going to rural areas what 
guarantees that new entrant will go to rural areas, where is the money coming 
from. 
 
 
Managed liberalisation in South Africa was overtaken by events thanks to 
the Altech-Autopage court judgement. The country moved from having a 
handful of operators to 400+ ECNS/ECS operators hence the need or 
even an obligation from ICASA to introduce mechanisms that will assist 
these operators or at least some of them gain access to high demand 
spectrum. The reality is that there are way too many of these operators to 
accommodate with the current spectrum supply. These „new smaller 
operators‟ vary in sizes, skill, technical expertise and finances. With the 
exception of the interviewee from one of the new entrants, all other 
respondents agree that licensing only the new entrants and excluding the 
incumbents will be the biggest mistake the country has ever made. This 
new entrant believes that:  
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excluding deep pockets is a problem but not necessarily a bad idea, 
new entrants have no legacy systems to maintain, some small 
operators have been able to rollout networks faster since they did 
not have the legacy systems, the range of dedicated resources is 
higher but limited in terms of complementing existing networks e.g. 
3G and other backward compatible networks is not there, both 
sides have benefits but the bigger benefit is to do it faster, (NE3, 09 
December 2013).  
Another new entrant stated that “the new entrants would start rolling out 
sooner than incumbents because incumbents are well established and are 
therefore not under pressure. They might want to „capitalise‟ on their 
current 3G networks before rolling out 4G (NE4, submission to ICASA, 28 
February 2012). 
The argument from most respondents is that it costs a lot of money to 
build a network from scratch and that the new entrants do not have that 
kind of money, they do not have existing infrastructure and no experience 
to make it. As one interviewee puts it, “this is a very capex oriented 
industry, licensing new entrants is setting the country up for failure as it 
costs billions of rands to build a network from scratch”, (IN3, 26 November 
2013). Building a national network will cost billions of rands which the new 
entrants on their own may not have especially in rural areas where there 
may not be a return on investment even in the longer term. Another 
interviewee expressing a similar view stated that “to start from scratch 
costs a lot of money, and it has been a natural progression for mobile 
operators, and therefore excluding the incumbents, the country will miss-
out on faster broadband rollout because for incumbents it‟s an upgrade of 
what currently exists”, (PR21, 20 January 2014). One interviewee 
cautioned that in licensing the new entrants “there is a need to avoid 
creation of stand-alone networks that don‟t integrate/interoperate with the 
existing 2G/3G networks”, (MA2, 20 January 2014). There still needs to be 
backward compatibility so that when subscribers move out of the LTE/4G 
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coverage areas they can still connect to the existing networks, e.g. 3G and 
2G. One interviewee suggested that as an alternative, ICASA should “give 
existing operators spectrum and encourage them to form a consortium 
because they have networks and base stations, and that will accelerate 
connectivity”. He further commented that “it will take up to 15 years for the 
new entrants to build the network so it will be more practical to allow the 
incumbents to be network providers but prohibit them from competing with 
their retail service providers”, (IN2, 18 November 2013). Another one of 
the new entrants proposes that there should be mandatory voice and data 
roaming to minimise barriers to entry for new entrants, (NE5, submission 
to ICASA, 29 February). An academic who agrees with these views stated 
that “new entrants might not be looking at building the new national 
infrastructure but looking at gaining access to networks”, (AC1, 09 
December 2013) because “new entrants will need capex and subscribers 
to run a successful business” (SO1, 13 December 2013), because making 
money is the objective of getting into business. In fact another interviewee 
stated that “it is debatable whether these new entrants have the resources 
needed to deploy national networks in a short period”, (IN4, 12 December 
2013). Once the network is built, which will take a number of years before 
it reaches national coverage, most respondents assuming 10-15 years, 
the new entrant needs to have users of the network, make money and 
become profitable to be able to service the loan. As confirmed by another 
respondent “the new operators will need economies of scale, some form of 
market share, subscribers to compete”, (IN3, 26 November 2013). These 
views were confirmed by one of the smaller entrants as expressed below:  
[the] primary concern is that excluding Cell C, MTN, Vodacom and 
Telkom from the bidding process at the wholesale level, will 
severely undermine the rollout of 800 MHz and 2,6GHz spectrum 
and the availability of 4th generation services such as LTE at the 
retail level.  Cell C, MTN, Vodacom and Telkom have existing 
physical networks in place, the financial capability, technical know-
how and experience required to roll-out the 800 MHZ and 2,6GHz 
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spectrum on a national basis in a relative short space of time, (NE6, 
submission to ICASA).  
However, the same concern exists as raised by the respondents as to who 
will fund rural broadband networks and propose that government gets 
involved and make funds available even if through the universal service 
fund. Quite refreshing was a comment that “the concept of SMME and 
BEE is supported but the guys who can do this are those with a lot of 
money, the last thing we want is another USALs”, (PR12, 13 January 
2014). It is evident as can be seen from the discussions above that there 
are concerns on the issue of lack of resources for new entrants and 
whether the new entrants have what it takes to rollout a national 
broadband network to meet the goal of broadband connectivity for all by 
the year 2020.  
4.3.3 No market study conducted 
IN3 stated that the amount of competitors in the market does not determine 
competitiveness in the market. Internationally there is a lot of consolidation in 
terms of the number of sustainable operators. Optimal number is not one, there 
needs to be some form of infrastructure competition, otherwise there is no 
incentive to be competitive and to upgrade networks e.g moving from 4G to 5G. 
 
PR1 cautioned that the proposal from ICASA will increase the number of 
operators but market study analysis is needed to determine how many to 
introduce into the market. If the document is implemented as is, the country might 
even double the number of operators. 
 
ICASA is introducing one new national wholesale open access operator to 
build a broadband network and some new regional operators. That already 
takes the number of national operators competing at infrastructure level 
closer to 10 if not more when one considers the signal distributors and 
Broadband InfraCo. The questions being asked by the respondents 
include „when is the number of operators enough and when should the 
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market be regarded as saturated. Further questions raised by the 
interviewees were (1) „on what basis did ICASA justify the introduction of 
new operators, (2) what was ICASA‟s decision based on to increase the 
number of operators as no market study was done to determine the 
maximum number justifiable in a country with a population size of South 
Africa and also taking into consideration the economic environment of the 
country. One interviewee from policy and regulatory institutions stated that 
“the market study analysis is needed to determine how many operators to 
introduce into the market”, (PR12, 08 January 2014). Another policy and 
regulatory interviewee expressed his concerns already mentioned above 
that there are currently 4 mobile operators and yet there is lack of 
competition. He further asked whether the market was big enough to cater 
for the new entrant, (PR22, 13 January, 2014). Even though most 
interviewees agree that competition at service level is necessary and not 
so much infrastructure competition especially for rural areas, there is a 
concern over the fact that the wholesale open access model and the 
managed spectrum park models are targeting new entrants. The real issue 
is that the models are new in the South African environment, they 
introduce new operators, wholesale open access with no retail and there 
was no mention of government involvement. One academic interviewed 
stated that “ICASA has the mandate to license spectrum at a broad level 
but the assumption is that economic study should have been done to 
decide on the approach”, (AC1, 13 December 2013). Another interviewee 
sharing on the concern stated that “these models (wholesale open access 
and managed spectrum parks) are untested and complex and can only be 
successful through thorough discussion among all stakeholders”, (MA2, 20 
January 2014). It became apparent that the operators including the 
industry at large would have preferred some form of pre-consultation from 
the regulator before the draft regulation was published so that they could 
debate and give input but none was made. 
One interesting observation from the interviews and information gathered 
is that the incumbents themselves have different views in terms of 
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alternative approaches to the wholesale open access and the managed 
spectrum parks. What was even more interesting was their different views 
even on the amount of spectrum reasonable for an operator to be 
successful in rolling out an LTE network, some believe the 2X10 MHz is 
adequate in the 800 MHz as the band is mainly addressing coverage 
issues whereas others believe that given the bandwidth hungry nature of 
LTE and future LTE-Advanced, 2X10 will be very limited and rather 2X20 
MHz will rather make more sense for operators. The regulator needs to 
take the lead, investigate and make those decisions in licensing hence the 
recommendation to do thorough investigations to assist in decision-
making. These are the issues that require some form of a study so that the 
regulator can make informed decisions. 
4.4. A look at the previous policy and regulatory landscape and 
future interventions 
The policy and regulatory intervention is shown and analysed separately 
as it is not one of the themes but the backdrop under which the themes 
were developed. The following are regulatory issues that emerged during 
interviews highlighting failures including few successes by the policy 
maker and the regulator in assessing the market and assisting the 
industry. 
Lack of Policy and Regulatory intervention 
Inability to create a conducive regulatory environment 
Regulator to relax regulatory rules 
 
Some of the incumbents, especially the late entrants believe ICASA could 
do better for the industry by assisting in minimising the regulatory 
bottlenecks. A number of examples were discussed e.g. accessing sites 
and getting approvals when rolling out networks is one of the most 
frustrating processes for operators and it is one of the major contributing 
factors to the delays experienced in network rollout. Looking into the 
historical models for licensing spectrum, all interviewees with the 
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exception of one agree that there has been some progress made, though 
others believe more could have been achieved had the Department of 
Communications and ICASA managed the industry properly. One 
interviewee pointed out to serious policy gaps that exist making it 
challenging for ICASA to operate in a vacuum. Confirming this, another 
interviewee challenged “on what basis was ICASA going ahead [with the 
2011 regulation] then as there was no policy in place. In an ideal world it is 
important to have some direction, policy first then regulation thereof but it 
is not happening hence ICASA‟s action”, (NE3, 09 December 2013). An 
academic respondent questioned the interdependence of ICASA to DoC 
when according to the EC Act it is no longer a must for ICASA to 
implement the policy directives but rather to consider them. She stated 
that “things have changed since the times of the old Telecommunications 
Act and therefore it is strange that the policy and the regulation are 
managed hand in hand”, (AC1, 13 December 2013) and yet regulatory 
inaction affects progress within the sector. 
An observation from the operators was that ICASA was not operating as 
one organisation; regulations that are produced and published contradict 
each other. An example between the Frequency Migration and the 
Spectrum Licensing regulation under discussion was noted. An 
interviewee stated that for example “Migration regulation and spectrum 
licensing regulation are conflicting because one is compensating for 
migration and the other says no compensation”, (NE1, 09 December 
2013). Confirming this view another interviewee commented “ICASA is 
operating in silos, there is no holistic approach e.g. the regulations, the 
licensing models should be linked to facilities leasing and interconnection 
regulations, the barrier of entry is the cost of infrastructure, affordability is 
due to interconnection rates that were superficially increased prior to the 
introduction of Cell C”, (SO2, 13 January 2014). The issue of regulatory 
intervention to make the industry more competitive came up a lot, another 
interviewee stating that “if the policy goal is to facilitate infrastructure 
based competition, then regulation was wrong, what about creating an 
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enabling environment for all 4 mobile operators” (IN5, 09 January 2014). 
On the same issues of regulatory intervention another incumbent stated 
that “if the regulator could relax some of the provisions it will be easier for 
the incumbents to interconnect their networks without having to go through 
the regulatory compliance rules of charging and paying each other e.g. 56 
or 92 cents etc”, (IN2, 18 November 2013). 
Some interviewees cautioned against creating another USAL story by 
licensing operators who will fail because they either do not have enough 
money to build the network or they do not have the technical expertise or 
both. One of the incumbents proposes that instead of excluding the 
incumbents as per the proposal, rather the alternative approach to fast 
track the rural connectivity would be to use the incumbents‟ networks and 
empower the new entrants to provide and compete on the level of 
services. One thing almost certain from the discussions though is that the 
incumbents will not be interested in wholesale only where they do not 
have to provide retail services as that is their „bread and butter‟, the core 
of their businesses. The regulator will have to relook at the no-retail 
proposal or revise the regulation to cater for the provisions made by the 
recently published Broadband Policy (2013) e.g. have the wholesale 
provider as a partnership between private and public service. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The researcher started out with the following themes as the focal points, 
broadband connectivity for all, markets and competition but the number of 
issues as listed below were identified during the process of data collection: 
i. Lack of spectrum strategy 
ii. No clear definition for USA and no realistic obligations 
iii. No incentives to go to rural areas 
iv. Introduction of wholesale open access only and 
Infrastructure sharing 
v. Introduction of secondary markets and spectrum sharing 
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vi. Introduce competition on services and encourage 
competitiveness 
vii. Lack of resources for the new entrants to be competitive 
viii. No market study conducted 
ix. Create conducive regulatory environment and relax 
regulatory rules 
These issues identified that have emerged from the data collection 
process will be discussed and analysed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis: The impact of ICASA’s actions on the broader 
communication’s industry 
All the data collected through interviews and information gathered from 
document analysis will be analysed to make sure all the sub-questions 
and the themes highlighted in the previous chapters have been answered. 
The aim of this analysis is to define concepts, categorise different types of 
attitudes, behaviours and finding associations amongst others, (Ritchie & 
Spencer, 2002). Observations will be drawn to answer the research 
questions and problem statement. The findings from the previous chapter 
will be compared with the literature reviewed and will be analysed to 
determine whether they try to answer the main question of this study and 
the sub-questions.  
The main objective of the study was to analyse and understand the 
advantages and disadvantages of ICASA‟s 2011 proposed draft spectrum 
licensing models of wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks.  
As explained in the previous chapter, during the interviews it became clear 
that it was impractical to discuss the models exclusively without taking the 
broader context of the entire regulations document into consideration. 
What became clear was that the models were proposed within a certain 
background of the South African context and considering the status of the 
communications industry at large hence the discussions include not just 
the models but other aspects proposed in the regulations. As Neuman 
(2011, p15) observes “qualitative researchers do not narrowly focus on a 
specific question, but ponder the theoretical-philosophical paradigm in an 
inquisitive, open -ended settling-in process as they adopt a perspective”. 
For example, the main research question for the study is to determine the 
extent to which ICASA‟s 2011 spectrum licensing models would 
encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity for South Africa. This 
question assumes theoretically that the proposed models would 
encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity for South Africa, but 
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leaves room for further exploration of the spectrum licensing models and 
to investigate the magnitude.  
In expanding on the main question, the sub-questions attempted to get a 
view from the industry in terms of the impact that the proposed models will 
have on the broader communication industry and how they will affect 
technology progression. Also, regulatory impact assessment type 
questions were included in the interviews to deepen the understanding of 
the benefits to be drawn from the models as well as understanding 
ICASA‟s actions and government‟s intentions. The discussions below 
demonstrate how the themes and the issues that emerged had to be 
argued with the background of the entire draft regulation. The results will 
be analysed and interpreted under the following themes: (1) regulatory 
environment, (2) the behaviour of the main actors and, (3) market-based 
spectrum management models. Some themes and sub-themes that 
emerged as highlighted in the previous chapter will be added as areas for 
discussion and analysed against the literature reviewed.  
5.1. The regulatory environment 
The regulatory cycle of telecommunications reform has always been: from 
state entities, creation of independent regulators, privatisation of 
incumbent monopolies then liberalisation, whichever comes first. In all the 
stages, the regulator is expected to regulate the market ex-ante in order to 
protect consumers, new smaller operators and enforce universal service 
obligations. Once the market is fully liberalised, the expectation is that the 
market moves from being regulated to limited regulation and the regulator 
only gets involved ex-post to address issues of anticompetitive 
behaviours. The reality in a fully liberalised market is that, “regulators [still] 
need to maintain a prominent role because market forces often fall short of 
creating the conditions necessary to satisfy public interest objectives such 
as universal access and service”, (ITU, 2011, p10). ICASA imposed USA 
obligations on all the big telecommunications operators and yet the 
country is still at less than 10% in broadband penetration. In trying to 
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address these market failures, ICASA proposed the introduction of 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum park in 2011 as modern 
spectrum licensing models due to limited supply which could not 
accommodate the demand. Amongst others one of the key issues was to 
address lack of broadband connectivity especially in rural areas.  Baldwin, 
Cave & Lodge (2012) argue that the objective of regulation in a market is 
to address market-failures amongst others “i.e. imperfections that lead 
unregulated markets to perform sub-optimally relative to some social 
welfare function”, (Joskow & Rose, 1989). As also highlighted in the 
literature review chapter these would also include, information failures, 
externalities, natural monopolies, and would require government 
intervention hence ICASA‟s action.  
Almost all the participants commended ICASA for taking the first step in 
starting the process of licensing the highly sought after „digital dividend‟ 
and the remaining available high demand spectrum but all raised serious 
concerns with the approach taken. The first issue, however was that all 
interviewees with the exception of some of the smaller new entrants 
agreed that the exclusion by the regulator of the incumbents in the 
process of licensing the 800 and 2600 MHz bands would be the biggest 
mistake for the country. The NDP (South African 2030 vision) states 
verbatim that “spectrum policy should favour competition, but incumbents 
should not be excluded from gaining access to bands they need to build 
networks using new technologies”. GSMA (2012, p3) refers to spectrum as 
the “lifeblood of the mobile industry” which comes back to the point raised 
in the previous chapter that mobile operators might find it difficult to 
participate under the proposed spectrum licensing models as spectrum is 
one of the core assets for their businesses and key to their business 
models. The reality is that the incumbents have existing infrastructure that 
covers the majority of the population even if it is just second generation 
mobile voice telephony. The response from one interviewee from the 
policy and regulatory institutions stated that, LTE/4G technology is a 
natural progression from the current 2G, 3G technologies (PR22, 20 
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January 2014) and only the incumbent operators run those networks. 
Another interviewee warned against creating standalone networks (MA3, 
20 January 2014) as consumers would want continuous connection even 
when outside LTE/4G coverage areas. 
5.1.1. Policy and regulatory key events since the publishing of the 
2011 regulations  
The 2011 regulations around which this discussion revolves have been 
overtaken by events. The picture has changed since the draft was 
published; the WRC 12 identified the 700 MHz band as the second digital 
dividend to be made available in the African region for „mobile broadband 
technologies‟. Sentech gave back to the regulator all the chunks of 
spectrum in the 2600 MHz band. What this means is that the assignment 
plan and the approach proposed by ICASA needs serious review, instead 
of 3 operators that can be accommodated in the 800 MHz band now there 
is now a potential for at least 6 making it possible for ICASA to consider 
either accommodating the incumbents or more new entrants and even 
licensing the wholesale open access operator if need be. In view of all this 
it would seem like ICASA failed to act proactively in leading the industry as 
the regulator because when the regulations were published, it was two 
months away from the beginning of the world radio conference in 2012, 
unless there were other reasons unknown to the researcher somehow 
missed an opportunity to show leadership by planning the 700 and the 800 
MHz bands together but continue licensing the 800 MHz to ensure that 
rural communities get connected. The OECD (2008) report states that 
“people place a higher value on a benefit that they obtain today than one 
they will obtain in the future”, (OECD, 2008, p13). All the active 
participants to the ITU processes cited the anticipated WRC12 decisions 
regarding the 700 MHz band as one of the reasons for the „forced‟ delay in 
finalising the licensing process. Coupled with this was political lobbying 
due to the exclusion of incumbents as confirmed and confessed by some 
of the interviewees.  
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Secondly the interviewees agreed that ICASA introduced the models in a 
vacuum as there was no policy in place which was one of the reasons 
cited by majority of interviewees why the regulations were not finalised. In 
terms of the EC Act, Section 3(1)(a) states that “The Minister may make 
policies on matters of national policy applicable to the ICT sector, 
consistent with the objects of this Act and of the related legislation in 
relation to the radio frequency spectrum”.  Section 3(3) further states: 
No policy made by the Minister in terms of subsection (1) or policy 
direction issued by the Minister in terms of subsection (2) may be 
made or issued regarding the granting, amendment, transfer, 
renewal, suspension or revocation of a licence, except as permitted 
in terms of this Act, (RSA, 2005). 
Lastly, Section 4 states that “The Authority, in exercising its powers and 
performing its duties in terms of this Act and the related legislation must 
consider policies made by the Minister in terms of subsection (1)…”. The 
minister published a policy directive on high demand spectrum of which 
800 and 2600 MHz band are a part, a day before ICASA published the 
regulations on licensing 800 and 2600 MHz bands. Or put differently, 
ICASA published its regulation on licensing the 800 and 2600 MHz bands 
a day after the policy directive on high demand spectrum was published. 
Does this mean ICASA had considered the policy directive published by 
the minister before publishing its regulations? Can ICASA issue 
regulations where no policy or policy directive exists? The researcher has 
not found a section where the minister must issue policy directive 
regarding licensing of spectrum or a section where the Authority must act 
in accordance with the policy directive as was the case under the 
Telecommunications Act. Limpitlaw (2009) attest to this and explains:  
ICASA, in exercising its functions and performing its duties in terms 
of the ECA and the related legislation, is required to „„consider‟‟ 
such Ministerial policy and policy directions but is no longer 
required to act in accordance therewith. The effect of this 
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formulation is that ICASA would be free to depart from such policy 
and/or policy directions if it felt such a course of action was in the 
public interest (Limpitlaw, 2009, p8) and yet ICASA seems to be 
failing to act independently or rather held at ransom. 
5.1.2. The impact of DoC policies on spectrum regulation 
The regulations have since been put on hold pending the finalisation of the 
policy directive on high demand spectrum. An academic interviewee 
during the interviews commented that it is strange that the regulation and 
policy are managed hand in hand and yet this is not the requirement under 
the ECA, (AC1, 11 December 2013). If ICASA had waited for WRC12 and 
given some time after the publication of the draft policy directive, would the 
situation be any different? It has been more than two years and to date the 
policy directive has not yet been finalised. The minister published a 
Broadband Policy at the end of 2013. Points to note that are related to the 
process under discussion include the following: 
 Wholesale open access 
 Service-based competition 
 Policy directive on high demand broadband spectrum  
 Public private partnership for NBN 
 Roles of SOE‟s  
Judging by the actions by the DoC and ICASA in the past two years, the 
expectation from the ECA on ICASA in relation to the policy directive and 
the Broadband Policy (2013), the licensing of the „available high demand 
broadband spectrum‟ can only proceed once ICASA has „considered‟ the 
final policy directive from the Minister whenever it gets published. There 
are good and bad consequences of the delays in licensing. The good: 
More bandwidth for operators is now available for higher speeds or for 
more operators to be licensed, whatever ICASA decides. The bad: The 
models were not well-thought out giving ICASA an opportunity to review 
and clearly define the proposed models including the proper form in which 
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the wholesale open access will be licensed. This was a concern raised by 
a number of interviewees regarding the lack of clarity on the definition of 
wholesale open access, one interviewee stated that “there is nowhere 
where WOA is clearly defined since there are so many different models of 
wholesale open access, no one understanding on what wholesale open 
access is and what model government and ICASA are introducing” (NE3, 
09 December 2013). This provides an opportunity for proper coordination 
between mobile and fixed broadband services, coordination within all 
spheres of government and that government is directly involved in 
ensuring that even the most remote rural areas are connected through 
partnerships, incentives or subsidies. 
5.1.3. Creating an enabling regulatory environment to improve 
competitiveness 
Lastly, the regulatory environment in South Africa since the licensing of 
Cell C and Neotel was never prepared for the introduction of any new 
operators; even at the time when these proposed spectrum licensing 
models were introduced, there was no regulatory intervention to make 
sure that the atmosphere is conducive to introduce competition. Looking at 
the obligations imposed on Cell C and Neotel, they were given stiffer 
USO‟s than Vodacom and MTN even though the duo had 10 years in 
existence before the introduction of Cell C and Neotel. Even though it was 
a known secret that Vodacom and MTN increased the interconnection 
rates, there was no regulatory intervention to ensure stricter facilities 
leasing regulations and interconnection regulations that actually favour the 
new smaller incumbents. Due to higher costs of telecommunications 
despite the introduction of competitors, ICASA was „forced‟ by parliament 
to take action and the call termination rates were reduced on a glide path. 
Asymmetric rates were proposed favouring the late entrants when ICASA 
reviewed these rates at the beginning of 2014. The regulations, however, 
did not indicate what the relation between the wholesale open access 
provider and the current incumbents‟ networks would be, assuming this 
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would be left to commercial agreements hence again that would be a big 
mistake. It is only time that will show to what extent these interventions will 
make a difference for the late entrants and consumers. 
The discussions above reveal a rapidly changing technology driven 
regulatory landscape, they reveal a pace at which changes take place in a 
technology driven environment. It is important for regulators to keep 
abreast and consistently conduct regulatory impact assessments in order 
to decide whether to act or to do nothing. This data reveals that ICASA 
and the South African government in general lost an opportunity to diffuse 
ICT services earlier contributing and encouraging ICT skills training, job 
creation and economic growth thereby improving lives of the poor 
communities. Unfortunately time wasted never returns and “the effect of 
time on money makes a dollar received or spent today worth more than a 
dollar received (or spent) in the future”, (OECD, 2008, p13). Broadband 
Policy (2013) might address some of the government concerns and 
objectives if implemented properly. 
5.2. Analysing the 2011 proposed models and considering other 
market-based spectrum management models 
Looking at the 2011 draft regulation under discussion, ICASA proposed 
that a combination of beauty contest and sealed bid auction be used to 
assign high demand spectrum to a new entrant that will be licensed to 
provide wholesale only services on a wholesale open access basis. 
Auctions and wholesale open access models are viewed as market-based 
assignment and licensing mechanisms, respectively. South Africa has 
never in the past used these models for assigning and licensing spectrum. 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, the country has more than 400 
ECNS/ECS licensees who require spectrum to provide services so these 
„market-based models came about as a result of demand exceeding 
supply in high demand bands.  
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5.2.1. Interpreting the wholesale open access model 
The findings from the interviews reflect a huge support of the wholesale 
open access concept as the licensing model especially for rural 
connectivity. The concern though raised with ICASA‟s concept is the 
wholesale with no retail approach. However, the view is different for urban 
areas especially from the incumbent operators, the view is that there is 
enough infrastructure competition in urban areas and there is therefore no 
need to introduce another infrastructure operator or competitor.  
Another major concern revealed by the data is the fact that there are no 
two operators or people who have a uniform or similar understanding of 
how the wholesale open access for mobile or wireless will look. There are 
similarities amongst operators as far as the thinking that the wholesale 
open access concept introduces MVNO‟s but the view is different from 
policy and regulatory institutions. The policy and regulatory institutions 
lean more on the infrastructure sharing concept as the form that wholesale 
open access will take.  The OECD (2013) report refers to the fact that for 
LTE networks, infrastructure sharing seems to be gaining prominence and 
that there is no evidence where the mobile wholesale open access has 
been successfully implemented. The Broadband Policy (2013) 
unfortunately also does not give detail except encouraging wholesale open 
access to enable infrastructure sharing and promote service-based 
competition. The figure below depicts a view from the participants on the 
wholesale open access model:  
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Figure 8: Different interpretations of wholesale open access 
 
Source: Researcher‟s own 
In the light of this confusion, lack of clarity and dis-unity on the description 
of wholesale open access, there is too little unity or agreement on the 
structure meaning that ICASA needs to go back and do a full review of the 
proposed model to try and bring all these parties to at least a uniform 
continuous circle. 
5.2.2. Evaluating the managed spectrum park model 
On the issue of managed spectrum park model, the majority of operators 
did not give any views on the model citing concerns that the model was 
just introduced and not for discussion or to be used for licensing; it was 
deferred to a later process. The very few who commented in passing 
stated that the approach is similar to the existing commons or licence-
exempt regime and that there might be space for it given the successes of 
Wi-Fi technologies. One of the incumbent interviewees alluded to the fact 
that “the managed spectrum parks model is no different to the current 
licence exempt model; the only difference is that the licensing is done on a 
managed basis”, (IN1, 15 November 2013) with another interviewee 
agreeing that “managed spectrum access is the way to go as it is not a 
free for all”, (IN2, 18 November 2013). Ohanga (2009) and Freyens (2009) 
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describe this model as a common band of spectrum shared privately and 
managed by those co-owners. At the time this model was considered it 
made sense to propose an approach that will facilitate as much spectrum 
sharing as possible within the limited supply. A number of authors (Peha 
(2007), Lehr (2005), Banerjee (n.d)) are even advocating for more 
spectrum to be made available on a licence-exempt basis citing that it 
encourages innovation and spectrum efficiency. There has been an 
ongoing debate between economists and engineers regarding licence-
exempt vs exclusive licensing: whether that is still relevant with the 
introduction of market-based models remains to be seen. Given the events 
that have occurred since the publication of the draft, it is debatable 
whether there is still a need to consider the managed spectrum park 
model moving forward or a consideration rather to include the block set 
aside for managed spectrum park to the wholesale open access proposal 
given its recent prominence. Alternatively the regulator might have to 
review what it wants to achieve with managed spectrum parks and 
therefore review how it will be implemented. 
5.2.3. Introducing secondary markets in addressing ‘artificial 
spectrum scarcity’ 
Most respondents proposed the introduction of secondary markets with 
the anticipated market-based spectrum management models especially 
since the 2011 proposal was targeting mainly new entrants with the 
expected failure of those new entrants to be successful and to meet the 
obligations imposed. Of high interest and the most popular was spectrum 
trading. The majority of interviewees proposed that ICASA should consider 
introducing secondary markets e.g. spectrum trading. One of the 
interviewees alluded to the fact that spectrum trading is a buy-product of 
auctions. The reality though is that spectrum trading can be introduced 
regardless of the spectrum assignment method. Cave (2002) seems to 
agree that a combination of auctions with secondary trading and 
liberalisation does amount to a genuine market-based reform. Interestingly 
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during the interviews, the findings revealed that the majority of operators 
especially the incumbents do not favour auctions and yet they support the 
introduction of spectrum trading. Their preference is that spectrum is 
assigned to those with „experience, technical skill and financial muscle to 
build‟. The new entrants accept that auction is the only practical 
assignment method under the current situation in South Africa. How else 
is high demand (IMT) spectrum in cases where demand exceeds supply 
going to be assigned in a way that is objective, transparent and fair without 
using market-based mechanism which in this instance is auction. The only 
concern from these operators that are „pro-auction‟ is that, it must be 
designed „properly‟. McMillan (1995) explains that governments can 
redress past wrong doing by designing the auctions in different ways to 
address this, one of those being to set-aside spectrum for specific firms to 
bid for them. This is exactly how ICASA had proposed to run the auction; it 
designated the spectrum only for new entrants. From this discussion it is 
evident that auctions can be designed in any form that the regulator in this 
instance desires to achieve a specific objective and that for high demand 
spectrum, market-based mechanisms is the only way to assign and 
licence. It is also evident that operators would want to see spectrum 
trading made compulsory in cases where spectrum is assigned through 
auctions. 
5.2.4. Considering infrastructure and spectrum sharing concepts 
From the discussions above and considering the Broadband Policy (2013), 
it seems as if the regulatory view of wholesale open access lean more on 
operators sharing the infrastructure. The figure below illustrates a form of 
infrastructure sharing that even existing operators are expected to adopt 
by some jurisdictions when moving to less densely populated areas and is 
one of the forms considered as ‟wholesale open access‟.  
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Figure 9: Proposed wholesale open access model 2 
 
Source: BIPT 
The data revealed however, that ICASA has been very reluctant in fact 
has not taken leadership in encouraging spectrum sharing despite 
operators not rolling out networks in certain areas, some hoarding 
spectrum for a number of years and also the supply exceeding demand. 
This is of course with the exception of the sharing that was encouraged in 
the 800 MHz broadcasting channels when Neotel was licensed to share 
the 800 MHz band with the broadcasters. This was done in the absence of 
any regulation by the regulator making it difficult for this kind of sharing to 
take place in other bands. As one of the interviewees noted during the 
interviews that the draft radio regulations attempted to introduce spectrum 
trading but was removed in the final radio regulations document. This was 
another missed opportunity for ICASA to formalise secondary markets as 
the leasing of spectrum (a form of spectrum trading) does take place in 
ancillary services like alarm systems and repeater systems. This issue 
cannot go on unattended for longer, the regulator will have to formalise 
and regulate this side of the market eventually to protect smaller players 
and consumers.  
5.3. The view and behaviour of the main actors 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the incumbent operators opposed 
the proposal by ICASA to introduce another competitor even though this 
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competitor was a wholesale open access network operator. They were 
also protesting against their exclusion from the process of bidding for one 
of the highly sought spectrum in the history of mobile technologies. Of all 
the participants to the study, only one interviewee clarified that, the 2011 
regulations did not exclude the incumbent operators but that they were 
only excluded from bidding for being the wholesale providers otherwise 
they were allowed to get capacity from the wholesaler to provide retail 
services. What this meant is a change to the business model of the 
incumbents which became clear that they are not ready to accept. As the 
GSMA (2012) report explained, „spectrum is the lifeblood of the mobile 
industry‟, without which their businesses do not exist. It became clear 
during the interviews that to the mobile industry, spectrum is the core 
asset, the most valuable of all and incumbents will do almost anything to 
get their hands on it. Looking closely at the reaction from the main actors, 
why are they opposed to the introduction of the new competitor? The 
argument from most interviewees especially the incumbents is that there 
was never a market study done to determine the maximum number of 
operators allowed before declaring the market saturated. One of those 
incumbent interviewees also stated that “there is a limited number of 
operators any country can sustain before it loses economies of scale, get 
a return on investment”, (IN3, 26 November 2013). Another incumbent 
interviewee suggested a similar investigation by the regulator and stated 
that “the regulations should address the issue of the maximum number of 
operators”. This view is confirmed by the GSMA report that “across 
developed markets the average number of mobile operators is 3.5 and 
across emerging markets the average number of mobile operators is 3.9”, 
(GSMA, 2012, p51). The data from the interviews reveal that none of the 
main actors are supportive of the fact that ICASA is introducing 
competition which could mean that they do not want competition as this 
will affect their market share. The effect of their exclusion and anticipated 
competition was that the incumbent operators started re-farming their 
current high demand spectrum launching the LTE technologies ahead of 
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the anticipated new entrant/s. Would LTE services have been introduced 
at the time they were, had ICASA not published the regulation when it did 
and excluded the incumbents? The answer is probably not. One of the 
interviewees alluded to the fact that the 800 and 2600 MHz bands were 
meant for the rollout of LTE technologies and therefore the incumbents 
might delay or would have delayed the introduction of such services as 
they “would not want to cannibalise their existing investments in order to 
get their return on investment on the existing networks”, i.e. 3G network, 
(MA1, 08 January 2014). 
5.3.1. Exclusive spectrum licensing as a norm for the main actors 
ICASA‟s mandate is to ensure efficient use of spectrum. The bulk of the 
currently available traditional high demand spectrum is assigned and 
licensed to the incumbents. What this means is that they have exclusive 
usage rights to these specific bands. From the literature reviewed some 
scholars argue that exclusive licensing limit innovation, efficiency and 
flexibility, they assert the „exclusive‟ spectrum licensing approach is static 
and leads to artificial spectrum scarcity and under-utilisation, (Banerjee et 
al (n.d) & Lehr, 2005). With all the spectrum and obligations imposed, the 
main actors have failed to rollout broadband in rural areas. The findings 
from the interviews reveal that operators will not necessarily go to rural 
areas unless specifically required to do so with clearly defined specific 
instruction in a form of those obligations and they also expect to be 
incentivised. The questions of whether ICASA‟s actions were justified in 
introducing these new spectrum licensing models, whether it was a best 
form of action and whether the intentions were clearly defined are 
answered by the discussion and findings made hereafter.  
It is evident from the data collected that all interviewees understood the 
objectives from ICASA was rural broadband connectivity and accepted by 
many that rural areas do not have broadband. ICASA was therefore well 
justified and within their rights to act the way they did otherwise the main 
actors would not have seen a need to start rolling out LTE though not 
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necessarily addressing rural broadband. What ICASA needs to do is to 
monitor the quality of service closely to ensure that the very poor 
communities do not get sub-standard voice services due to re-farmed 
spectrum. From the discussions, it is clear that the main actors could be 
either enablers or obstacles to creating a dynamic competitive market and 
fostering a digital country. It is up to the policy and regulatory bodies to 
ensure that they are always a step ahead in enforcing some of the 
government objectives because for commercial entities, the business is 
about the bottom line. However, that must be done in an informed and well 
investigated environment, which brings us to the next theme.    
5.4. Lack of market study and no regulatory impact assessment 
conducted 
South Africa is starting to move in the right direction exploring 
infrastructure and spectrum sharing models though at a very slow pace. 
This is the view from some of the interviewees who applauded the step 
taken by ICASA. One thing though that most respondents agree on is the 
lack of market study, research or market analysis before introducing new 
concepts. The incumbent operators who are active participants in the 
industry argue that ICASA has slowly been introducing new concepts e.g. 
administrative incentive pricing (AIP) for spectrum fees and now the 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum parks for spectrum 
licensing but unfortunately fails to consult properly. The argument from 
some is that the process of consultation has changed dramatically from 
the days when the country started formulating the Telecoms legislative 
framework post-apartheid. The process used to follow a green paper, 
white paper, draft legislation, public consultation then the final legislation. 
Now there is no longer pre-consultation during the process, ICASA 
publishes a draft document for consultation which most of the time 
seriously lacks clarity and detail. The wholesale open access and 
managed spectrum parks are new concepts in the South African 
communications environment and the effects of their implementation are 
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unknown but potentially huge. What this means is that they have a 
potential of introducing new markets and changing the business models 
for the operators. All the stakeholders who participated in interviews agree 
that the proposed spectrum licensing models were not clearly defined to 
an extent that operators are making their own assumptions in terms of 
what form the proposed wholesale open access will take. This they all do 
in a manner that will benefit their businesses.  
5.4.1. Using RIA as an approach to conduct market studies 
A number of scholars (Kirkpatrick &Parker, Radaelli, Goggin & Lauder) all 
agree that when a new regulation is introduced, conducting a regulatory 
impact assessment plays a key role in assisting governments to take 
evidence-based decisions. They insist on conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis to get an understanding of how the different players will be 
affected and the magnitude of those effects. In the process of assessment, 
clear definitions and government‟s intentions will be highlighted, how the 
different parties are affected and also identifying who the beneficiaries are. 
Sutherland (2010, p22) concurs that as one prepares for an impact 
assessment, “a detailed understanding of the economics of specific 
markets in order to see how the different players will be affected” is 
required and to determine the distribution of such effects across society. 
RIA assists in deciding also when the benefit to be derived from the 
regulation cannot justify the cost for the government action and yet the 
problem will still not be addressed effectively, (OECD, 2008). During the 
interviews, a number of respondents raised a lack of investigative or 
market studies and a lack of impact assessments as a concern in that 
ICASA‟s documents lack detail and clarity. One of the incumbent 
interviewees even alluded to the fact that as the incumbents they come 
across as criticising everything even in areas where ICASA is doing well 
because of short-circuited processes by ICASA. He insisted that they 
never get an opportunity to participate in the drafting stages of the 
regulation, the only consultation is when the draft is published which is too 
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late to understand the way of thinking. They are therefore forced to 
analyse the document in detail, critique and almost re-write the document. 
This view agrees with the scholars in that ICASA did not conduct any 
regulatory impact assessment before introducing the wholesale open 
access and managed spectrum park models. No form of analysis, be it 
social, economic or environmental was done to determine the impact on 
the market, its role players and consumers. The reference was also made 
to the fact that ICASA usually publishes a 10-page document whilst 
introducing an unknown concept whereas similar institutions like OFCOM 
(UK regulator) would normally produce 300 pages more showing the 
amount of detail in OFCOM‟s documents and the lack thereof in ICASA‟s 
documents. Interestingly though, OFCOM does policy and regulations, 
whilst ICASA implements policy as a regulator only, therefore the 
comparison is not comparing likes for likes. This view was elaborated on 
independently by one of the SOE‟s with concern also that ICASA 
unfortunately does benchmarking with OFCOM on the results without even 
researching and understanding the principles applied. Having made that 
observation, it still does not excuse ICASA from doing in-depth research 
and impact assessments before introducing new concepts and new 
regulations.  
5.4.2. Introducing competition or enhancing competitiveness 
The discussions above reveal a lack of proper research conducted by 
ICASA. A more inclusive process that solicits views from the industry in 
the drafting stages of any regulation would facilitate buy-in and faster 
implementation. 
Secondly, the operators are concerned that no market study was 
conducted to decide on introducing more operators into the market be it 
infrastructure competition or service competition. There is no evidence that 
justifies ICASA‟s action to introduce competition. The question asked by 
many was, when is the number of operators enough for the market to be 
declared „saturated‟? Even though all agree on service competition, the 
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argument posed is that increasing the number of operators in the market 
does not guarantee competitiveness if one considers operators like Cell C 
and Neotel, not to mention Telkom Mobile who are finding it really difficult 
to significantly break MTN and Vodacom‟s duopoly. Cell C and Neotel 
have been struggling for years to break-even and Telkom Mobile with all 
the backbone infrastructure, financial and technical backing from Telkom 
is still so insignificant in the mobile market, the question is what makes 
ICASA think that a „greenfield‟ operator will do any better. The reality 
though is that in South Africa there is either no real competition or 
competitiveness. Without having done a market study to determine the 
maximum number of operators that the South African market can handle, 
it will be unrealistic to announce upfront the acceptable number of 
operators in the country. As already highlighted above, the GSMA report 
suggests that for emerging market the average number of operators is 3.9.  
The reality in the country is that those operators that came in last into the 
market are not finding it easy to compete, there could be a number of 
reasons contributing to this including lack of regulatory protection and 
assistance as alluded to by these operators and the new smaller entrants 
and as already highlighted  in 5.1 above. Regulatory failure to act pro-
actively is what is revealed from these discussions and what needs to be 
addressed moving forward. 
5.5. The appropriate level at which ICASA and Government should 
take action 
The findings from the previous chapter expose that what is more of a 
reality is that the incumbents are doing very little to ensure broadband 
connectivity for all especially outside the cities which is one of the major 
goals of government. The people in rural areas of this country are sitting 
with limited, if at all, 3G network making it impossible to access internet 
and emails. It was such a shocking experience during the interviews when 
some of the interviewees asked the question of why government would 
want 4G networks for rural areas in the first place. In 2014, there are 
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operators who do not see a need for regulator and government to see 
through the vision of broadband connectivity for all especially in rural 
areas because the people in rural areas are very poor to afford broadband 
services and do not have the skill to use 3G or LTE devices? This is the 
debate that should not even be entertained. As true as it is that majority of 
rural communities lack skill, the operators should rather stress the 
importance of government involvement in assisting with rolling out the 
broadband infrastructure especially to those areas that are completely 
under-served and to rollout projects that facilitate the training of rural 
communities. The debate of whether to address demand or supply 
regarding infrastructure for rural areas should not be entertained. The 
World Bank has published reports where it confirms that broadband 
services contribute to job creation and economic growth. For example, 
other countries have taken a decision to have government play a central 
role in bringing broadband to every citizen in their countries and have 
started reaping the rewards. In Korea for example, as a way of 
encouraging and ensuring the take-up, government embarked on 
awareness campaigns and training, it “set up the  Internet Education to 
Ten Million People Project, aimed at providing IT literacy training for all 
citizens”, (Qiang, Rossotto & Kimura, 2009, p9). Fortunately the 
Broadband Policy (2013) identifies illiteracy and issues of costs for 
gadgets as an issue that government will have to address. One of the 
interviewees also cited some of these issues as areas for government to 
address as connectivity alone will not achieve the desired outcomes; 
during the interviews this interviewee stated that: 
Assigning a combination of low (coverage) frequencies with higher 
capacity) spectrum is one strategy to provide connectivity to both 
urban and rural areas. However connectivity alone does not result 
in the full benefit of broadband for the populace. Issues of 
affordability, usability, and relevant localized content are integral 
and should be addressed, particularly in the rural areas, (MA2, 20 
January 2014).  
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Germany however, still insisted on imposing the obligation on the 
incumbents. The German regulator auctioned the 800 MHz and imposed 
conditions on all three operators who managed to secure 2X10 MHz 
bandwidth. The condition was that the operators must rollout broadband 
network to 90% of the population starting with the communities who are 
less densely populated before moving on to the next level. All interviewees 
with the exception of the policy and regulatory interviewees, proposed that 
ICASA should consider models like the German model (GSMA, 2011) 
where rural connectivity is prioritised, meaning the operators start at the 
out-skirts and make their way into the urban areas but strictly once the 
minimum of 90% of the population in those areas has been covered. The 
difference with the ICASA proposal is that there was no new entity that 
was assigned spectrum; the licenses were given to the incumbent 
operators with the exception of one who could not be assigned as there 
was nothing left anyway. What ICASA might want to consider in doing the 
benchmarking especially with the developed countries is to ensure that 
they customise the approach to suit the South African environment. The 
level of infrastructure development in developed countries is far different 
from countries like South Africa so customisation will be key to address the 
unique environment. No one size fits all and unfortunately a number of 
developing countries fall into a trap of adopting policies that were 
established for developed countries. A number of authors (Ladegaard 
2005, Kirkpatrick & Parker 2004) agree that developing countries need to 
customise policies to suit their own circumstances including when 
conducting RIA.  
5.5.1. Mandatory wholesale open access for rural areas 
For this country (SA), it is evident that to achieve broadband connectivity 
for all, wholesale open access network is necessary especially for rural 
areas, what needs to be investigated and defined properly is how it will be 
implemented, who should build the network and how. The OECD (2013) 
report observes that “there is little evidence to date of wholesale-only 
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mobile operators enjoying commercial success. Infrastructure sharing 
agreements appear to be gaining importance and this may be the trend in 
many countries for the deployment of LTE networks”, (OECD, 2013, p12). 
The Broadband Policy (2013) might be a good start in answering some of 
the questions and giving guidance to ICASA on how to approach and 
design the wholesale open access network moving forward though the 
policy also does not explicitly explain how the wholesale open access 
model will look.  
To decide on whether there are benefits in introducing the wholesale open 
access model or not, there is an overwhelming agreement amongst 
operators and the literature reviewed that wholesale open access is the 
way to go especially for rural areas. The respondents agree that it will be 
costly to implement the proposed models but the benefits especially for 
consumers are even bigger and the best approach is to do it faster. This 
touches on the regulatory decision making ability and power to act and 
implement without external influences be it from government, operators or 
any other. The regulator might want to understand the level at which to 
take action and the powers it has in order to be able „regulate without fear 
or favour‟ because the inaction is costing the country and the sector even 
more. 
5.6. Infrastructure versus service competition 
Wholesale open access and Managed Spectrum Parks models trigger 
infrastructure sharing, infrastructure competition and service competition. 
There has been infrastructure competition in the country for a while to an 
extent that mobile operators would erect high-sites opposite each other 
until they started realising how costly that exercise was and so they 
started sharing infrastructure on their own without real intervention from 
the regulator or government especially the passive infrastructure. Also the 
roaming agreements amongst mobile operators mainly have been entered 
into as forms of infrastructure sharing but only until the late entrants start 
building their own networks. The operators have, nonetheless, been very 
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cautious on what parts of their networks are shared. Bauer, Westerveld & 
Maitland, (2001) encourage network sharing to reduce capital expenditure; 
this is particularly relevant for rural networks. From the data collected 
almost all operators agree that there is a need for competition on services 
and not so much on infrastructure. Be that as it may, one interviewee 
stated that, this does not mean that there should be monopoly on 
infrastructure, some level of competition is still necessary on infrastructure 
otherwise that one operator will not see a need to upgrade its network e.g. 
moving from 4G to 5G, (IN3, 26 November 2013). A proposal from some 
of the interviewees is that there should be competition even for the 
wholesale open access providers. This protects the country from a risk of 
sitting with one wholesale provider who in case of failure the whole country 
suffers. The trick as proposed by non-incumbents is to licence the entire 
spectrum to the wholesale open access provider/s to avoid other entities 
competing with wholesale only provider/s and with retailers. This would 
jeopardise the wholesale provider/s‟ business and whatever chances of 
profitability. The better alternative that Cave (2002) suggests is that 
“regulators should be interested in inserting competition in infrastructure 
as deeply as possible in the spectrum value-chain in order to sharpen 
commercial rivalries and promote service differentiation”. For rural areas it 
is evident though that competition will only make business sense at the 
retail level and the regulator must take the lead in addressing the rest of 
the country. Again regulatory failure or inaction is what compromises the 
country more. 
5.6.1. True gap analysis and using the 400+ operators to achieve 
100% population coverage 
In the country there are currently 400+ ECNS/ECS operators who need 
access to some form of high demand access spectrum for them to be able 
to provide wireless and/or mobile services. The spectrum to be licensed at 
wholesale level is very limited in terms of available bandwidth to 
accommodate the demand and therefore it is justified to introduce 
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wholesale open access model so that operators can compete on services. 
Innovative ways could be used to get the bulk of the smaller operators 
involved without crippling the industry or duplicating networks e.g. using 
them as service providers and competitors (encouraging consortiums) in 
deep rural areas or where incumbents will not go. Most of the interviewees 
re-iterated that the approach applied for urban and rural areas will have to 
be different as urban areas do not necessarily need serious regulatory 
intervention. Moving to semi-urban areas, the approach might be a bit 
different and might require a mild push from the regulator then up to the 
deep rural areas where no infrastructure exists. This is where government 
needs to take over and ensure the infrastructure is built and make services 
available at a minimum or no cost to communities. A proper needs 
analysis and coordination from all stakeholders is necessary to ensure that 
the market addresses those gaps that can easily be accommodated by the 
market so that the true-access gap is clearly defined. This maximises on 
the available resources and minimises duplication to help keep costs down 
to a minimum. The diagram below depicts how a coordinated approach 
could encourage inclusive broadband connectivity. 
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Figure 10: Different levels to address geographic reach 
 
Source: Intelecon, 2009. 
The smart subsidy zone and the true access gap both require government 
funding and this is the main focus of government and is what ICASA is 
trying to address with the introduction of the wholesale open access 
models. The issue of funding is a major concern raised by the all those 
interviewed as the commercial operators will not willingly rollout in rural 
areas unless there is some form of an incentive or government subsidy. 
As one of them indicated, „money follows infrastructure‟. What has not 
been discussed and considered is addressing the true access gap using 
other means, other than terrestrial networks. From the data collected, it 
became clear that this is not one of those areas that government or private 
sector can drive on their own. It became evident that government and 
private sector need to get together to address this part of the market 
regardless of the selective objections and proposed approach from some 
incumbents. Considering the discussion and the explanation as depicted 
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by the diagram above, neither private sector nor government can afford to 
duplicate infrastructure in rural areas so a coordinated approach is the 
only way to apply so as to avoid wasting the limited resources. The 
wholesale open access and managed spectrum park models will therefore 
not encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity on their own. An 
inclusive approach that brings private sector with government has to be 
adopted to achieve government objectives of broadband connectivity for 
all.  
5.7. Lack of involvement of SOE’s  
The discussion under this topic is not necessarily highlighted as one of the 
themes but rather an area for consideration in reviewing and revising the 
2011 regulations.  As previously highlighted, the 2011 proposed regulation 
assigned some spectrum in the 800 MHz band to Sentech to build the 
wholesale open access network. Sentech has since returned the entire 
high demand spectrum that was licensed to them due to high spectrum 
fees costs. During the interviews almost all interviewees with the exception 
of an academic, state entities and policy institution mentioned the lack of 
involvement of the state owned entities. One interviewee from the policy 
and regulatory institutions stated that it was unfortunate that there was no 
government-owned operator that could be mandated to rollout the 
broadband network in rural areas, (PR12, 13 January 2014). Another 
concern and confusion is why Broadband InfraCo is not at the centre of 
100% broadband connectivity in the country and yet it was created to 
ensure that the country achieves national broadband coverage. One 
academic also raised this concern that rolling out in rural areas will be 
expensive and given the issues of costs, what was the role of Broadband 
InfraCo given that they were formed to assist with broadband connectivity, 
(AC1, 06 December 2013). 
Given Sentech‟s track record, financial burdens, negative publicity, DTT 
focused priority and their inability to provide broadband services in the 
past, it was no surprise that eventually they returned the spectrum back to 
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ICASA hence the sceptics from the majority of the interviewees. This does 
not necessarily mean that Sentech is completely out of the game, there 
have been talks of SOE‟s getting involved as key players in the broadband 
wholesale open access network from some of the interviewees, but it is 
currently not clear what role they will play, if at all, in making sure the 
government‟s objective is achieved. After all, everyone agrees that 
government‟s goal of broadband connectivity for all can only be achieved 
through partnership between government and private sector. None of 
these institutions can do it alone and that has been proven in the past with 
Telkom‟s exclusivity period and the mobile operators, Vodacom and MTN 
who are making their profit from voice services hence no urgency to 
ensure national 3G data coverage whilst consumers sit with substandard 
data network quality even in urban areas.  
5.8. Conclusion 
The chapter attempted to analyse the data from interviews, providing a 
better understanding of the advantages of introducing wholesale open 
access and managed spectrum parks as spectrum licensing mechanisms. 
This was done contrasting the views from data collected and literature 
reviewed. New themes that emerged were discussed together with some 
of the themes from the previous chapter. The analysis reveals that the 
benefits of the proposed spectrum licensing models outweigh 
disadvantages of not introducing them even though they may not achieve 
the objective on their own; other aspects will have to be incorporated. 
Concluding remarks on key issues that arose and recommendations for 
consideration by the regulator will be done in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Regulating spectrum for a digital country 
needs dynamic thinking and mechanisms 
The radio frequency spectrum is generally referred to as a „scarce 
resource‟. This depends on who you are talking to, an economist or an 
engineer. Engineers believe exclusive licensing creates „artificial scarcity‟ 
whilst economists want to protect the huge initial investments on networks 
and therefore pro-exclusivity. Traditionally spectrum was regulated to 
avoid interference, to ensure different services are accommodated (e.g. 
mobile, broadcasting, maritime etc.) and consumer protection amongst 
others. The wider liberalisation and arrival of digital technologies present 
benefits and challenges i.e. digital technologies are more spectrum 
efficient but are also more bandwidth hungry and there are more 
competitors for the limited available spectrum. Regulators face an even 
bigger challenge of regulating for the digital signal. 
Spectrum regulation in the 21st century is about access to digital services 
e.g. broadband and digital broadcasting services. The regulators have a 
responsibility to allocate spectrum „equally‟ amongst these digital services 
and taking into consideration, existing infrastructure, what consumers want 
and value most but also what is needed to grow the economy. To achieve 
an all-inclusive digital country, a collective approach to spectrum 
regulation that combines market-based mechanisms with the traditional 
command and control is the only way because it has been proven that 
markets alone cherry-pick lucrative areas and command and control 
results in hoarding of spectrum. For countries and regulators to bring 
digital services e.g. 100% broadband coverage and digital broadcasting to 
its citizens, spectrum regulation remains at the fore-front and an enabler. 
The markets have proved that they will rollout networks and provide 
services in areas that are more economically viable and will not voluntarily 
go to areas where affordability and skill is a challenge. In identifying this 
challenge in a digital era, the regulator needs to regulate spectrum, 
(including defining the exact frequency bands), in a way that addresses 
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the true-access gap bringing e-services to at least closer to 100% 
population coverage. 
It also became clear that the market on its own will not address 
government goal of greater broadband inclusivity. As part of the evidence-
based decision making required by a RIA process, regulators need to do 
close investigation and monitoring of the industry to understand the 
problem they are trying to solve and how best to solve it. A cost-benefit 
analysis of any intervention will assist in determining the consequences of 
the regulatory action and impact on the affected players. In understanding 
the gaps, the regulator will act from a well-informed position cushioning 
itself from any form of regulatory capture or litigation and will help realise 
that the markets need a push to fulfil some of their obligations. 
It is important also to note and realise that spectrum alone will not bring a 
digital country; a more coordinated all-inclusive technology neutral 
approach is required. This involves bringing copper and fibre network 
operators, mobile network operators and satellite network operators 
together including infrastructure of SOE‟s; to interconnect these networks 
for broader coverage and capacity. Also encouraging the markets to be 
competitive by removing regulatory bottle necks e.g. interconnection, 
facilities leasing, allowing secondary markets and rights of way will assist 
innovation thereby contributing to the digital country. 
6.1. Concluding remarks and recommendations for decision-making 
This chapter will draw from the arguments and findings in other chapters 
and recommendations will be made including the way forward. The 
chapter reflects on the critical issues that came out from the previous 
chapter as they relate to the main research question. The main research 
question in the study is to determine the extent to which the wholesale 
open access and managed spectrum park as licensing models would 
encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity for all. 
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It was highlighted in the previous chapters that the difficulty experienced 
by the broader electronic communications industry was the introduction of 
market-based spectrum management models that were not work-shopped 
and no evidence shown to justify the action. It became clear that a 
regulatory impact assessment or any form of a market or baseline study is 
necessary for any regulatory intervention that changes the market 
structure and business models.  
The discussions from the analysis chapter also revealed a lack of 
consistency, lack of decision making ability and will-power to embrace 
progression (e.g. secondary markets) by the regulator. Given the realities 
of evolving technologies demanding more spectrum and limited spectrum 
supply to accommodate the demand, it is evident that the South African 
communications environment will only be satisfied through innovative and 
flexible regulatory mechanisms. The deliberations below touch on issues 
for consideration as a step to make some of these issues a reality, areas 
for improvement as well as the way forward. 
6.2. Making RIA a permanent process in decision making 
The regulatory impact assessment has become part of the process of 
developing regulations in developed countries and a number of developing 
countries have also started adopting a RIA approach. ICASA is 
nonetheless lagging behind in terms of adopting RIA despite the country 
having documented guidelines. For the regulator to gain credibility within 
the industry and to produce well-thought, easy to understand regulations, 
it is important to embrace and internalise the culture of conducting 
research and assessment studies. This process needs to be inclusive 
starting with well-directed, well-researched and pro-active policies from 
government. The process of RIA in itself entails consultation, and all 
relevant and affected stakeholders need to be part of the process. What 
this means is that the process of RIA should not only be adopted by the 
regulator, a coordinated approach between the policy-maker and the 
regulator is important.  
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6.3. Seizing opportunities in a rapidly changing digital landscape 
The communications environment is a highly paced technology driven 
industry such that it becomes a challenge for policy and regulations to 
remain relevant. Approaches to regulation in the 21st Century need to be 
flexible in a way that encourages progression; the policies and regulations 
therefore should be easily adjustable for technologies of the day. It is also 
important for the regulator to remain flexible by embracing disruptive 
technologies that are introduced so that it doesn‟t stay rigid such that it 
misses opportunities to get ahead. For these disruptive technologies to 
flourish, the regulator should allow and introduce secondary markets e.g. 
spectrum trading, spectrum leasing. For example, as explained previously, 
ICASA approved the use of „white spaces‟ by Neotel in the 800 MHz band, 
but did not expand or allow such practices to other bands, services and 
areas. There are a number of interests from the smaller new entrants to 
provide services outside the golden triangle and there are already pilot 
projects using „white spaces‟ in the broadcasting channels. ICASA should 
investigate the availability of these white spaces post the digital migration 
and their existence outside the broadcasting channels as an example. In 
some instances it becomes difficult for the regulator to determine whether 
it needs to regulate a certain sector and technology, this is one of those 
instances that the regulator should assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of regulating versus not regulating. And lastly, it is a fact 
that the available high demand spectrum will never be enough to 
accommodate the current supply, it is therefore important for ICASA to 
forge ahead and seize the opportunities that the market-based spectrum 
management models unveil. 
6.4. Firm behaviour: An enabler or an obstacle 
The issue of broadband connectivity for all will remain a dream unless 
ICASA is prepared to be unpopular with the industry especially the main 
actors. ICASA cannot try to satisfy everyone whilst everyone gets 
frustrated in the process. It has been revealed by the data collected that 
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operators will not build infrastructure in rural areas unless a drastic step is 
taken by those in power and it is therefore ICASA‟s responsibility to take 
radical measures to ensure broadband services are brought to the people 
with or without the main actors in the sector. This is the investigation and 
decision that ICASA will have to take eventually but the action should be 
sooner than later otherwise the spectrum economic value is lost. However, 
ICASA needs to create a conducive environment for the operators to be 
competitive in order to force operators to be innovative. For commercial 
entities, it is business as usual and it is about shareholder interests whilst 
the majority of the citizens remain in the dark. 
6.5. Clarify the regulatory view of wholesale open access and 
spectrum sharing 
The previous chapters discovered that under the context of this research 
wholesale open access and infrastructure sharing are described in a way 
that implies that the introduction of wholesale open access means 
infrastructure sharing. However the 2011 spectrum plan and ITA did not 
explicitly promote or even propose infrastructure sharing and the 
interviews revealed different interpretations including MVNO‟s. This kind of 
confusion in the definitions of wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum parks including how they can be implemented is what is creating 
havoc and will continue to do so until the concepts are properly defined 
and reasons document produced for the chosen interpretation. It is 
common practice that ICASA publishes a reasons document when 
publishing a regulation to explain its interpretation and the reasons for its 
decisions. These concepts (wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum park) seemed to have gained some prominence in as far as rural 
networks are concerned and not so much for the rest of the country. This 
is mainly due to the understanding that these models encourage 
infrastructure sharing. ICASA must use that to the advantage of those 
poor rural communities and make infrastructure and spectrum sharing 
compulsory moving forward especially when licensing high demand 
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spectrum with the intention to connect rural communities. This will assist to 
minimise network rollout costs for operators which will reduce service 
costs for consumers.  
Spectrum sharing on the other hand; is not a popular topic especially in 
the commercial environment. Co-existence in the same channels in the 
same area was never an option, for technical reasons, e.g. interference. 
Spectrum has always been allocated to specific services and assigned 
exclusively to operators. Technology is advancing and engineers are 
experimenting with dynamic spectrum access technologies using cognitive 
radio. During the interviews, one of the interviewees suggested spectrum 
pooling as one of the spectrum sharing models that could be 
experimented with, coupled with white spaces as they go hand in hand 
with cognitive radio. ICASA has started supporting pilot projects on white 
spaces but it is important to ensure coordinated and all-inclusive efforts so 
that the benefits are realised sooner. 
The regulator can do a lot with the concept of „managed spectrum parks‟ 
as a form of spectrum sharing although it is not clearly defined as yet. 
From the literature, the managed spectrum parks are meant to take a form 
of open access for a private user group with limited regulatory intervention. 
Some of the authors are advocating for increased bandwidth in licence-
exempt bands, why not consider either limiting or eliminating the part of 
management on spectrum parks. This will increase bandwidth in lucrative 
bands where research and development could be encouraged as was 
achieved with Wi-Fi technology. In reality, it is the regulator that can 
determine what impact such an approach will have; whether it assists the 
country achieve the goal of broadband for all. 
6.6. Analyse capacity requirements for rural areas. 
The Broadband Policy that was published at the end of 2013 introduced 
ambitious broadband targets and yet is not giving a comprehensive view 
and approach of the implementation. Nonetheless, this is where the 
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regulator should apply an all-inclusive technology neutral regulatory 
strategy to foster implementation. For this strategy to make sense, an 
analysis of the smart subsidy zone and the true access gap needs to be 
done so that licensing is carried out with an understanding of the 
background. This understanding makes it possible for the regulator for 
example to choose a satellite operator over a fibre network operator for 
deep rural coverage. The one size fits all kind of approach and ambition 
does not work and tends to deny rural communities access to ICT services 
using cost efficient, technically feasible alternatives. The example here is 
that the 450 MHz band is one of those bands identified for possible future 
broadband services in rural areas due to its propagation characteristics. Of 
concern with the band is the amount of bandwidth available for broadband, 
the availability of end user equipment then comparing the cost of 
deployment of broadband in the band in rural area versus using alternative 
technologies e.g. satellite. The issue raised during the interviews by one 
operator was that the demand-side priorities are not defined e.g. e-health, 
e-education, e-government etc. to determine the appropriate technology 
and therefore the capacity requirements. These are the kind of 
engagements that the regulator should have with all the relevant 
stakeholders to define the problem clearly and then come up with realistic 
mechanisms to address the problem otherwise ubiquitous and high speed 
broadband coverage may never be achieved. 
6.7. Conclusion 
Throughout the discussions, the investigation was whether the main 
question and sub-questions are being answered. In concluding the issue, 
the main question has been answered despite limitations which will be 
highlighted below. The wholesale open access and managed spectrum 
park spectrum licensing models will assist government and the country to 
achieve ubiquitous and high speed connectivity, however, not on their 
own; a number of other issues need to be factored in. An example of this, 
is, defining and understanding the problem to be solved (conducting RIA), 
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defining and describing the models clearly (MVNO‟s, infrastructure sharing 
or any other), licensing now or later, licensing new entrants, incumbents or 
PPP‟s and creating a conducive technology neutral regulatory 
environment. These are amongst the top critical issues to be addressed 
when implementing ICASA‟ 2011 spectrum licensing models otherwise 
ICASA‟s regulation process will forever be challenged.  
The sub-questions have also been answered in the sense that it is 
highlighted that none of the government objectives can be addressed 
without a coordinated approach with all the affected stakeholders taking 
into consideration the regulators‟ mandate. The questions were grouped 
under different themes of universal service and broadband connectivity, 
technology and digital era, competition and lastly policy and regulatory. On 
the questions of universal service and broadband, the analysis shows that 
the traditional spectrum assignment and licensing models have introduced 
the basic infrastructure but resulted in hoarding and artificial spectrum 
scarcity. However, the market-based spectrum management models will 
assist government and the regulator in addressing issues of low 
broadband connectivity but not on their own. Creating standalone 
networks with these models will affect 4G rollout unless the regulator 
designs the licensing in a way that either involves the current networks or 
at least enforces access to existing networks through regulatory 
intervention. Again it is a question of coordination amongst the affected 
stakeholders and employing a technology neutral, all-inclusive national 
network rollout.  
The critical areas in the RIA investigative questions were addressed in the 
sense that, the stakeholders do agree that ICASA is justified to act and the 
introduction of the 2011 spectrum licensing models is the best form of 
action. The issues of demand versus supply had to be addressed, 
nevertheless the regulator failed to make a thorough investigation and 
consultation of the affected parties. The affected parties were identified 
and the basic effects discussed though they could not be quantified. The 
142 
 
participants to this study could not really identify alternative spectrum 
licensing models to address rural connectivity other than the proposed 
„sharing‟ models; they agree that for rural connectivity a form of 
infrastructure sharing is the only cost-effective and sensible model. The 
issues of compliance and technicality of the models can only be properly 
defined once clarity has been given and stakeholders have managed to 
gain some comfort and understanding of the proposal.  
The limitations though with the study were a lack of understanding by the 
interviewees of the differences between spectrum assignment models and 
spectrum licensing models. For example, in asking for alternative 
spectrum licensing models, interviewees would refer to auctions as 
licensing models and yet they are assignment models. In any case this 
made for an interesting engagement and debate getting to the common 
level with the interviewees. One of the main limiting factors was limited 
availability of academic journals researching some of the critical areas of 
this study e.g. „wholesale open access for mobile‟ and „managed spectrum 
park models‟. Another limitation was the reluctance from the participants to 
divulge costs related with rolling out a national network in order to make 
an estimate and comparison with rolling out a national broadband network 
as a result the table on costs that was meant to quantify costs was not 
used. The direct involvement of the interviewees with the project made for 
a possibility of subjective participation with an objective of influencing the 
regulatory end result but literature reviewed was used to confirm some of 
the views. 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
My name is Yolisa Kedama. I am a student at the University of 
Witwatersrand doing a Masters of Management in ICT Policy and 
Regulation. I am currently doing research as part of the requirements to 
complete the degree and I request an interview as part of the data 
collection for my studies. I would like to assure you that the information 
gathered from the interview will be treated with the strictest confidence 
and will be used for study purposes only and no names will be published 
in the final report. 
Please be advised that you are under no obligation to participate and that 
you may choose not to answer any of the questions and you may opt out 
of the interview at any time, however I would really appreciate your 
participation. 
Lastly I request your permission to record the interview and to consult with 
you in future for clarification on any point you make. The interview will be 
limited to 45-60 minutes. 
I have combined the questions under different subheadings to reflect 
some themes as per my study and government goals of universal service 
and access, digital connectivity, competition and then looking at the policy 
and regulatory space. 
Organisation  :_______________________________ 
Occupation  :_______________________________ 
Date of interview :_______________________________ 
Annexure A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Universal service obligations and Broadband penetration 
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a) To what extent would ICASA‟s 2011 (draft) spectrum licensing 
models encourage ubiquitous and high speed connectivity for South 
Africa? 
b) To what extent would this regulatory approach address issues of 
low broadband connectivity in both urban and rural areas? 
c) How much progress has the communications industry seen with the 
traditional spectrum management and licensing models? Explain 
d) How would the models proposed in the 2011 draft regulations affect 
4G rollout?  
e) In your view, what are the reasons why the 2011 draft regulations 
were not finalised? 
f) What alternative approaches to spectrum licensing would be 
appropriate to enabling faster broadband rollout and further 
technology advancement in broadband? 
2. Technology and the digital era 
a) To what extent do the proposed spectrum licensing models foster a 
digital country? 
b) What other effects could this regulatory approach have on services 
offered by the broader electronic communications market? 
c) What types of spectrum licensing models should be used in 
licensing the available high demand bands in future? E.g. 450 MHz 
band etc. 
d) What technical measures would need to be in place to make the 
implementation of these licensing models practical? Please explain 
3. Competition 
a) To what extent are the proposed spectrum licensing models 
expected to encourage competition in electronic communications 
markets? 
b) How will the proposed new spectrum licensing models impact on 
the industry and the broader electronic communications market? 
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c) In your view, what form should the wholesale open access take?  
d) How much will it cost operators and the country at large if 
incumbents are left out of the wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum park approaches? 
e) Would the five fixed and mobile incumbents be adequately catered 
for by the licensing measures other than open access and spectrum 
park? 
4. Policy and regulatory framework (RIA questions) 
a) In your view what is the legal or economic basis for this proposed 
regulation? 
b) Is the introduction of wholesale open access and managed 
spectrum parks justified, why? 
c) Have ICASA and government correctly defined what they want to 
achieve? What is their goal? 
d) How is the introduction of this regulation the best form of action by 
ICASA and government, or not? 
e) What is the appropriate level (or levels) at which ICASA and 
government should take this action? 
f) Who are the affected parties, operators, consumers, regulators, 
government itself, treasury? 
g) Is the distribution of effects across society transparent, how, who 
are the beneficiaries? 
h) How will this affect your organisation? Revenue, costs, profitability, 
business model, infrastructure investment? 
i) In which ways do the anticipated benefits justify the costs 
associated with implementing the proposed spectrum assignment 
plan/regulations? 
j) Is the regulation clear, reliable, understandable? How can it be 
implemented? 
k) What are practical steps to follow to ensure compliance?  
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l) What is the alternative to the wholesale open access and how can 
that alternative be used to achieve the same government objectives 
of competition and broadband connectivity for all by 2020? 
m) What are the benefits of using this alternative licensing method and 
how much do the benefits outweigh the costs involved, please 
explain? 
Source: OECD (1995). 
Table 1. Estimating regulatory costs. 
Cost Time 
taken 
Hourly 
cost 
Frequency 
per year 
Groups 
affected 
Total cost 
      
      
      
      
Source: OECD, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
